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The subject laid out for study is the development of
men's capacity to reason in political life. Most of the
relevant literature in contemporary political science has
adopted a distinctive framework built upon the concept of
"political socialization**. This framework, however, and
even the conceptualization of political socialization, has
been influenced by a conformity perspective. This conform-
ity perspective on socialization involves a way of looking
at and talking about human development that omits any
important reference to the exercise of judgment or to the
growth of the capacity to reason. Individual social develop-
ment is the product of molding forces and pressures.
Our critique of this conformity interpretation is built
upon the idea that the basic point of the term socialization
is to pick out those social processes which lead to the
capacity to use reason in social life, to understand and
care for others in a social order. Political socialization
involves bringing people to the point of being able to
participate intelligently in a society's political practices
vi
Failure to build upon this point about the connection
between socialization and the use of reason has led to
two related developments in the political science
literature: a potentially harmful focus on conformist
behavior, and a failure to investigate the character or
conditions of the higher development of political think-
ing.
We then suggest that the further development of
political reasoning can be understood as political educa-
tion. Political education covers those processes by which
citizens develop a capacity for reflective political
thought. Politically educated citizens will be capable of
recognizing others as persons, as potentially capable of
citizenship of the highest level. Framing a critical view
of the public interest and acting on the basis of self-
accepted principles will involve promoting the equal
opportunity of all to develop their capacities as citizens.
The researches of cognitive-developmental psychologists
provide one potentially fruitful framework for the under-
standing and explanation of the successes of political
socialization and political education. But the character
of the higher achievements of political thinking must be
explored further. It is suggested here that the reflective-
ness of mature political thought be taken as a central
achievement. And the explanatory framework of the develop-
vii
mental psychologists must be revised to include a more
specifically sociological component. For the develop-
mentalists have failed to recognize the ways in which
the concepts involved in the development of socio-political
thought are imbedded in the structure of social and
political life.
Finally, we argue that political education ought to be
promoted in complex and changing modern industrial societies.
The task at hand is the exploration of those institutional
and structural transformations which will provide the condi-
tions for political education and a fully developed
citizenry.
vlil
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PART I. POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION
AND POLITICAL EDUCATION
CHAPTERI
INTRODUCTION
Freedom and Reason In Modern Society
From the first, this study should be understood as
a contribution within the tradition of critical social
theory. Mention of two characteristics of critical theory
will perhaps clarify part of this broader intent, as well
as suggest certain lines of development I have not pursued
and certain references which have been left more to tacit
understanding than explicit statement. The first character-
istic is a committment to seek new possibilities for
freedom and reason in the process of human and social
change.^ A second characteristic of critical social inquiry
is a certain reluctance to pay undue heed to rigid
disciplinary boundaries shaping much academic work today.
In this section of the Introduction I will pursue briefly
the themes of freedom and reason in modern society. In the
third section, I will return to the question of discipli-
nary boundaries and the approach of political science to
the problems pursued in this study.
A number of significant works appearing in the
post-war period have focused on the social conditions
of personal freedom, integrity, and autonomy - such
as Erich Fromm, Escape From Freedom ? T. W. Adorno,
et al. The Authoritarian Personalitv i^ Christian Bay,
2The Structure of Freedo>n; 4 ^nd Herbert Marcuse. One
Dlrnenslonal These studies have begun with the
problem
- often focused m terms of the experience of
Fascism m the West
- of how men can, apparently willingly,
give up their personal and political freedom.^ Put
another way, the problem Is how men can come to use and
recognize the value of freedom. One current of thought on
this problem, developed here, is that the capacity to
reason reflectively about the social world is crucial to
securing and expanding the dimensions of personal freedom
in the modern world.
Liberal Interpretations of Reason and Freedom . Any
serious diagnosis of modern society - its structure,
problems and internal dynamics - must at some point come
to grips with the fact of extensive bureacratizatlon
through massive organizational complexes. Such bureaucrati-
zation is often viewed in liberal thought as an increasing
"rationalization" of society. Certain assumptions about
the nature of man and his capacities have facilitated
the movement of liberal thought toward a reconciliation
of this vision of increased "rationalization" with the
values supposedly served by a market economy and a
competitive polity.
One primary value to be served by these competitive
institutional arrangements is individual freedom. And one
3important supporting assumption about the individual is
his rationality. Freedom is said to be well served when
competitive arrangements offer the individual multiple
options for action in satisfying his wants. And the test
of rationality is often taken to be the degree to which
actions taken are appropriate as means to the end
envisioned - the satisfaction of wants. These goals,
freedom and rationality, are also seen as mutually
reinforcing. Rational action is facilitated by competition
to offer suitable options for individual want satisfaction.
And individuals whose reasoning is finely honed to
instrument their wants are the foundation of progress in
a competitive society. This image of man and society has
been an immensely persuasive one in the modern western
world, shaping the interpretive frameworks of a long line
of liberal thinkers. It has also, no doubt, had some
shaping influence on the manner of development of modern
society. For example, in the logic of this interpretation
it is but a short step from the characterization of the
rational entrepreneur to the vision of the rational
organization and the bureaucratic society. Each is geared
to the efficient selection of means appropriate to its end.
Critique of Liberal Interpretations of Reason and Free
dom . There are at least two critiques of western capital-
4Ist societies which challenge the adequacy of this liberal
Interpretative frameworJc. The first, rooted in Marx's
political economy, points to the dissociation of human
needs from the goals of production when labor is exploited
in the profit system. When money is the end and the means
in the exchange process, the rational calculations of the
capitalist lead to social irrationality through economic
and political crises. The second type of critique also
finds an increasing social irrationality threatening,
rooted in an absence for individuals of important group
ties intermediary between basic social units and the huge
organizations dominating our society. This is the critique
of mass society. The absence of intermediary ties threatens
the individual with pervasive anxiety, and threatens the
society by providing fertile ground for extremist movements.
Both of these critiques hinge to some degree on a
critique of the notion of individual rationality dominant
in liberal thought. That notion is quite clearly stated
by Bertrand Russell
i
Reason has a perfectly clear and precise meaning. It
signifies the choice of the right means to an end
that you wish to achieve. It has nothing whatever to
do with the choice of ends.
7
The critique which provides the foundation for my analysis
la not a critique of reason per se . but of this rather
narrow interpretation of rationality. It is inadequate
5ultimately because It obscures and misconstrues the places
of reason and passion in the determination of action.
Before moving to a formulation of this wider notion
of rationality, let us see how it figures in a critical
understanding of modern society. C. Wright Mills finds that
men today are increasingly unable to tie their self-
conceptions, drawn from a narrow personal milieux, into a
vision of world history - the arena for the social
structural changes which affect their lives. We find
ourselves in a society increasingly "rationalized** by
bureaucratic organizations, which, however, may be "a
means of tyranny and manipulation, a means of expropriating
the very chance to reason, the very capacity to act as a
free man.**
The increasing rationalization of society, the contra-
diction between rationality and reason, the collapse
of the assumed coincidence of reason and freedom -
these developments lie back of the rise into view of
the man who is 'with* rationality but without reason,
who is increasingly self-rationalized and also
Increasingly uneasy.
8
What is it that Mills is trying to formulate by presenting
the apparent paradox of a **contradiction between rationality
and reason** or •*the man who is 'with* rationality but
without reason**? What is behind the •*collap8e of the
assumed coincidence of reason and freedom'*?
The first step in clarifying this critique is to
6note that Mills is contrasting the "formal rationality"
of bureaucratic organizations with the "substantive reason
of men whose independent reasoning would have structural
consequences for their societies, its history and for
their own life fates, "^ In modern society increasing
numbers of men are "with" the "formal rationality" of
bureaucratic and hierarchical organizations which shape
and dominate them, but without the "substantive reason"
which would allow them to shape their own lives. And it
la the former type of rationality which may stunt the
development of the latter - thus the contradiction between
rationality and reason,
H0W9 then, can we clarify further this notion of
"substantive reason" and relate it to Russell's narrower
definition of reason? The difficulties with the narrow
interpretation arise first of all when we note that any
course of action considered as a means, can from another
perspective be seen also as an end. The goal of my previous
action could have been to make this subsequent course of
action available to me as an option. And, likewise, any
end could also be considered as a means to another end.
That the deliberations of reason have nothing whatever to
do with the goals of human action, as Russell's femulation
implied. Is less plausible in this light. As John Dewey
has observed!
7Means and ends are two names for the same reality. Theterms denote not a division in reality but a distinctionin Judgment .... 'End* is a name for a series of
acts taken collectively - like the term army. •Means*
Is a name for the same series taken distributively -
like this soldier, that officer. To think of the end
signifies to extend and enlarge our view of the act
to be performed. It means to look at the next act in
perspective, not permitting it to occupy the entire
field of vision. 10
This understanding of the relativity of the means-
end distinction allows us to move toward a formulation of
the notion of reason which will be comprehensive of
Russell's definition as well as Mill's idea of "^substantive
reason". As proposed by Dewey, we can distinguish between
a •Vide and narrow use of reason** in deliberation.
The latter holds a fixed end in view and deliberates
only upon the means of reaching it. The former regards
the end in view in deliberation as tentative and
permits, nay encourages the coming into view of
consequences which will transform it and create a new
purpose and plan.H
We can see now that this distinction does not point to a
hard and fast logical feature of the concept of reason,
but brings out certain variable features contained within
the idea. An Inquiry directed toward an understanding of
this distinction will not be purely conceptual clarification^
nor purely empirical research. It will pose a question of
the following typei What is there for us to mean by this
understanding of the variable features of the notion of
reason? Such an inquiry is suggested by some of the
8important threads of analysis pursued in this study, it
is proposed that the distinction, the variation between
narrow and wide uses of reason, be understood develop-
mentally) that the distinction be filled out by attention
to the research of developmental psychologists. Along this
line, we propose, in Part II, that the distinction be
framed as a difference between "instrumental rationality**
(or the cognitive
-developmental psychologists* operational
thought) and 'reflective rationality** (or formal thought).
This will be our interpretation of how men could be **with**
(instrumental) rationality in a bureaucratic ethos, but
without (reflective) '•substantive reason**.
And our interpretation of the **collapse of the
assumed coincidence of reason and freedom** sensed by Mills
is more clearly set now, A characteristic liberal
interpretation of freedom would be that one is free to
the extent that he is not prevented from doing what he
wants. The critique of this formulation often hinges on
the superficial understanding of the relation between
wants and persons embodied in the restrictive or narrow
notion of reason. Mills, in his critique, clearly draws
on his broader idea of '*substantive reason**.
Freedom is not merely the chance to do as one pleases;
neither is it merely the opportunity to choose
between set alternatives. Freedom is, first of all,
the chance to formulate the available choices, to
argue over them - and then, the opportunity to
9choose. That is why freedom cannot exist without an
enlarged role of reason in human affairs. Within anindividual's biography and within a society's history,the social task of reason is to formulate choices, to
enlarge the scope of human decisions in the makina ofhistory, 12 ^
Reason is essential to the expansion of personal freedom
because wants, or the ends of action, are in a sense
shaped in the process of reflecting on different ways of
viewing the alternatives. Obstacles to the development of
the capacity for reflective reasoning are also, then,
constraints on individual freedom.
Human Capacities and Social Practices
This Introductory section should have conveyed to
the reader at this point my dominant concern with the
conditions for the development of reflective reason. How
can we more adequately study the growth of reason as a
central component of personal autonomy and human freedom?
But this is, in a sense, only half of this study. The
whole of Part I is devoted to a clarification of the study
of ••socialization" and ••education". What, one might ask,
is the connection?
The matter is quite complex, and the bulk of my
thinking on this is spread through a number of passages in
this study. What I would like to do here is to present a
capsule of the argument. We can begin by noting that in
Mills' statement of the relation between "substantive
10
reason- and "freedom" (pp. 8-9), he speaks of "the social
task s of reason". The tasks he is referring to are
related to the involvement of the individual in the
shaping of his world, the reflective participation in
activities by which he can have an impact on the course
of social change and thus on the course of his own life.
Thus the "social task of reason" is a task relative to an
achievement; and the achievement is the development of
social projects by which the individual can connect his
personal life to public issues of social structure. The
exploration of this web of connections is, I would argue,
one side of an adequate social psychology. The question is,
how are the capacities developed in the course of social
life related to the maintenance or transformation of
social practices. The other side of social-psychological
inquiry revolves around the q[uestion of how the varieties
of prevailing social practices relate to the development
of these human capacities. Before I tie these notions to
"socialization" and "education", let me briefly clarify
the ideas of "human capacities" and "social practices".
Questions about human nature I take to be questions
about the character of human capacities. And questions
about social structure I take to be questions about social
practices. At the root of this terminology is a distinction
between the manner in which the human organism is capable
of performing, and the specific dimensions of the
11
performance. This distinction is analogous to that
between talent in dancing and doing a Jig or the tango.
Talent can be expressed in the skilled performance of any
number of specific types of dance. But one with little
talent can still dance. In the same way, there are certain
human capacities which lie behind the specific practices
embodied in a social structure,
A crucial capacity of this sort is the capacity for
rational or intelligent action. At a basic level, this is
the capacity ot organize one's purposes in a coherent way.
With the acquisition of language, children are able to
symbolically represent their goals. And with a higher
development of reason, we can become capable of reflecting
upon a variety of ways of formulating our goals and
conceiving possible activities as related to these goals.
Now how do these ideas figure in the study of
"socialization'* and •education"? The study presented here
pursues the second side of social-psychological inquiry,
the question of how social practices relate to the
development of man^s rational capacities. It is not an
empirical study, but an essay in clarification, I propose
and attempt to clarify one approach to this problem.
Toward this end. Part I deals with the study of "sociali-
zation" and "education" in contemporary social science.
These two concepts, it is argued, capture the achievement
12
Of certain levels of social reasoning. Understanding the
concepts this way clarifies what it is that social practices
promote in the course of human development. Social
practices are thus conceived of critically, as potentially
related to the tasks necessary for the achievement of
socialization and education.
Part II continues the clarification of how social
practices relate to the development of man's rational
capacities. It is proposed that the study of individual
mental growth by the cognitive-developmental approach
helps us to understand what there is for us to mean by
Dewey's distinction between narrow and wide uses of
reason in deliberation. However, a thorough assessment
of the major works by cognitive-developmental psychologists
will show, it is suggested, that they have virtually
ignored the other half of the problem of social psychology.
They have failed to pursue their studies with an adequate
theory of social structure. Such a theory would allow
them to see how levels of mental development are implicated
In the social structure - for example. Mills* idea of a
bureaucratic ethos in which men are "'with* rationality
but without reason".
This failure is reflected, I argue, in an inadequate
theory to explain mental development. "Participation",
for example, is mentioned by one prominent developmental
13
psychologist (and by social theorists in the critical
tradition as well) as a general factor which promotes
mental development. But "participation" is far too
general a notion to explain specific levels of mental
development. Participation in a culture which views
dreams as the arrival of spirits will not help a child
see dreams as mental phenomena. Nor will participation in
planning his organization's Christmas party help the
bureaucrat develop the capacity to connect his personal
troubles to public issues, to recognize what policies
are in his interest, and thus to understand how he can
affect his own life. What is needed, I suggest, is an
understanding of the specific social practices which will
promote mental development, or the development of rational
social and political thought. The categories for the
formulation of such an explanatory theory will be drawn
from a critical theory of social structure. And the
framework for such a study is provided by the concepts of
socialization and education.
Political Science and Human Development
The second characteristic of critical social inquiry
which I mentioned as throwing light on the approach of
this study was a committment not to allow too much to be
written into the disciplinary boundaries sanctioned by
contemporary university life. Insofar as these boundaries
14
sanctify presumptions about the institutional autonomy
of the economic or political or social spheres of life,
they are rejected. And while there can be a genuine
division of interests among students of social life, the
critical social theorist recognizes the necessity of
drawing together the most fruitful insights in all fields.
My concern here will be with the problem of the bearing
and fruitfulness of studies of individual mental
development as part of a theory of the development of
political thinking.
In particular, this study grew out of a dissatisfaction
with the way the problem of human development has been
handled in political science, under the general rubric
of **political socialization". Most common among these
studies are those which survey specific attitudes and
beliefs of children about surface features of contemporary
political life. When attention is moved from surface
opinion to basic features of political thought, the
approach is usually to simply tie an opinion to the
basic function it serves within the individual psyche.
And when more basic features of political life enter into
the questioning, the focus is generally on simple
measures of approval or disapproval of the government.
What we fail to find, for the most part, is a critical
vision of the conditions, the socio-political practices.
15
which promote the development of citizens' capacities for
reasoned and reflective political thought.
About the notion of
-political thought" to be
developed here, I would argue that our vision of politics
surely ought to extend beyond purely governmental
decisions. Politics includes other institutional and
structural features of society involved in shaping the
lives of broad segments of the population. And when
referring to political practices as prom.oting or hindering
citizen development, I will likewise be drawing on a
rather broad notion of politics.
Decisions taken by modern governments do not merely
provide a framework for the operation of autonomous social
forces. Nor are they best viewed as merely regulating or
refining interactions among semi
-autonomous economic,
political and social spheres. Instead, we view the sphere
of potential government decision as a crucial element in
the process of creating an institutional life responsive
to (and responsible for) all citizens. And a prime concern
in the development of an institutional life responsive to
human needs and respectful of human rights ought to be
the development of a citizenry capable of taking responsi-
bility and acting responsibly in political life, Urie
Bronfenbrenner, in his study of child rearing in the U. S.
and the U. S. S. R. , has formulated this criterion as "the
16
concern of one generation for the next."
How can we judge the worth of a society? ... If the
children and youth of a nation are afforded opportunity
to develop their capacities to the fullest, if they
are given the knowledge to understand the world and
the wisdom to change it, then the prospects for the
future are bright. In contrast, a society which
neglects its children, however well it may function
in other respects, risks evetual disorganization and
demise. 13
I begin with the thesis that most academic students
of the political aspects of human development have failed
to come to grips with an essential questiont what sorts of
social and political practices will be adequate to the
task of providing the conditions which promote responsible
citizenship - citizenship based upon a reflective under-
standing of the nexus of personal life and social history?
My argument will be that a failure to adequately
conceptualize the process of human development and
characterize its outcomes is at the root of this situation.
The development of hypotheses geared to this question may
be fruitfully pursued, I contend, by treating conceptual
development as an essential aspect of human development.
Conceptual development is viewed as a process of developing
a progressively more complex and integrated framework of
concepts for interpreting and acting in the world. I want
to focus on the development of those conceptual capacities
necessary to grasp and act responsibly toward the most
17
complex and most fundamental features of political life.
Thus, my work is about concepts t about the under-
standing of human development as conceptual development;
and about the theoretical concepts used to comprehend this
process of human development. I take the latter problem
first, and present a discussion and critique of "political
socialization'* as a concept for organizing such inquiry,
and a clarification of "socialization" and "education" as
guides to our concerns with human development. Then, in
Part II, I focus on one approach to human development,
the cognitive-developmental theory, which does view the
process in such a way as to highlight the emergence and
importance of concepts as tools of understanding.
CHAPTER II
"POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION" IN CONTEMPORARY
POLITICAL SCIENCE
Terminological and Conceptual Discontinuities
In the decade or so since the term was first
introduced, the study of "political socialization** has
become a major subfield within the discipline of political
science. 14 No other field of political inquiry has expanded
8o rapidly, at least in terms of the number of political
slcentists identifying it as a major interest. 15 But this
growth, in interest and in the number of studies published
as contributions to our understanding of "political
socialization", has not been an even growth. It has been
accompanied by its own methodological difficulties,
first of all. But even as major works are appearing which
tackle these methodological difficulties, the importance
of disputes centering around the concept of "political
socialization" Itself are increasingly being recognized.
As David Easton and Jack Dennis note, "there are many
ways of describing the processes to which the word
socialization is presumed to refer, and each description
helps to predetermine the kinds of data examined, the
modes of analysis applied to them, and even their final
interpretation. "1*7
If we were to attempt to characterize the actual
19
intellectual currents in the field or subdiscipline of
political science called "political socialization", it
could not be done in neat phrases like "contrasting
approaches** or "contending camps" or even "coherent
debates". While significant empirical work has been done
and continues to appear in scholarly journals, the
actual intellectual state of the field is terminological
chaos and conceptual confusion, I intend to offer a
remedy. But I would like to first sketch briefly some
of the dimensions of the problem of terminological
discontinuity.
Almost invariably, an introduction to the study of
political socialization covers two points. First, we are
reminded that the study of the political aspects of
human learning and development has a respectable history,
ranging from the works of Plato and Aristotle, through
Rousseau and DeToqueville, to the researches of Charles
Merriam and his associates, These studies are generally
said to deal with "civic education", or "citizenship
education** or •*political education". And second, the
roots of the modern behavioralist approach are exposed by
mention of the first studies developing the terminology
of ••political socialization",
••Civic education" studies have fallen on hard times.
The ••behavioral movement" in political science has brought
an increasing absorption in quantitative empirical
20
methodology, approaching at times a new ••methodise". 19
As Richard Dawson grants in his survey of political
socialization literature, "The contemporary rigor,
systemization, and method through which questions about
political socialization are posed and researched
involve new techniques and constitute a new conceptuali-
zation. "20 These new conceptualizations of the political
learning process are built upon the attempt to expunge
all value implications from the theoretical notions used
to guide political research. "Civic education" was
apparently viewed as too much laden with the values and
normative concerns of earlier theorists.
Another factor in the disrepute of "political
education" studies is related to a connotation of
intentional instruction or indoctrination which the term
has acquired for some. Michael Oakeshott's attempt to
rescue the term is prefaced by the following comment!
The expression "political education" has fallen on
evil days; in the willful and disingenuous corruption
of language which is characteristic of our time it
has acquired a sinister meaning. In places other than
this it is associated with softening of the mind, by
force, by alarm, or by the hypnotism of the endless
repetition of what was scarcely worth saying once, by
means of which whole populations have been reduced to
submission, 21
Behavioral political scientists have retained a range of
referents for the term "political socialization" broader
21
than the notion of Intentional, organized instruction.
Fred Greenstein makes this contrast between narrow and
broad meanings of political socialization*
Narrowly conceived, political socialization is thf>deliberate inculcation of political information,
values, and practices by instructional agents whohave been formally charged with this responsibility.
A broader conception would encompass all political
learning, formal and informal, deliberate and
unplanned, at every stage of the life cycle, including
not only explicitly political learning but also
nominally nonpolitical learning that affects political
behavior
. . ,
.22
All of this would seem to indicate a fairly consistent and
open terminological and conceptual shift within the
discipline of political science, from the traditional-
normative study of "political education", to the
behavioralist study of "political socialization". The
term "political socialization", and by implication the
corresponding shift in conceptual concerns, is connected,
then, with the emergence in the 1960 's of a field of
specialization "coequal with such venerable subdivisions
as Constitutional Law and International Politics. "23
But even as the boundaries of the field are being
secured, the need is felt to locate and elevate its
intellectual progenitors. This is the second typical part
of an introduction to the study of "political socialization",
Herbert Hyman's book. Political Socialization , is nearly
22
always acclaimed. The introductory passage in an article
by Greensteln is not atypical.
"Political Socialization" is a growth stock. Thephrase seems never to have appeared in print before1954, at which time it was introduced more or lessin passing in the chapter on voting in the first
edition of The Handbook of Social Psvcholnqy
. Thisterminology was still exotic in 1959, when a book byHerbert Hyman entitled Political Socializatinn was
published: as the book made clear, by that date not
a single piece of research had been self-consciously
carried out under the 'political socialization*
rubric, even though many research findings relevant to
the topic could be extracted from the often quite
fugitive literature on the development of children's
social orientations. 24
While Hyman 's book came out in 1959, it is rarely
noted that in 1957 David Easton conceptualized the
process of political learning as "politicization**.
As each person grows up in a society, through a
network of rewards and punishments the other members
of society communicate to and instill in him the
various institutionalized goals and norms of that
society. This is well known in social research as the
process of socialization. Through its operation a
person learns to play his various social roles. Part
of these goals and norms relate to what the society
considers desirable in political life. The ways in
which these political patterns are learned by the
members of society constitute what I call the process
of politicization . Through it a person learns to play
his political roles, which include the absorption of
the proper political attitudes. 25
This is merely a terminological difference, to be sure.
For in his cooperative research with Robert Hess, Easton
adopts the term "political socialization" to cover the
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same View of the political aspects of learning and develop-
ment. 26 The conceptual content being unaltered, the shift
In terminology might have been influenced by the growing
currency of "political socialization", or by the divergence
m this conceptualization from previous attempts to attach
a meaning to the term "politicization". The following
definition of "politicization" is offered, for example,
by Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan in their widely
known work. Power and Society .
Conduct is politicized in the dearee that it isdetermined by consideration of power indulaence ordeprivation of the self by the other, 27
Here politicization would be the transforming of social
relations into power relations, rather than, as Easton
viewed it, the inculcation of the dominant political norms
and values. Lasswell and Kaplan draw on the notion of
power motivated activity. Easton* s most recent book, on
the other hand, reinstates the term "politicization"
within the conceptual framework of "political socialization"
and gives it the sense of becoming politically aware .
Children in the political System , by Easton and Jack
Dennis, identifies four major processes involved in early
political socialization, one of which is termed 'politici-
zation*. Here, a child who is thoroughly politicized "has
become aware of the presence of an authority outside of
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and more powerful than the family. "28
Easton's shift from the term •politicization' to
•political socialization* as a generic category should
cause no discomfort to those who wish to move quickly to
Identifying empirical gaps in the literature, or to
bringing data to bear on divergent hypotheses generated
by theoretical reflection on a process whose main
dimensions have been agreed upon. Any number of studies
could be cited which note a fairly wide range of definitions
of political socialization, and then select one "for present
purposes" in order to get on with the business at hand.
But Easton's terminological shift to the mainstream
in the early 1960 's culminated in 1969 with a general
critique of all previous conceptualization of political
socialization. This explicit departure is made because
earlier definitions "typically refer to phenomena that we
consider too variable to include with confidence in the
basic description of political socialization. "29
Consider now the further discomfort which might be
felt, by one attempting to gain acquaintance with the
dominant debates and camps in the field, when it is
discovered that Easton's former collaborator, Robert Hess,
now rejects not only the term but also the concept of
political socialization itself.
25
The concept of political socialization is no Inn^^r-adequate as a tool for understanding the pS?itlcal
^S^^^^^S^ S5 studying the^rocessesthrough which it is acquired. 30 ^ proces
It is also noteworthy that the term "political
education" and "civic education" have not in fact been
dropped from the vocabularies of "political socialization"
researchers, despite any possible "sinister meaning", value
connotations or empirical imprecision which might be
adduced. Fred Greensteln uses the term freely, and
apparently often Interchangeably with •political
socialization* .31 a survey of literature by Richard
Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt, on the other hand, identifies
•political education* as a sub-type of political sociali-
zation. It is, for them distinguished first of all as a
transmission of specifically political orientations, and
secondly as an intentional or deliberate process, ^2
Others, such as Robert Pranger and Christian Bay,
have made contributions to distincruishlnCT the spheres of
political education and political socialization processes.
They have not considered them as alternative terms to
cover a single process of political learning and develop-
ment. They are seen rather as the names of alternative
and competing processes or modes of communication within
a political culture,
It appears that the terminological and conceptual
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variations may reflect an incipient intellectual chaos.
Closer to the truth may be the observation that social
conflict has produced deeper questions and deeper
divisions among those reflecting on human nature and
society. Robert Hess suggests such a process in relating
that when he adopted the term political socialization for
research in the late 1950 's.
One feature of the political life of pre-adults was
a general lack of fervor and conflict over politicalIssues and problems .... in that tranquil atmosphere,the concept of political socialization seemed singular-ly apt. Since then, the political life of the youth ofthis country has changed in dramatic ways. 34
Most of the authors I have cited recognize that
their choice of terms is not arbitrary. We cannot divorce
ourselves entirely from considerations of the historical
acretions of meaning which become attached to our terms.
Nor can we ignore the current vocabularies of the social
slcences. Intellectual progress, even sanity, weigh
against each choosing a technical and idiosyncratic
meaning for his terms. But few have recognized and
confronted the deep-rooted assumptions about man and
society which influence the choice of conceptual content
in the process of explication.
From this brief survey we can at least conclude
that some order must be brought to this area of study if
communication between competing views is to be possible.
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Two Views of An Emerging Debate
Some of the difficulties in explicating the concept
of •'political socialization" can be attributed to factors
such as the very rapidity of growth of interest in the
topic, or the time lag between the borrowing of a concept
and an understanding of the various disciplinary and
theoretical contexts from which it was torn in the process
of importation. These could be seen as temporary problems
to be worked out with increasing interdisciplinary
sophistication and expanded research. This view is
summarised by Fred Greenstein:
Conditions of rapid growth are bound to generate a
aSuf confusion .... The confusionbo t political socialization begins with the vervmeaning of the phrase? there seem to be at leastfour prevailing usages, and some of the contestation
on the general merits of political socializationinquiry appears to be of the blind-men-and-the-
""ff^!!^' ^^^^ debating parties disagreeingon the implicit referents of their terms rather than
on empirical grounds. 38
On Greenstein 's usage, which is common among "political
socialization" theorists, "political education" is taken
as an alternative term to cover the same phenomena. The
debate is thus terminological and the real issues largely
"empirical".
The "elephant" story aside, Greenstein might be
saying that our concepts are "open" in the sense that
there is a range of possible empirical research necessary
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prior to a full characterization of the phenomenon in
question. It is here, he admonishes, that disagreements
should focus. But while it is true that our concepts are
open in this sense, they are also "open textured" in the
sense that they are imbedded in a larger system of tacit
rules and meanings. 39 jt is this larger system of meanings
that we refer to as a theoretical perspective or framework.
If a theoretical or conceptual framework is taken as a
given, as unquestioned, then, the fruitfulness of a
concept is indeed wholly an empirical matter. A different
perspective emerges, however, when we focus on the
theoretical framework itself,
Greenstein's "blind
-men-and-the-elephant" analogy
is a singularly Inappropriate one for his purposes. He
wants to argue that the current disputes over the fruit-
fulness of different explications of "political sociali-
zation" amount to nothing more than a definitional quibble.
Explanatory fruitfulness can only be determined by hard
empirical research, he admonishes us. What he fails to
note is that the blind men are engaged in a quibble about
how to describe an "elephant", not how to explain it.
The story does illustrate an important point i that
phenomena can in principle be classified in an indefinite
number of ways. But imagine now that the fourth blind
man took Greenstein's advice and moved immediately to
30
empirical research, in order to explain how this tree-ltk.
creature moves. (The fourth blind man is touching the
elephant's leg.) Certainly we can see that his initial
characterization has involved empirical assumptions which
render his task ludicrous. He will not, for example,
investigate "slithering" mechanisms, nor will he have any
Inclination to give an account in terms of "walking"; for
"tree-like" is equivalent to "one-legged".
What we can draw from this fable is the lesson that
phenomena can be classified in an indefinite number of
ways. Concepts, embedded as they are in theoretical
frameworks, involve one in a particular characterization
of the phenomenon in question, thus closing off an
indefinite number of descriptive possibilities. And this
partial closure of our concepts involves the importation
of empirical assumptions into explanatory research.
While in Greenstein's view, "political socialization"
and "political education" are alternative terms to cover
the same phenomenon. Christian Bay applies the terms to
what he sees as crucially different phenomena. Elaborating
on a distinction made by Robert Pranger,'*^ Bay views
"political socialization" studies as capturing "the ways
in which established political norms are implanted on
nonsuspecting youngsters, who by and large become molded
toward accepting what exists, rather than educated
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on
toward questioning and judging the present and seeking
better ways for the future. "41 "Political education",
the other hand, is directed toward "equipping us to seek
and promote the best political order. "42 According to
Pranger's formulation, the aim of "political education" is
to produce "the free man armed with enough political
sophistication to participate in politics as a person
with the capacity for independent Judgment, despite the
pressures from political socialization, "43
As I have said, we want to find a way of under-
standing these terminological and conceptual divergences
which will bring some clarity to this area of inquiry.
A good part of this task of clarification is philosophical.
But the possible contributions of philosophy to the debate
are almost totally unexplored, and the few contributions
which have been made are largely ignored in the political
science literature. When Richard Peters was preparing an
analysis of the concept of education in 1963, he was
"unable to unearth any previous attempt to demarcate
the concept of 'education* . "44 And there is, to my
knowledge, no explicitly philosophical clarification of
the concept of socialization, and only a small number
which pay any serious notice to the complexities of the
concept, 45 The terrain is thus largely unexplored, and
I offer my conrments with some hesitancy. They can be
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Judged fruitful, I beueve, if they aid in the two
.ain
tasks I have set for this wor)c: first, a critique of the
currently accepted concept of political socialization; and
secondly, an attempt to assess one possible approach to
the study of political education.
The kernel of my thesis about "socialization" and
''education" can be introduced in two parts. First, the
use given to a wide range of concepts, including "sociali-
zation" and "education", is governed to a large extent by
complex webs of normative committments which I will refer
to as a •^conformity perspective" and a "developmental
perspective". 46 Alternative readings of these two terms,
•socialization" and "education", are shaped by the
committments involved in these two perspectives. In the
next section of this chapter we will lay out briefly the
crucial tenets of the "conformity" and "developmental"
perspectives. In the following chapters I will show how
certain uses of "socialization" and "education" are
related to these perspectives. I will argue that since
the conformity perspective closes off important empirical
questions, it may have undesirable results for political
inquiry and for political life.
The second part of my thesis about "socialization"
and "education" is an attempt to clarify a more prominent
feature of the debate, the question of "aims". I will be
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arguing first that the normative component of each concept
13 bound up in the different level of human development
It picks out. In order to clarify this dimension of these
concepts we turn in Part II to an assessment of "cognitive-
developmental psychology. The criteria which different
processes and activities must meet, if they are to
contribute to "socialization" or "education" are tied to
the achievement of different levels of rationality in the
course of mental development.
We will turn now first to the perspectives which I
have labelled "conformity" and "developmental", and then
in the next three chapters to a clarification of the
concepts of "socialization" and "education".
The Conformity Perspective and the
Developmental Perspective
We have looked at some terminological and conceptual
discontinuities which have plagued the political science
literature on learning and development. There has been.
In general, a failure to probe into the sources of these
surface differences. Just as the clash and clang of issue
conflict in the governmental arena may divert attention
from submerged issues, so also in the Intellectual arena
some of the most significant incipient challenges to
prevalent conceptions of political socialization may be
lost in the heat of contest over minor points. The debates
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Within the political socialization literature generally
range only through matters of research strategy and
methodology, and fail to touch on fundamental assumptions
and perspectives. Fred Greenstein, as we have seen, takes
up the criticism that political socialization studies
operate with a pervasive conservative bias and dismisses
it quickly as either a simple misunderstanding or a
definitional quibble. 47 But if definitional differences
have important ramifications, we cannot dismiss them
as trivial.
Every discussion of politics carries with it a
conception of human nature - a psychology and a philosophy
of man. This is true regardless of the priority one gives
to the understanding of whole political systems as an aim
or focus of study. As Robert Lane has noted.
Classical political theorists relied, implicitly or
overtly, on assumptions regarding the plasticity,
socialibility, fearfulness, ambition, conscience of
mankind. Sophisticated modern political theorists,
more conscious of the many dimensions of human nature,
may turn to the theories of contemporary psychology
and psychiatry to inform their doctrines and make
their conceptions more plausible, 48
This, surely, must be a recognized premise of any empirical
study of political socialization or political education.
But in choosing a particular psychological theory, we may
close off certain questions and possibilities relating to
human capacities and abilities. Political scientists who
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remain aware of this, without denying the need for
empirical research, would do well to consider the warning
announced by Slgmund Koch,
That modern psychology has projected an Imaae of manwhich Is as demeaning as It Is slmpllsltc, few Intel-ligent and sensitive non-psychologists would deny.To such men - whether they be scientist, humanist or
citizen - psychology has Increasingly become an
object of derision ..... But for the rest, the massdehumanlzation process which characterizes our time -the attenuation of the capacity for experience -
continues apace. Of all fields in the community of
scholarship, it should be psychology which combats
this trend. Instead, we have played no small role in
augmenting and supporting it, 49
Psychologists and philosophers have engaged in reflection
on their perspectives on human nature, but political
scientists have not often drawn on this type of thought
in assessing the psychological dimensions of their
research, without endorsing his precise assessment, we can
cite Carl Rogers* attempt to come to grips with this di-
mension of research.
Each current psychology has its own implicit philosophy
of man. Though not often stated explicitly, these
philosophies exert their influence in many significant
and subtle ways. For the behaviorist, man is a machine,
a complicated but nonetheless understandable machine,
which we can learn to manipulate with greater and
greater skill until he thinks the thoughts, moves in
the directions, and behaves in the ways selected for
him. For the Freudian, man is an irrational being.
Irrevocably in the grip of his past and of the product
of that past, his unconscious.
It is not necessary to deny that there is truth
in each of these formulations in order to recognize
that there is another perspective. From the existential
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internal frame of reference, man does not simolv h;,v*»the characteristics of a machine, he is not s^iniv
T
being in the grip of unconscious motives^he is aperson in the process of creating himself, a pirsonwho creates meaning in life, a person who embodies adimension of subjective freedom
. ... He ITlhll Llive dimensions of his life which are iot fully or
itT^l l^':'^''''^^''^^ ^ description of his condition-ng or of his unconscious. 50 «j.^i
The last sentence in this passage is important. The claim
is made that certain explanatory theories in psychology
close off descriptive possibilities, and that these
descriptive possibilities may be linked to the perspective
on man which underlies and merges into empirical research.
Failure to recognize this possibility of closing off
descriptive avenues and thus possibilities for empirical
research has contributed to the confusion about the concepts
of socialization and education as frameworks for research.
The perspective on human learning and development
which prevails in the "political socialization" literature
will be called the "conformity perspective". And the
perspective built up by competing views which advocate the
study of "political education" will be called the
"developmental perspective". These perspectives can be
characterized in terms of a broad set of ideas which
influence the selection of research problems, the
selection of theoretical frameworks from the psychological
and sociological sciences, the analogies and metaphors
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selected in making interpretations of research plausible
to the research community, and the view taken of the
consequences of research for social and political life.
The Conformity and Developmental perspectives are in one
sense Ideal tyeps. No single author explicitly and
consistently adheres to all the positions on major
questions relating to learning and development. But the
issues and positions do constitute a fairly coherent set
of clues as to an author's image of man.
Each of these perspectives involves, first of all,
a broad view of how man does and can relate to his world
and how fullfilment, realization or personal meaning is
achieved in the course of his life. A general view of
the alternatives is laid out by Silvan Tompkins,
Is man the measure, an end in himself, an active,
creative, thinking, desiring, loging force in nature?
Or must man realize himself, attain his full stature,
conformity to, a norm, a measure, an ideal essence
basically independent of man?51
Tompkins traces the ideas which "resonate" with these two
positions in mathematics, the philosophy of science,
metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, art, educational theory,
psychology, etc. In the psychological and sociological
literature on learning and development, this issue is
frecjuently interpreted as dealing with assumptions about
the source of "initiative** in these processes. But it is
important to note that there are clearly different views
38
about the nature and criteria of human fulfillment.
Assumptions are made about what is and is not worthwhile
m the products of learning and development. But in actual
research, these assumptions are not always made explicit.
The conformity perspective, as we shall see, suffers from
an "Ostrich complex", denying, when challenged, that any
normative committment preceeds or is supported by its
empirical presumptions. Both the conformity and the
developmental perspectives grant that we must postulate
certain human capacities which are required if there is
to be any social life at all. Where they differ is in
how we are to characterize these capacities.
^- The Conformity Perspective . Finding the measura
and fulfillment of men given outside of, and beyond them,
the conformity perspective sees man as a passive recipient
of those beliefs, values, etc. in terms of which we specify
his behavior. The capacities given in the character of
human existence are displayed in the molding of man by
social stimuli and his adaptability in the face of
social demands connected with the stability, continuity
and survival of the group. Man, in other words, is the
passive recipient of societal norms and values connected
with these goals? and these norms and values are
impressed by its agents on his mind or geared into his
behavior patterns. Human capacities are specified in terms
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of a metaphor of malleability or plasticity. And this
often amounts to the view that man's uniqueness lies in
Ms capacity to be trained or conditioned to fit into
existing societal patterns.
In taking conditioning or training as paradigm cases
of learning, conformity theorists typically adopt
explanatory notions which can be assimilated metaphorically
to the ideas of collision and manipulation. At the explana-
tory level, these theorists often involve themselves in
a language of material force and mechanistically conceived
causal laws. Agency or assertiveness is attributed to the
-other", not to a "self", in the explanation of human
behavior, agency moves to the fringes of attention. The
whole landscape becomes a collection of passive, plastic
objects, or at least it is the "other" who becomes the
source of assertion and decision. As the environment
impacts upon the organism, its malleability is indicated
by the emergence of responses which correlate with (are
a function of, reducible to, conform to, caused by, etc.)
the initial stimuli. If there are purposes gleaned in his
pattern of conduct, they are not in any irreducible sense
Ms purposes, the purposes of an agent and definitive of
his capacities; for mind is seen as a more or less direct
reflection of environmental agency.
The man who emerges from these learning processes
40
CGS
is seen as a direct reflection of social forces, past and
present. His actions appear to be calculable as an
equilibrium point among vectors of differing direction
and intensity. Social groups and organizations provide us
with the social cues, expectations and pressures that
l«bue a pattern of life with coherence. And social practi
involve actions which we are led to view «as if they were
our own.
^* The Developmental Perspective
. The conformity
perspective as we have seen, takes the capacities of man
to be unchangingly specified in the minimal requisites
for social functioning. While the content of what is
learned may change, the manner of coming to grips with
the social world (i.e., conformity) is set in an image
of unchanging human nature. The developmental perspective,
however, views man's nature in terms of the progressive
development of his capacities, or qualitative changes in
his mode of acting in the world. And it is in the frame-
work of these changing capacities that man seeks his
fulfillment. In loving and hating, creating and trans-
forming, risking and protecting, appreciating and resenting,
in all these activities man defines and, as he develops
his capacities, redefines the dimensions of his human
fulfillment.
The developmental perspective thus offers a
characterization of man in terms of capacities which can
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be developed. These hu-nan capacities may be understood
outside the context of any contribution to social function-
ing. The development of human capacities may contribute
to social stability, or social transformation, or they
may not contribute at all to the structural properties or
functional capacities of the social system. Instead of
seeing man as the passive target of environmental impress,
this perspective sees man as actively structuring the
perception and knowledge of his world. And his activity
is essential in the development of qualitatively new
modes of acting, new capacities. This is not by any means
a postulate which involves denying the influence of the
social environment on human learning and development.
It is rather a claim that exchanges between human beings
and the social world are interactive exchanges.
Human capacities, human ways of performing, are
captured by notions which relate together the specific
beliefs etc. of an agent . one who chooses, decides,
intends - one who in other words is the source of an
assertive point of view. One of these ways of characteriz-
ing human capacities from a developmental point of view is
in terms of rationality, and it is this capacity which
will be of particular concern in this paper. Viewing man
in terms of the development of essential capacities does
not involve the claim that men can ever become totally
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self-conscious or able to reflect critically on all
aspects of their situation at one time. But the development
of one's capacity for reflective reason can enhance the
ability to step back from a situation with apparently
"given- alternatives and reconsider the alternatives in
light of values which transcend the practices structuring
the situation. Habits of mind and established practices
become less entrenched. And the emergence of new
perspectives and possibilities need not bring one to the
brink of confusion and panic, but can provide challenges
to the most human and humane activities.
CHAPTER III
THE CONCEPT OF SOCIALIZATION IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL SCIENCE
Origins of the Concept of Socialization
Only a small amount of attention has been given in
the last decade or so to the definition of the term
"socialization". A full understanding of the intelletucal
history of the term is beyond the scope of this section.
It would involve a treatment of the practical and
theoretical concerns of many thinkers through the centuries
who have written of the process under a different label;
a consideration of the social, political and intellectual
climate in which the term first acquired conceptual
significance I and an exceptional cross-disciplinary
competence, sufficient to grasp the core concerns of
sociology, psychology, and anthropology in the process,
We will look here first at the origin of the term,
and then at the meaning it had for the scholars who first
attributed to it a broad theoretical importance. What
questions did they ask? What issues led them to focus on
and fill out a conception of socialization? Theory is
developed in response to questions we ask about reality.
And, as Dennis Wrong reminds us, "Forgetfulness of the
questions that are the starting point of inquiry leads us
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to Ignore the substantive assumptions 'buried* in our
concepts and cotnmits us to a one-sided view of reality. "54
The term "socialization", like most others developed
as concepts for the social sciences, was used in ordinary
discourse long before being appropriated as theoretically
significant by sociologists and psychologists. There seem
to have been three important early usages. 55 pij-st of all,
the term was used as a political-economic concept - in the
sense of subjecting to collective (or governmental)
ownership or control, as when socializing the economy
refers to establishing collective ownership of the means
of production. According to the Oxford English Dictionary ,
"to socialize** can mean ''to establish or develop according
to the theories or principles of socialism.** In a second
usage, socialization captured the idea of a universalizing
of culture, overcoming differences, or creating moral and
political unity among all men, A third use of •*socialize**,
noted by the OED as early as 1828, gave it the sense of
•*to render social, to make fit for living in society**.
The first two types of uses noted above were both
present in the literature of the social sciences through
the first decades of this century. In the edition of the
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences oublished in 1938,
the article on •*Socialization** dealt with the first type
of use, as a concept of political economy. In 1921,
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Robert E. Park and Ernest W, Burgess wrote that
-Soclali.
zation, when that word is used as a term of appreciation
rather than description, sets up as the goal of social
effort a world in which conflict, competition and the
externality of Individuals, if they do not disappear
altogether, will be diminished that all men may live
together as members of one family, "56 2^935 ^^^^
seemed to be drawing on both the political-economic and
socio-cultural uses when he wrote of the progressive
socialization of the world, that is, the incorporation of
all the peoples of the earth in a world-wide economy,
which had laid the foundations for the rising world-wide
political and moral order. "57 Both of these uses of the
term involve developmental notions, i.e. they point to
standards or conditions which may or may not be achieved,
A task is indicated, and this is related internally to
an achievement which serves as the fundamental criteria of
the associated processes.
Socialization and Conformity! An Exposition
In turning to the thrid, early lexical, definition
of socialization, "to render social, to make fit for
living in society," we must note first a crucial ambiguity
which appears in refining this definition. Unless one
carefully attends to the distinctions we find in the
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ordinary uses related to this definition, it is not clear
Whether the important reference is to the beliefs etc.
which are necessary if there is to be any society or
social life at all, or to the beliefs etc. which are
required of a child by "the special milieu for which he
is specifically destined. -58 it is my thesis that the
most fruitful explication will root itself firmly in
reflection on the core idea of what is necessary for there
to be any social life, or what is presumed by the notion
of man as a social animal. Indeed, John Clausen notes
that the first sociological usage of the term "appears to
have derived from the concern of early sociologists with
the problem of how society is possible. "59 socialization
is an apt term for organizing reflection on this question,
for in its central uses it captures a ground-level vision
of human rationality. That is, the most important achieve-
ment picked out is the achievement of a basic ability to
reason, through language, in achieving a coherent organi-
zation of purposes.
But with the growth of a "scientific sociology"
modeled on the natural sciences, the central implication
of socialization has become "that the individual is
induced in some measure to conform willingly to the ways
of his society or of the particular group to which he
belongs. "60 in other words, where the definition "to
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render social" can be interpreted along the lines of what
is required for there to be anz social life, or as what
is required in a specific social order, the social sciences
pursued primarily the latter sense of the term. This
course of inquiry is not inappropriate as long as we
recognize the crucial link between these two aspects of
socialization. However, when these investigations are
pursued from the conformity perspective, the link with
the more fundamental sense of socialization is cut. My
critique begins with the failure to attend to the develop-
ment of those human capacities required in any society. I
want to argue that any such inquiry into the requirements
of a specific social order mugt not lose touch with the
more fundamental question of the requirements of any
social order. We must not lose sight of the basic human
capacities whose development is presupposed by the idea of
a human society.
The same issue of the American Journal of Sociology
in which Park referred to "the progressive socialization
of the world" contained an article by John Dollard, in
which socialization was defined as "the process of training
a human animal from birth on for social participation in
his group. "^^ From this time, the conformity perspective
has prevailed in most thinking about the empirical fruit-
fulness of the notion of socialization. Three features of
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Dallard's definition are noteworthy. First, socialization
is itself taken to be a process, rather than indicating
criteria which processes such as training, instructing
etc. must meet if they are to be referred to as sociali-
zation. Second, the process is equated with training, and
It is one feature of this notion that the criteria of
success is not given in the activity itself. Socialization
Is thus made to imply a method of achieving extrinsic
ends. And third, these extrinsic ends are specified by
the beliefs etc. of a particular group.
Dollard also noted at that time a dichotomy that
has dominated thinking about the assumptions and hypotheses
of a theory of socialization.
The 'child development* movement is closely
allied to the study of socialization. The trouble
with this conception is that it implies that development
is more or less automatic, granted certain conditions,
while the socialization concept pictures development
as occurring only under pressure and sometimes heavy
pressure. 62
The language of both "heavy pressures" and "automatic
development", calls to mind a vocabulary of mechanisms,
when in fact he is speaking, we must presume, of human
beings.
The "official certification" of the conformity
perspective on socialization came with Irvin Child's
1954 review article in the Handbook of Social Psycholocrv .
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Child defined socialization as "the whole process by which
an individual born with behavioral potentialities of
enormously wide range, is led to develop actual behavi<
which is confined within a much narrower range - the
range of what is customary and acceptable for him
according to the standards of his group.
I cannot deal here with the factors which led to a
narrowing of the types of usage given to the term sociali-
zation. One could almost say it became a cross-disciplinary
paradigm for socio-psychological research. And it should
be noted that this development was accompanied by a vast
expansion of the amount of research done under the rubric
of "socialization", as well sis a multiplication of the
disciplinary and theoretical perspectives which competed
to establish which were the most important problems to
solve in expanding our understanding of "socialization".
Irvin Child's 1954 review of the relevant literature
for the Handbook of Social Psvcholoav
. titled "Sociali-
zation", also gave the term something like an official
status as designating a field of inquiry in a broad sense. ^5
Many social scientists have taken this "field of inquiry"
status of the term as warrant for omitting a definition
of the term. But repeatedly one finds further statements
about what socialization "is" or what it "means" scattered
throughout the pages of these researches. Thus, one
ambiguity of the term lies in its use, on the one hand.
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as
.3 on
are
m a general or broad sense to designate a field of
inquiry, and, on the other hand, to narrow down the
specific conception of socialization to make it
compatible as possible with the authors • committment,
basic theoretical issues.
Other terms have been employed in the past, and
used today, to refer to what is now called socialization -
m the broad sense of the designating a focus of interest.
Child rearing, enculturation, education, occupational
preparation, role learning, etc. are examples of terms
which could be used to pick out a relevant aspect of
social reality. But the assumptions and implications of
each terminology varies, as a certain conceptual boundary
is established in use. In the case of socialization, the
original theoretical question to which its scientific
conceptualization from the conformity perspective
constituted a response was not -how is society (or group
life) possible? "67 rather, »*how is it that an infant
acquires the behaviors (beliefs etc.) of the specific
group or society in which he was born?"
•^Education" is treated as virtually synonymous with
••socialization" by these authors in many cases (e.g.
Greenstein, as we noted above). When it is distinguished
explicitly it Is generally in terms of two rather
ambiguous criteria* Education is taken to imply a more
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formal and a more explicitly intentional or directed
learning process. In this case, education can be viewed as
a particular type of socialization, and socialization as
a particular type of training. Both terms thus are taken
as picking out processes and activities directed towards
ends external to the processes themselves.
At the individual level, human learning and
development are treated as adjustment to the demands of
group life, the receiving of group or societal norms and
values. At the social system level, the focus is on the
shaping and molding of man by his society, and the effect
of these processes, in turn, on social cohesion and
stability. And insofar as it is admitted that human beings
are capable of satisfaction or frustration, fulfillment
or misery - that men can find one form of life in some
sense better than others - this fulfillment or satisfaction
comes through conformity to socially defined behavior
patterns.
At the individual level, a view of man as essentially
passive, plastic and malleable is most typical of attempts
to apply the principles of behaviorist learning theory to
social learning. And at the system level, this view of
man is most typical of structural-functional theorists.
This latter is the perspective of Alex Inkeles when he
specifies the elements of a sociological view of man.
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can be given all manner of content?
culturf:hUe™;a'out''orr? °' '"""^"^ °—
«
dependency. leadrto'internalizf??on'of
cooperation, he resoonds to -xternal n,.f ?f
again push hi. to act
.ain?ytn accorl with'the
^TtilT ^^^"f '^''^ characteristic ol society innis time and place. 68 ^^-xcu
Here we have an explicit formulation of several of
the theses of the conformity perspective, and definition
of socialization in terms of conformity. Man is viewed,
first of all, as malleable and plastic, "a flexible form
which can be given all manner of content." Man is also
seen as the passive recipient of cultural, societal, and
group norms and values. The fundamental motivation to
conform to the demands of society, to engage the cultural,
social and group norms of his environment (captured by the
process term "internalization"), is found in a characteri-
zation of man as an acceptance-seeker, "eager to earn the
good will and approbation" of others in his network of
social relationships. And the language of mechanism and
manipulation is clearly applied when he speaks of
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"external pressures which
. . . push him to act
. . .
.
.
Elsewhere Inkeles states that "the objective of sociali-
zation is to produce competent people, as competence is
defined in any given society"; and the "aspects of
competence" he deals with in this article "are precisely
those which one requires either to continue as part of. or
attain to a position in, middle-class America. "69
And Inkeles* use of the term is not at all atypical,
for there is no question, in the following quotations,
about the intention to pick out the molding of children
to a very specific form, getting them to conform to what
is acceptable in a particular society.
Socialization consists of those patterns ofaction or aspects of action which inculcate in
ii;^
^^^^^^ (including knowledge), motivesand attitudes necessary for the performance of present
or anticipated roles. 70 ^
The socialization process ... is the processby which people are developed into social system
members., who carry in their heads as cathexes,
cognitions, and evaluations the culture of the system. 71
From the sociological point of view, sociali-
zation refers to the process whereby individuals acquirethe personal system properties - the knowledge, skills,
attitudes, values, needs and motivations, cognitive,
affective and conative patterns - which shape their
adaptation to the physical and sociocultural setting
in which they live. 72
We may define socialization as the process by
which someone learns the ways of a given society or
social group so that he can function within it, 73
Socialization is the learning of patterns of
behavior which are conventional in the society, "74
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But the conformity perspective has not captured the
entire range of literature dealing with the empirical
study of human learning and development. For example, the
'•symholicinteractionisf' school of sociology and social-
psychology, built up around the works of C. h. Cooley, w.
I. Thomas and G. H. Mead, has kept alive a mode of
discourse which challenges the assumptions of the conformity
perspective. This literature characteristically draws
on a language of choice, decision and purposive activity,
usage of the term "socialization" retains the important
sense of becoming a human, i.e., social, being - getting
children to the point where they are able to grasp and
communicate about the basic rules of social life. One
textbook in this tradition, for example states that "the
child becomes socialized when he has acquired the ability
to communicate with others and to influence and be
influenced by them through the use of speech. "^S
Some sociologists in the conformity school, on the
other hand, have explicitly recognized a moral quality of
man which sets him off from society in a way that can
hardly be captured by mechanistic notions of engendering
conformity of passive organisms to an intransigently
external social order. Ralf Dahrendorf, for example notes
that "this moral quality of man detaches him in principle
from all claims of society. "76 This aspect of human
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development is not, however, open to social research for
Dahrendorf
,
for ''what sociological theory does not tell
us about man is his moral quality." But perhaps social
science is limited in this way, on Dahrendorfs view,
because of the restrictive notion of ^•science" he and
others adopt. Dahrendorf continues:
Scientifically it may be plausible and usefulto interpret the educational process as the sociali-zation of the individual, but morally it is crucial
^«^?n^^%i"^'r'f"^' capable of holding his^Snagai st the claims of society,
We will quote now another passage from Dahrendorf which
makes clear how he interprets the implications of the
moral quality of man for sociological theory.
Now the assumption that man behaves as homo
socioloqlcus makes possible a general explanatory
proposition; that a person in a situation of role
conflict will always choose the role with which
the stronger sanctions are associated .... This
is an example of "good" sociological theory ....
All this is true even though the role conformity
assumed by the theory is "unrealistic", in the sense
that there are many poeple who do not behave in the
manner postulated here. If we should now try to make
our assumption "realistic", the entire theory would
fall to pieces. The following statement would clearly
be more "realistic": "'In the face of the role conflict,
many people (perhaps 60 per cent ) are inclined to
prefer the role with which the stronger sanctions are
associated? others (say 25 per cent) behave in accord-
ance with moral principles without regard to social
sanctions; and some (say 15 per cent) react to role
conflicts with complete resignation or passivity.
•
Such a statement is all very well, but it can no
longer be used to explain anything, 78
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In making his proposition
.ore "realistic", what Dahrendorf
has done is to specify the types of re.nons for an action
Which constitute the context for decision of various
individuals. While this more '^realistic" proposition might
not explain what Dahrendorf is intent on explaining, because
it is not in general form, it is not devoid of explanatory
significance. Within a developmental perspective, one
might formulate a proposition such as . a person who has
reached a stage of moral development in which right and
wrong are defined in terms of external sanctions, will
always choose the role with which the stronger sanctions
are associated. And more importantly, propositions such
as tho following can be formulated! social conditions X
will facilitate the development of persons who behave in
accordance with moral principles , rather than merely
responding to external sanctions.
We need a more adequate explication of the
concepts of socialization and education for organizing
and guiding investigations such as these. As we turn to
this task, we present a critique of the interpretation of
"socialization** in terms of conformity, and a clarification
of the primary sense of the term - development of those
capacities required of human beings if there is to be
any social life at all.
CHAPTER IV
THE CONCEPT OP SOCIALIZATION. A CRITIQUE
AND A CLARIFICATION
The danger In the pattern of the analysis of sociali-
sation in terms of n^olding a chlld^s essentially malleable
mind lies in a tacit promotion of conformity for conformity
sake. The analysis is guided by the restrictive conception
of what the scientific study of man ought to be like
which emerged under the influence of positivism, and the
failure here reflects on this program. In order to see
where the fault in this analysis lies we must look at the
entpirlcal questions which cannot but fail to emerge, and
the tacit normative committments which cannot be avoided
by social scientists who view socialization as conformity-
training.
First of all, as we noted earlier, "socialization"
is viewed as the name of a proces s or activity. Frequently
it is taken to Imply that socialization is a method ,
distinguished from formal teaching or instruction."^*^ The
result of treating socialization as a process is to sever
the conceptual connection with any human achievement.
This supposedly preserves the "scientific" value neutrality
of social science, for the connection with what is learned
through this method is an external, wholly empirical one.
Any particular beliefs, values, etc. could be learned
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through this
.ethod, and the study of this process ventures
no norniative criteria as to what is to be included. But
When we spealc of a .an^s beliefs, attitudes, values, etc..
we are not citing his essential capacities. Instead, thesl
tertns specify the categories by which we distinguish his
specific pprfnrm.nrr^n. If. on the other hand, by 'sociali-
zation" we pick out an achievement - the achievement of
those mental capacities which warrant the claim to be a
social human being
- then the application of the term
involves certain normative judgments. The achievement is,
I want to suggest, the capacity to reason, to organize
one's purposes through communication in a public order.
Now there is a certain kernal of truth in the
conformity interpretation. That is, basic social rules
must also be the rules of some particular society.
However, while it is true that societies will specify
these rules differently, there must be some such rules.
It has been argued by several contemporary philosophers,
for example, that any society must have rules about not
injuring others, caring for the young, and the distribution
of goods; and these rules presume the centrality of
notions of truth-telling, con£3ideration of interests and
justice. 80 It is the capacity to grasp and apply these
rules in the conduct of life that is captured by the
notion of rationality. There are in addition, as Alasdair
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Maclntyr. notes, "some com.onsense beliefs (about day and
night, the weather and the material environment generally)
which are inescapable for any rational agent, "81 And it
is this achievement of rationality, necessary to the
persistence of any social order, which is central to the
criteria of socialization.
John Clausen comes close to noting this essential
connection with rationality in the following passage.
^oer^enr^r
^^^^^^^ce of deviant socializationexpe i nces
- that is, of socialization to deviant
norms, or of the individual's emotional or rational
rejection of norms. Nothing is explained bv savlnrr
I'^^^.^"
^"^^""^"^^^^^ 'i^n^ncialized* unless th^ ^t^.r-^
of the deficiencies in his socialisation can be
specified. Conversely, conformitv in itself is not
evidence of successful socialization. Neither the
rigidly conforming neurotic nor the person who
conforms without being committed to group goals canbe regarded as an ideal product of socialization. 82
In considering the possible meanings of "unsocialized",
Clausen notes four alternatives. The first alternative,
**socialization to deviant norms", is on the face it contra-
dictory. This type of confused statement is not infrequent
in the literature, and the source of confusion is the
attempt to treat socialization as the name of a process
which is externally related to its outcome. But this attempt
clearly comes to grief when we look at the implications of
picking out "unsocialized" behavior. For it is perverse
to maintain that unsocialized behavior could be the
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successful outcome of a socialization process. But let us
overlook this for the moment and aslc what the sociali-
zation theorist might be trying to convey by implying
a connection between socialization and deviant behavior.
The answer, of course, is that in distinguishing between
dominant and deviant socialization, the hope is to avoid
the charge that "socialization^, has an inherent conservative
or status quo
.
bias. Socialization may be to dominant or
deviant norms, and is not centrally connected to the
stability of a particular social order (although it is
still interpreted as the learning of particular social
beliefs or norms). The attempt must ultimately fail how-
ever. Given the notion that socialization is externally
related to a particular set of norms (and also the pre-
sumption that learning the particular beliefs and norms
of some group is implied), socialization may be
characterized as dominant relative to one group, deviant
at a second level, dominant in a third order of social
participation, etc. The characterization as dominant or
deviant is wholly arbitrary! unless , that is, the beliefs
etc, of a particular social order are reinstated covertly
as an implici t normative criterion . In the latter case,
of course, characterizing a learning process as "sociali-
zation" does indeed imply a crucial connection with the
stability of that social order.
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The fourth alternative suggested by Clausen as an
Interpretation of "unsocialized" - rational rejection of
norms
- is also implausible. We would hardly say of a
young man who. with a clear mind, sound reasons and a
coherent argument, commits himself to a non-violent
refusal of induction into the military, that he is "un-
socialized". It could be implied, of course, that his
position has been influenced by "deviant socialization" -
participation in a social group which rejects loyalty to
war-making organizations or rejects war under any aegis.
However, aside from the difficulties with the notion of
••deviant socialization" noted above, this interpretation
is counter to the thrust of "rational rejection of norms"
as implying a self-conscious and autonomous decision.
In the other two cases, "incomplete or inadequate
communication of norms," and "emotional. , . rejection of
norms", we are getting closer to the heart of the central
criteria of socialization. I cannot take up here a full
analysis of the many faces of these interpretations. But
I can point out that in the latter case ("emotional ...
rejection of norms") it would be important to distinguish
between being "overcome by emotion" and acting out of,
for example, jealousy. When we say someone is overcome
with emotion, we imply his vision is clouded, that his
grasp of the situation is unclear; and in this case
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The Xln.
^^^^^^^^ ^^^-^^
the fieia o. action is
.Xurrea. WHen a hus.ana pleaas In
court, however, that he Mllea his wife in a fit of
jealousy, he is claiming that he coula not help aoin.
What he knows clearly he aia. He actea without regard to
reason and calling this
"unsocializea.. behavior wouia not
be inappropriate.
Although Clausen^s suggestions about the possible
meanings of •^unsocialized" n.iss the
.ark, I helieve, m
the passage we are discussing he does suggest two cases
which bring us closer to its central meaning, "Neither
the rigidly conforming neurotic nor the the person who
conforms without being committed to group goals can be
regarded as an ideal product of socialization." The
behavior of the "rigidly conforming neurotic" does not
exhibit understanding of how his behavior fits into the
social context
- the pattern of behavior is fixed in
regard to some point in his past. This suggests that the
capacity to understand the basic features of the social
context is an important part of what we convey by the
idea of "socialized" behavior.
But what of "the person who conforms without being
committed to group goals"? This case suggests a second
important criterion of socialization, A person must not
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-rely
.e
..ought to the point of u.na^^,t^
.asic
requirements of an ongoing social life, he
.ust also be
Sommltted m some sense to the Implications of his
behavior. Its consequences for group life. He must stand
committed to his behavior In the sense of taking responsi-
bility for Its consequences vis a vis the group, from
the point of view r^f the aronn <^oo1^
Thus, m the case of both the rigidly conforming neu-
rotic and the person who conforms without committment, it
is Implied that the Intelligent organization of behavior
necessary for social life in this context, and its articu-
lation through reason and communication, is absent. "Social-
ization", then, picks out, in its primary sense, the tasks
(activities and processes) involved in getting human
beings to the point where their behavior exhibits an under-
standing of and committment to the basic requirements of
Q4
social life.
But this interpretation will still be somewhat un-
clear until we face squarely the complexity Introduced
by application of the term to cover social learning
through the whole life-cycle. I do not want to argue that
such a usage is necessarily inappropriate, but it does seem
to me that we must be especially cautious here. The clear-
est cases of socialization in this primary sense are drawn
from experiences with young children. For example, the
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young child who constantly attacks his companions may be
deemed "unsocialized"
, while socialization will lead him
to understand and act on the premise that social life
Just cannot proceed on the basis of constant aggression.
It is clear here that by "social life" we do not mean
only the child's particular group of companions; it
refers to the requirements of anY group life.
Applications of the term to cases of social learning
later in the life cycle are built upon this primary
sense of "socialization". We might say, for example, that
a Junior executive had been socialized to his role in the
organization. Now it is clear that we are not speaking
of anx organization, but of this organization in particular.
How do the criteria of understanding of and committment
to the requirements of any group life carry over into
this derivative use of socialization?
The complex of beliefs associated with the organi-
zational life of executives can be divided roughly into
two categories. There are, first, those basic norms
which are essential to the existence and character of the
organization; for example, making a profit in the case of
a business organization. Second, there are many relatively
specific (and possibly conflicting) rules which are inter-
pretations of these norms in terms of the problems
confronted in ongoing organizational life. Socialization
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of a Junior executive occurs when he is brought to under-
stand the specific rules of the organization in terms of
its basic norms or purposes, his intelligent application
of the rules exhibits an understanding of and committment
to the more basic purposes of the organization. So we
interpret socialization in specific organizations,
institutions, professions, etc., in terms of learning the
intelligent application of rules of social interaction
^
from the point of view of the goals or purposes of the
organization etc. The criteria of understanding and
committment are retained. With young children, the develop-
ment of social understanding and committment hinges
crucially on the development of the capacity to reason,
in the basic sense of influencing others and being
influenced by them, through language, in the organization
of his purposes and the selection of actions. With this
derivative sense of socialization in later life, the
capacity to reason in this instrumental sense (the
means-end sort of selection of actions in light of the
goals of the group) is presumed.
There is an additional conceptual point to be made
about the primary sense of socialization. It is, I believe,
a logical feature of this notion that we would not say
that one chooses to be socialized, A child who begins to
cooperate with his companions rather than conflict with
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the. constantly has not to recognize the futility
Of conflict. It is hardly so self
-conscious an accomplish-
ment. He has Simply recognized it in the course of his
interactions, helped along perhaps by the admonishments
of his parents. And while we might call behavior connected
With many forms of mental illness "unsocialized"
, it
would be odd to say that a mental patient chooses to be
socialized. This points to the basic level of rationality
Implied. A socialized person is capable of selecting
means to his ends with at least the minimum required
attention to the basic necessities of the social context.
But to say that a person is being socialized does not
seem to convey the idea that he is being brought to
self-consciously conceptualize and choose to account for
these basic requirements of social life. The explanation
for this is that it is precisely this capacity to choose
self-consciously in social interaction which is the
achievement of socialization. One could hardly utilize
a capacity he had not yet developed.
We would not normally say of a young man who takes
a new job or pursues professional studies that he chooses
to be socialized according to the norms and beliefs of
the organization or profession. ^5 jt is not a specific
activity or process, like training or instruction which
he may Indeed choose. It is rather a standard which
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activities n.ay move one toward. Socialization, then.
Picks out certain criteria which social processes U,ce
training and instruction must meet.
While a medical student would choose to be instructed
m anatomy rather than choosing to be socialized to the
norms of the profession, at some point he may be told
that he has been socialized - that his actions reflect an
understanding and concern for the profession which was
not earlier present. Or others might point out that the
lack of change in his behavior indicates failure of
socialization. If he has a developed capacity for rational
reflection on the success or failure of his "socialization"
- for putting this in perspective of his larger social
world
- he might be gratified or disappointed. On
reflection he might approve of these basic norms and their
interpretation, or critically appraise these norms which
he does now understand as themselves irrational. But this
capacity for critical reflection and appraisal is a
further achievement in the development of reason which,
we will argue presently, is part of what is picked out
by the notion of being an educated person.
While it would be quite odd to say that a baby or
a neurotic chooses to be socialized, there is a subsidiary
sense in which one can submit himself or engage willingly
in processes which, he recognizes, may result in
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socialization. If a blue collar worker is given a respon-
sible management position (e.g. the television character
Arnie Nuvo), his union's shop steward may say that he will
be "socialized". Here socializing picks out the idea that
the worker will be faced with the problem of rational
behavior in the context of a different group with
distinct interests. Its correct application in this context
is based on the truth of a conterfactural condition such
as, if he were to maintain the same view of what is in
the interest of the workers, his actions would exhibit
a certain incoherence, rooted in inconsistent beliefs
about the appropriate action to take in situations
related to union-management disputes. In accepting a
management position, the worker would be committing
himself to engage in activities which he may recognize
would involve socialization in some sense, though he
might disagree about the implication of socialization
in this particular context. Part of what he might
communicate by arguing that socialization would not have
this particular result is his incredulity that he could
commit himself to opposing the interests of the workers.
He might envision himself rigorously supporting the
norms of comportment, committing himself to the goal of
efficiency and profit, and yet slyly supporting the
interests of his former compatriots when a conflict of
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interests arose in maneuvering to avoid the need to take
a position in situations of conflict.
Part of what is implied by socialization in the
basic sense of becoming a human (i.e., social) being is
that being on the inside of normal social life involves
caring about others, respecting them as persons who have
a distinct point of view and a place of rational partici-
pation in some social order. 8^ r^e criterion of caring for
the point of view of others in a social order carries
over into subsidiary uses, where we imply that one cares
that the group should exist and is not impervious to the
central focus or goals of the group. Thus, to assert that
after a period of time our worker-manager has not come to
commit himself to the ascendancy of management over
worker interests in situations of conflict, is to go
some way toward defeating the claim that he has been
socialized. We might want to say that he is not fully
socialized.
These criteria of understanding and committment
have been discussed from the point of view of the achieve-
ment aspect of "socialization". But they carry over also
to the task aspect. Thus while instructing and training
might contribute to socialization, neither conditioning
nor mindless drill would be included; for part of what
we communicate by the notions of conditioning and drill is
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precisely the lack of intelligent participation of the
subject with concern for meeting standards of rationality
implicit in a sucessful outcome.
If we are correct in connecting the proper appli-
cation of the term "socialization" to the achievement of
the basic rational capacities required for participation
in any social order
- through the criteria of understanding
and caring for the standards implicit in the basic rules
of social intercourse - then I think we have gone some
distance toward supporting Alasdair Maclntyre's argument
that "a logical dichotomy between facts and values must
break down.
"
For to characterize actions and institutionalized
practices as rational or irrational is to evaluate
them. Nor is it the case that his evaluation is an
element superadded to an original merely descriptive
element. To call an argument fallacious is always at
once to describe and to evaluate it ... , The
social scientist is, if I am right, committed to the
values of rationality in virtue of his explanatory
projects in a stronger sense than the natural
scientist is. For it is not only the case that his
own procedures must be rational; but he cannot escape
the concept of rationality in his inquiries. 98
This committment to rationality is the tacit normative
committment which, at the beginning of this section, I
suggested was obscured by those social scientists who view
socialization as the name of a conformity-training process.
In uncovering this committment we also bring to view the
empirical questions which I asserted cannot but fail to
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emerge on the conformity interpretation. Socialization
cannot be just
-learning'* of any sort, linked as it is to
the notion of achieving a basic rationality, if sociali-
zation were to be viewed as
-learning" of any sort, it
would have to be taken as failing to distinguish between
coming to hold rational and irrational beliefs. Preserving
these distinctions allows us to keep open for empirical
research questions about whether getting on the inside of
a particular social order leads to securing a grip on
rational behavior in a new social order - to socialization,
in other words - or to the dissipation of the coherence
of one's beliefs insofar as they are related to action in
this social context.
It might be objected that in a -scientific"
context, closing off some of the distinctions implicit in
the variety of ordinary uses is unavoidable and/or often
disirable. But this objection fails if I have successfully
captured the most important criteria of the concept of
socialization. For I have argued that the very point of
having distinct concepts such as "learning", "sociali-
zation", and "education", is to separate out different
standards which must be met for applying the terms to the
results of different activities and processes. In other
words, there is an achievement implied by the notions
of socialization and education, and the most important
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function of these terms is to capture these achievements
as they are exemplified through processes and activities
associated with learning and mental development.
The sort of achievement indicated by the notion of
socialization, connected as it is with the notion of
rationality, rules out processes which involve presenting
a subject with incomprehensible or incoherent ideas, or
engaging him in mindless conformity for conformity's sake.
This is, at least, in some sense and to some unknown
degree, necessary for the persistence of any social order.
No rational parent, so far as I know, would seriously set
out to make such demands on his child from the time he
Is an infant. And it is on this around - that we >nnch
value the achievement of the rationality exhibited in
social life if there is to be any social life at all -
that the case for mv explication of the concept of
socialization must rest .
There is no canon of "science", aside from the
committment to rationality alluded to by Maclntyre, which
forbids the organization of inquiry around a conception
of socialization as conformity-training. Still, this
focus involves, as we have seen, a neglect of the task
of explaining how some activities and processes connected
with the learning lead to the securing of a basic level
of rationality, while some do not. They may fail to
CHAPTER V
EDUCATION AND SOCIALIZATION
The Concept of Education
We have already gone a long way in the last chapter
toward a clarification of the concept of education. For
education is a concept of the same type as socialization,
and is connected with the development of reason through the
same criteria of understanding and commitment. 8^ For the
most part we need only capsulize Richard Peters' analysis,
which, so far as I am aware, holds the field of philoso-
phical clarification of the concept of education to
itself. But before I introduce Peters* analysis of the
concept of education, I want to introduce two passages,
by different authors, which will help set the framework
for the remaining portion of this inquiry. First, Professor
John Anderson points to two currents of thought on
education
:
The classical and the utilitarian views of education
are distinguished as employing intrinsic and extrinsic
criteria, the one considering education in its own
character, as the development of thinking or criticism,
the other considering it in its contribution to some-
thing else, subordinating it in this way to the non-
educational and running the greatest risk of distorting
its character. For clearly there can be no subject or
field of study which is utilitarian in itself, whose
character resides in what it produces or helps to
produce, and this applies as much to science as to
any other study • '^^...
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Here Anderson points to a crucial connection between
••education" and ''the development of thinking or criticism".
We will be introducing Peters* more refined criterion of
-cognitive perspective" as a way of illuminating the
connection in a moment. But Maclntyre eleborates on the
importance of critical thinking as an educational
achievement. I quote at length from his intriguing and
forceful argument.
Our aim ought to be to helo oeoDle to discover
activities whose ends are not outside' themselves ; andit happens to be of the nature of all intellectualinquiry that in and for itself it provides just such
activity. The critical ability which ought to be thefruit of education serves nothing directly except foritself, no one except those who exercise it.
About critical ability I want to stress three
things. First it is the antithesis of that acceptance
of wants, tastes and prejudices as given facts which
so disfigures our society. For critical activity
involves the testing of any claim to knowledge or
understanding at the bar of some impersonal, rational
criterion .... Secondly, critical ability is some-
thing each has to acquire for himself .... Thirdly,
to have seen this is to see that the element of
universality in all criticism is perfectly compatible
with specialization. The unity of criticism lies in
the fact that all understanding and all knowledae is
a matter of concepts and to that degree philosophical;
and that all understanding and all knowledge is
acquired as dependent upon its own past intellectual
background and is to that degree historical ....
But there is something more important still about
critical activity. It is not the activity of isolated
individuals. It is always exercised inside an academic
tradition which is the tradition of some particular
society. Unless critical standards claim social
recognition, criticism is untrue to its own claims to
universal allegiance. But a condition of this is
precisely the refusal to make criticism the prerogative
of an elite .... We are all equal before the
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standards and democratic community need ea:ro?Lr.91
In this long passage a number of themes emerge
which will be important for drawing together the overall
direction of this inquiry. They are . 1 ) the possibility
of suspending a direct instrumental relation to one's
wants, of gaining a certain detachment from them; 2) the
idea of education as a personal achievement, or an achieve-
ment, as we Will argue in Part II, connected with an
individual's development as a person, 3) the important link
between education and conceptual development, 4) the social
and historical rootedness of a tradition of critical
thought; and 5) the kernal of an argument showing the
Intertwining of value committments associated with the
notions of "education" and "democracy". The first four
of these themes will figure importantly in our assessment,
in Part II, of the potential contributions of a cognitive-
developmental psychology to the study of political
education. We turn now to the concept of "eudcation".
Peters' analysis of the concept of education can be
Introduced through his own capsule statement of his
thesis.
My thesis is not that 'education* refers to any
special sort of process which might be equated with
Instruction, training or drill, rather that it
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alone couia ^rtllZ be^^rae' a°?'For°U^^^"^"^training and instruction might be in futiL tMn„,like opium-taking
.... P^rthermorefinslr^cUonmight consist m presenting inert ide^s whl^ areincomprehensible to children, whilst training mightapproximate to mindless drill
. . .
_92 ^
™ n
The criteria implicit in the central cases of education
are i
(1) that 'education* implies the transmission ofwhat is worth-while to those who become committedto it
;
(2) that 'education* must involve knowledge and under-
standing and some kind of cognitive perspective
which are not inert;
(3) that 'education' at least rules out some procedures
of transmission, on the grounds that they lack
wittingness and voluntariness on the part of thelearner, 93
The first two of these criteria refer to the achievement
aspect of the concept of education. This achievement
aspect is more elaborately captured in the following
summary
:
(1) An educated man is one whose form of life - as
exhibited in his conduct, the activities to
which he is committed, his judgments and feelings
- is thought to be desirable,
(2) Whatever he is trained to do he must have knowledge
not just knack, and an understanding of principles
.
His form of life must also exhibit some mastery
of forms of thought and awareness which are not
harnessed purely to utilitarian or vocational
purposes or completely confined to one mode,
(3) His knowledge and understanding must not be
inert either in the sense that they make no
difference to his general view of the world, his
actions in it and reaction to it or in the sense
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that they involve no concern for the stand,^flo
w^T^aftie ^hfTf.°' awareness?^:ell s th ability to attain the™. 94 '
This last summary sets forth the achievement aspects
of education most clearly implicit when we speak of an
"educated person". This, Peters indicates, is "shorthand
for summarlzinc our notion of a form of life which is
worthwhile enough to deserve being handed on from
generation to generation. "95 But this usage is of relatively
recent origin.
A little research in the O. E. D , reveals tha^the notion of "educated" as characterizing the all-
and''lf^T^ fT^"""
a person n^orally, intellectucallv
spiritually ennerged only in the nineteenth
5^
before the nineteenth centurvthere had been the ideal of the cultivated person who
^tl I
product of elaborate training and instruction,the term "an educated man" was not the usual onp fordrawing attention to this ideal. Thev had the concept
cut they did not use the word 'educated* quite withthese overtones, 96
The main idea embodied in this use is that certain social
activities should lead to the development of desirable
qualities in someone.
Other uses of the term education and its derivatives
differ in certain respects from what is conveyed by the
idea of an "educated person". For example, to indicate the
variety, we may speak of making educated guesses or hiring
professional educators; of the educative effect of certain
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activities, or the influence of education on econornic
developn^ent, of A^ish education, or American education
or socialist education, and of primary, secondary and
higher education. I cannot go into special features of
these many uses, some of which are clearly peripheral to
our concerns here. But we can note certain of these
features in order to get a better view of the concept of
political education to be proposed.
Some of these uses of the term "education'' tend to
view education as a manner of achieving ends which are
extrinsic to the activity itself, it would not be at all
logically odd to speak of the affects of education on
industrial development, or to refer to Amish education
where some external link to the passing on of Amish
traditions is suggested. What we want to point to, in
these utilitarian and social-economic uses of "education**,
is that by separating too sharply the achievement aspects
of the notion there is a danger of promoting or tacitly
supporting the grip of conformist ways of thinking. As in
the case of socialization, viewing education as a process
draws attention away from the essential goals of education.
As Peters notes.
In the context of the planning of resources it
may be unobjectionable to think of education as
something in which a community can invest? in the
context of a theory of social cohesion education may
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be harmlessly described as a socializing process. 97
But he warns that ''these descriptions are both too general
and too embedded in a dangerous dimension, for they
encourage a conformist or instrumental way of looking at
education. '.98 ^hese descriptions are rendered from the
point of View of a spectator who attempts to suspend his
grasp of the goals of educational activities. But getting
at what is essential to and distinctive in the notion of
education involves grasping a relatively specific type
of human achievement. When we speak of the "influence of
education on economic development- it may be all too
easy to confuse the effects of institutionalized training
with the goals of education. .\nd the problem with uses
such as "Amish education" is the implication that an
educated Amish person is distinctive in being Amish and
not being educated. In this case the achievement aspect
of education is tied to the passing on of particular
social practives rather than to the full development of
human capacities. Where possible, it would be better to
substitute phrases like "the socialization to Amish
traditions," which may occur partly in Amish schools.
The fact that specialized institutions are often
seen as carrying the burden of promoting education has
affected the character of these uses of the term. The
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fact that we call these institutions
••educational" should
not obscure the fact that some, if not most, of what goes
on within them may not have an educative effect on the
young people populating them. And, likewise, we cannot
limit the notion of educational or educative processes to
formal institutional activities, separated by physical and
social barriers from the rest of the world. Those education-
al theorists who speak of
-^education in the streets" or
••schools without walls" are not, at least in this respect,
confused about the concept of education. And, most
importantly in the context of this inquiry, public policies
of many kinds, and even political activity itself, can
clearly promote the development of citizens as educated
men. The extent to which this is possible in different
political contexts - for example in the context of
American state -monopoly capitalism as opposed to a
socialist system - is an important question. But the
thrust of our inquiry would be lost if we do not keep
clearly in mind that it ls_ an open question. The purpose
of Part I of this paper is, in a sense, to contribute to
this cause by bringing out the point of keeping it an
open question. Exactly how institutionalized or non-
institutionalized activities can be educative can be seen
more clearly when we turn to the "cognitive perspective"
aspect of education.
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While education is not tied to the effects of special
institutions, it is usually thought of as an intentional
activity, or an activity whose connection with the aims of
education is fairly clear. As Peters notes.
People often say thincrs like 'It was a real educationto travel with my neighbor.' This usage is an exceotion
that l°^"'°"f
criterion that education is sometM^f
"
we consciously contrive for ourselves or forothers, "9
To summarize, the concept of education specifies
certain criteria which activities or processes must meet.
The activities picked out are not necessarily the domain
of specialized institutions, but can be a part of any set
of institutionalized or non-institutionalized practices.
The possibility of conscious control of or engagement in
these activities is however, implied. The criteria of
these activities are connected with the development of
human capacities in the passing on of a form of life.
The aim or achievement implied is bound up in the idea of
the development of reason.
The distinctiveness of the notion of an "educated
person** flows from the higher levels of the development
of reason implied, indicated by Peters in the achievement
of **cognitive perspective". Part of what is meant by this
is that "being educated implies the possession of
knowledge, but rules out mere knowledge, in that it also
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requires understanding of principles
. .
. .
..iqo ^nd part
of the meaning of cognitive perspective seems to be
attached to the idea of overcoming the disciplinary
specialization implicit in calling someone a trained
ntathematician or scientist or cook, and yet recognizing that
-we can
.
. ,
ask the further question whether such people
are educated men.-lOl The core of Peters* notion of
•^cognitive perspective" is, I believe, that a man who is
highly trained, but not educated "has a limited conception
of what he is doing."
He does not see its connection with anythina else,its place in a coherent pattern of life. It'is, forhim, an activity which is cognitively adrift. 102
These aspects of "cognitive perspective" can be summed
up, perhaps, in terms of the high levels of conceptual
development implied by this distinction between training
and education. It is a degree of development in one's
conceptual grasp of the world that allows him to apply
Intelligently those principles imminent in his activities
which point beyond their narrow functional aspects toward
their role in the shaping of a coherent pattern of life.
But such a formulation covers over some ambiguities; and
the reader might note a difference in nuance in turning
back to Maclntyre's interpretation of pinnacle of
educational achievement in critical thought. We mentioned
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there in a footnote that Peters Is far ^ore cautious
and concerned to avoid the implication of mere criticism
in talk about critical thought. Maclntyre presents a
sharp contrast between critical thought and "that acceptance
of wants, tastes and prejudices as given facts which so
disfigures our society." (,^ve, pp. 75-76) Peters, however,
is satisfied to note a certain "fluidity of wants. "103
And there are other concepts which have been taken as
capturing this higher level in the development of reason
which is promoted by educational processes, such as, for
example, "autonomy". In Part II of this paper, I want to
propose that the idea of the "reflectiveness" of high
levels of rational thought be pursued as part of what can
be seen as a middle ground between Maclntyre 's emphasis on
the shaping of a form of life and Peters* emphasis on
putting it in perspective. And we will be looking at the
way in which a •'cognitive-developmental* psychology can
be fruitful in filling out this notion of reflection.
But before we turn to this second part of our
inquiry, let us bring together the main comments made on
the concepts of socialization and education, and sketch
in a preliminary way what we would be looking for in a
study of political socialization and political education.
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Socialization. Education, and Political Science
The political beliefs and orientations of citizens
are important both to the polity and to the individual
Citizen. The social processes involved in the development
of these orientations are connected also with the
development of capacities for social and political reason-
ing. It is this latter development which gives political
beliefs and orientations an openness, flexibility and
integration which is important for individual satisfaction
and social cohesion in a changing society. It is the
importance of this development of reason which leads us
to call for careful attention to the distinctions between,
as well as the common processes associated with, political
socialization and political education.
The notions of "socialization" and '^education" are
linked through their mutual connection with the idea of
reason and its development. The point or sense of these
concepts is derived from the particular interpretations
or specifications of the criteria of understanding and
committment. This mutual link with the development of
reason in social life makes the connections betwen the
concepts quite complicated. Some uses of each term
overlap into the conceptual territory of the other,
creating difficult to handle borderline areas. I want to
pursue the argument here that certain distinctive uses of
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each term ought to be Incorporated into any study of
political socialization or political education.
One of the overlapping uses of the two terms has
already been noted when we mentioned the idea of Amish
education. Part of what we might mean by this could be
conveyed Just as well by speaking of the socialization
to Amish traditions in Amish schools. The same point
holds for Catholic education or American education. This
comes out clearly when we think of the point someone
might make that he received an American education at
school and Polish education at home.
Another area of overlap is highlighted when we
speak of "social education" or "social aims of education."
Part of what we might convey by this is a general deepening
of a child's understanding of the social world around
him, and a refinement of the skills of social interaction.
The term socialization could also be applied to these
activities without stretching its point. ^0"*
But this overlapping should not lead to the idea that
the two notions can be assimilated to one another. It is
the distinctive uses of the terms, and the point conveyed
by these uses, which are most Important. The primary sense
of socialization is becoming a social human being, capable
of organizing and executing one's purposes through
interaction with others in a social order. And the
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primary sense of education, built on the understanding
and con^ltt^ent presumed m social participation, points
to the achievement of a capacity to put one's activities
m perspective, and. Importantly in this context, to
reflectively appraise different facets of one's social
participation, and to view social forms In critical
perspective,
A different sort of argument could be made against
•
this position, drawing on the broadest possible sense
of socialization. Socialization is becoming human in a
social world. So socialization in its broadest sense is
all encompassing! the introduction of the child to a
heritage of all types of knowledge. Since the development
of children's minds can occur only through some sort of
interaction with this social world of knowledge, it could
be said that education is a form of socialization. ^05
While this interpretation builds on the indisputable
truth that all learning occurs through participation in
a social world, it is inadequate for two reasons. First,
this interpretation of "socialization" is far too broad to
provide a useful framework for empirical research. Peters'
comment on this proposal makes a similar point:
All education can be regarded as a form of
socialization in so far as it involves initiation into
public traditions which are articulated in language and
forms of thought. But this description is too general
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And second, the very breadth of this notion of
socialization obscures the basic sense of becoming a
rational human being. The acquisition of irrational beliefs
from one's social environment leading to mental instability,
could still be viewed as socialization on this inter-
pretation. It would also, then, be quite impossible to
give any specific sense to the term "unsocialized".
It would be more appropriate to the basic sense
of each concept to view socialization as a precondition
to the engagement in educative activities . This proposal
meets the requirements of common usage, first of all.
Unless socialization has proceeded far enough in the
child's early years, it would be said that he is unready
for school education. Or unreasonable defiance of a
classroom teacher would be viewed as unsocialized
behavior, and would interfere with educational activities
in the classroom. But besides being in accord with common
sense, this proposal also makes good theoretical sense.
For example, this interpretation helps us to organize our
thinking and research in a way that brings out the chang-
ing capacity of the child to formulate and choose among
alternative courses of action. The logical feature of
"socialization" that makes it inappropirate to say that
a child "chooses" to be socialized can help focus our
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attention on the fact that the categories for choice are
given In a social world that Is as yet outside his grasp.
Once on the "Inside" of a social order, however, the
opportunity arises for him to consciously pursue the
complexities of his cultural heritage through education.
Ana at some point, he will be capable of choosing self-
consciously to pursue an education or to contrive
educative experiences or activities for himself or for
others. In other words, we can choose to become educated,
but not to be socialized; and this feature of these
concepts focuses our research efforts around the conditions
for the development of capacities for rational thought and
choice.
So my argument is that socialization should be viewed
as a precondition to education. But we must add a
qualification about socialization in its derivative sense
of initiation into the social practices of particular
institutions, organizations, etc. The most appropriate
locution here is "socialization to" some sphere of social
life.^O*^ Socialization to some particular social sphere
niav be educative in the sense of contributing to develop-
ment of perspective on one's social activities. For example,
socialization to the norms of a government regulative
agency may help a businessman gain perspective on the
somewhat different norms which he had earlier accepted in
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corporate life. But the connection here Is a loose one;
ana this is part of the reason for retaining the separate
concept of education to pick out activities with a closer
empirical connection with the development of reflective
reason.
With this in mind, we can interpret more clearly
C. Wright Mills, observation that many people in modern
society are
-with' rationality but without "substantive
reason". We can say that many have been socialized to the
norms of large bureaucratic organizations. But their acti-
vities do not lead to a perspective on their personal
lives and the social world that will tie their personal
troubles to issues of social change. The very organizations
whose actions produce the disruptions of social change may
in fact be preventing the development of substantive reason
by its emplyees. The activities of work life may be
restrictive of mental exercise rather than educative. .\nd
the intervention of these organizations in political life
may be preventing public policies which would promote
educative activities of all types. The most important of
educative activities then would be "political education".
But whether or not this theory is correct, we can
new at least give a fairly definite sense to the concepts
of "political socialization" and "political education".
First of all, "political socialization" can be
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understood as piocing out the activities and processes
Which bring people to the point of being able to partici-
pate intelligently in a society's political practices, it
is an initiation into the rules of political activity which
brings out the rationale or dominant purposes served
through the established political framework. Consider a
youngster who distributes campaign literature for the
candidate for elective office, on the belief that the
candidate is to be appointed and is trying to drum up
business through advertising. Clearly he has not been
led to grasp the rationale of his activity in terms of
competitive elections for public office.
This interpretation of political socialization is
not a step back toward the conformity perspective. It is
not a process of training in established political
behaviors, but involves activities which lead to a grasp
on the principles of political life in a particular society.
In the first place, the rules of political practice
require intelligent application to particular circumstances.
For example, as the political socialization of our young
person who distributed campaign literature proceeds, he
might be called to work in a congressman's Washington
office. His charge is to welcome and aid any people from
the home constituency that show up in the office. V/hen
he applies this rule rigidly, to the letter, even to the
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extent of aiding the campaign manager of the Congressman's
opponent in the coming election, we would certainly want
to say that his socialization to electoral politics is
incomplete, for lack of understanding. Or if he understood
the implications of aiding a lobbyist in defeating his
Congressman's bill, and yet did go, we could say his
socialization to the norms of congressional politics was
Incomplete, for lack of committment, m addition to
intelligent application of rules to particular circumstances,
political socialization leads to the capacity to interpret
conflicting rules or guidelines in terms of the overriding
organizational rationale of one's activities. And the
criteria of understanding and committment, not conformity,
elucidate this Judgmental capacity as well.
One final point to note about "political socialization"
is that socialization here is taken in its derivative
sense. Political understanding and committment are not
essential to becoming, at a basic level, a social being
capable of acting on reason in social life,
"Political education," finally, picks out those
activities and processes which bring people to the point
where they are capable of reflecting on and critically
appraising established political practices. It does not
apply to merely getting people to criticize. Nor does
it imply that we can be reflective all the time or in
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all matters, a critique may or may not emerge from
reflection on features of our political life, but if it
does, it should be a reasoned critique, pointing to
alternative principles and new practices for political
life. The rules, priorities and even the goals of establish-
ed political life can, at this level of development, be
viewed in terms of new possibilities. No longer limited
In his rational capacities to the intelligent application
and Interpretation of given rules, a politically educated
person can explore the possibilities for expanding the
dimensions of politics. 108 And exploring these possibilities
can be viewed as an important part of responsible
citizenship, an important dimension of committment to
creating a form of life in which human needs are satisfied,
human rights are expanded, and political education
through participation is made available to all.
The first part of this inquiry is now complete. We
have attacked the problem of how to conceptualize human
development in a politically relevant way. The first
task was to sort out uses of the term socialization
along broad criteria suggested as a conformity perspective
and a developmental perspective. The conformity inter-
pretation of socialization was criticized as cutting out
a vital sense of socialization as the development of
basically rational human beings, and thus tacitly
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yielding to a promotion of molding people for blind
conformity. A developmental interpretation of the concepts
of socialization and education was proposed, and their
bearing on issues of citizenship was suggested. The
next part of this study moves to an analysis of cognitive-
developmental psychology, which can help to fill out our
preliminary idea of the achievements of political
socialization and political education.
PART II. DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
AND POLITICAL EDUCATION
CHAPTER VI
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY. AN EXPOSITION
Introduction
1. We have seen in Part I that the aims of political
socialization and political education are distinct. The
study of political socialization brings out the achieve-
ments involved in acting rationally within and in terms
of the norms of a given political framework. And the
achievements of political education point to the develop-
ment of the capacity to step back from this framework
through the reflections of reason, and appraise it in
perspective. Political socialization and political educa-
tion are distinct, then, but are also mutually linked
to the capacity for rational thought and action, A major
advantage of this analysis - as opposed to the treatment
of socialization and education as the names of processes
- is that it leaves open questions about the extent to
which particular social structures and public policies
promote the development of reason through socialization
and education.
What I want to do in Part II is to suggest a
possible course of study toward a theory of political
education. It is a suggestion that the approach to
developmental psychology of Jean Piaget and Lawrence
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Kbhlberg will aid us in filling out the empirical di.ensi
of the processes involved in the achievements of sociali-
zation and education. We need a more complete sense for
the kinds of changes that occur as mental development
proceeds, and the Piaget-Kohlberg approach may help. The
assessment of this approach attempts, first, to clarify
further the achievements of mature thought picked out
by the concept of education. The second part of the
assessment tries to show that a developmental approach
to political education requires a more specific explana-
tory theory than that offered by Piaget or Kohlbert; a
theory which is tied into a theory of social structure.
In the concluding chapter, an example of research
in developmental political psychology is discussed, and
is evaluated in terms of its relevance to the conceptual
framework of political education. Finally, we offer a
view of why and how political education ought to be
promoted,
2. Any discussion of the cognitive-developmental
approach must make choices about the best way to present
and talk about it. The effort here is informed by a
desire to draw on both "philosophical-normative" and
"psychological-empirical" inquiries.
Philosophical understanding has attended primarily
to the elaboration of conceptual distinctions. But their
ons
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usefulness for the scientific interpretation of human
behavior is hindered by the failure to fill in empirical
facts, especially those about conceptual development.
Psychological investigations, on the other hand, often
fail to make adequate conceptual distinctions. The
attitude taken here is that the cognitive-developmental
approach is informed in its descriptive enterprise by
some important and too often neglected distinctions. The
clarification of the significance of these distinctions,
however, is aided by analysis in which philosophers
specialize.
In discussing the cognitive-developmental approach
I will be taking Piaget and Kohlberg as representatives
.
Piaget has dealt primarily with children's responses
to theoretical questions, where "theoretical" is con-
trasted with "practical"; and Kohlberg has dealt primarily
with children's responses to practical questions. This
distinction is clarified by Peters.
(With theoretical questions) no issue of doing
anything or changing anything is settled by answering
them. The issue is about what is the case or why it
is so or when something happened. Practical questions,
on the other hand, are concerned with what ought to
be the case, with reasons for action .... This
realm of discourse has its own distinctive concepts
such as 'ought', 'right', 'desirable', 'worthwhile',
and 'good' as well as its own distinctive features
for answering questions which are raised, 110
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Political discourse involves an intermingling of both
types of questions (as is also the case with educational
issues). Coming to a Judgment on political questions
requires treatment of both theoretical and practical
issues,
.^d reflective and rational political discourse
is an individual and social achievement which can only
be had if we become clear about the whole multi-faceted
phenomena of mental development.
Failures of understanding and problems of assimi-
lation have accompanied the over-sharp drawing of discipli-
nary boundaries between psychology and the social sciences.
While philosophers and psychologists are now beginning
to see the need to attend in a self-conscious manner to
the description and justification of the full development
of human capacities, they often seem to be wearing
intellectual blinders when the problem arises of connecting
these ideals of development to their realization in the
actual socio-political world. For the developmental
psychologist, this may be connected with a failure to
clarify the character of mature social thought and the
conditions for its development. For the philosopher it
may be the result of a rather uncritical faith in our
"liberal society". As C. Wright Mills assesses the state
of that tradition, "the ideals of liberalism have been
divorced from any realities of modern social structure
loo
The order of exposition will be as follows. Fi^t
we Will give a general characterization of the cognitivl-
developmental approach
- the basic hypothesis pursued
by Piaget and Kohlherg
- and a su^.ary statement of the
stages of .ental development they have postulated (Chapter
6). The next two chapters will involve a sympathetic but
critical assessment of their theories, dealing with the
characterization of mature thought (Chapter 7), the
explanation of development, and the relation between
modes of thought and social action (Chapter 8).
General Characterization of the Cognitive-
Developmental Approach
The core achievements of the cognitive-developmental
approach can be referred to as descriptive. Piaget has
forcefully reminded us that characterization of the
products of mental development is closely bound up with the
type of explanation of development offered. But the explana-
tory side of his theory is somewhat undeveloped. 112 The
crucial element of this descriptive contribution is the
doctrine of stages of mental development. The organizing
"hypothesis" or main thrust of the work of Piaget and
Kbhlberg is the view that mental development can best be
comprehended as a qualitative transformation of cognitive
structures in an invariant and culturally universal
101
sequence. Discussing separately the ter^s of this hypothesis
Will give us an outline of the main tenets of the stage
theory.
1. 2oanitive_Stru^^ A stage of mental develop-
ment is posited on the basis of a coherence or organization
among actions and patterns of action. It is the underlying
•*thought-organization"ll4 which is the basis for attribut-
ing stages. The distinction between structure and content
is a useful device for understanding this point. There can
be wide variation in the content, or specific thoughts
and actions of children at a certain age, but by comparing
their thought to that of older and younger children, a
certain type of mode of thought emerges as characteristic
of that age,
2. Structural Transformation
. Mental structures
(types or modes of thought) change with age,1^5 j^Yxts
change can best be seen not as a gradual, incremental
accretion of actions or types of action (schemata), but
rather as a total alteration (transformation) of the
basic character or underlying organization of thought.
3. Qualitative Transformation
. The idea of structural
change as transformational is required by two further
characteristics of stages. They are first of all
"structural wholes", more or less complete and balanced
(equilibrated) organizations of thought. Secondly, these
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structural wholes are qualitatively aifferent fro™ one
another,
4- Bterarchlcal Intearatloj,. A mental structure
does not disappear when a higher form of thought is
achieved, father it is reintegrated into the succeeding
structure even while its character is transformed. The
earlier structure is in one sense part of the "matter"
upon which the new structure operates. One stage thus
takes the character of pre-requisite to the succeeding
Stage.
5. Invariant Segn^nrp. The positing of an invariant
sequence of stages in mental development is one of the
most difficult and intriguing claims of the developmental-
ists. It involves a number of assertions and qualifications.
The stage must appear in an unchanging and constant order,
so that stage A appears in every child before stage B.
This invariant sequence also forms a logical order, in
that the logical character of the concepts available at
stage B presumes the attainment of stage A concepts. It
is not necessary that all individuals, or even all
"normal- adults, achieve the final stages. Some may be
fixated at a lower level, while others may achieve a
higher mode of thought in one content area but no in
another
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SultumiiUJnlversal. The distinction between
structure ana content Is the basis of the assertion that
While content
.ay vary with culture, there are universal
structural elements In .ental life. Where the later
staces have not been achieved In a culture, It Is said
that they would follow the same Invariant sequence If the
conditions facilitating further developn,ent were to
appear.
Form this core stage theory we will be focusing
primarily on the invariance of the sequence of stages
which is posited for all cultures. But with our outline
of these stages we will discuss the Piaget-Kohlberg position
in two related areas: the conception of mature thought
at the final stage of development; and the notions
introduced to explain development,
7. MatureJ[2!o^^ It is recognized among the
developmentalists that investigators will differ somewhat
in their descriptions of mature thought. This is a
crucially important interpretative enterprise, if the
full implications of this approach are to be brought out.
For the characterization of this mature thought sets the
stage and casts the characters for the related tasks of
explaining this development, and justifying its promotion.
Each successive stage is said to be more differentiated
(to embody conceptual distinctions built upon those of the
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on
en
P-vious stage) and complex, and .ore integrated. The
-in feature of this final fonn of thought is thus a
general and
.ore stable equibriu. between the thinner
and his World.
^- ^^^i^naMor^of^eve^^ The type of expUnati
offered by the cognitive developmental approach has be
Characterized as interactionist. This ter. designates a
.manner of relating together the explanatory factors and
notions used. As we said, it is important to understand
the manner of describing and interpreting mental develop-
ment in order to grasp the significance of this type of
explanation. An eclectic statement that full explanation
of mental growth requires an account of both biological
and environmental factors, distinguished in terms of
their quantitative significance, would not be an inter-
actionist position. For the primary task the developmental-
1st sets for himself is understanding the genesis of
mental structures which are qualitativ^T
y
distinct.
The question about the genesis of structures is approached
by the developmentalist by positing an Interaction
between the active structuring of the world by the child
and the given structure of the environment. An account
which attributes mental structures to one of these types
of factors alone is said to be inadequate. 116
It Is especially important to understand the role
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of experience with the environment, if the implications
of this approach for social and political theory are to
be drawn out. I quote here from Kohlberg.
staaes'^Siffprr^; ^" interactional conception ofc g o dif ers from a maturatlonal one in ^v,=t. <vassumes that experience is necessary ?or the stages
generallv Lre'"' ^ asLSng'that'
J richer stimulation will lead to
nronoLfrrr^ ^^^^^^ involved. Itp oposes that an understanding of the role of
?^aturef ^ analysis of universalfe tures of experienced objects (physical or social)
ind ?n?e^r.M°'
sequences of differentiation'a i t gration in concepts of such objects, and(3) analysis of structural relations between experieinputs and the relevant behavior organization. 11?
nee-
Before we move to an exposition of the stages of
mental development outlined by Piaget and Kohlberg, it
is necessary to intoduce two further distinctions. Both
Piaget and Kohlberg accept the thesis that every judgmental
act has both cognitive and affective aspects. These are
two facets of what is essentially the same phenomena of
human intelligence in operation. Another distinction which
is tacitly made in their studies between judgments made
about the physical world and those made about the
interpersonal or social world,
Piaget 's studies have focused primarily on the
development of the child's conception of the physical
world, although in one seminal work he dealt with moral
Judgments. And he has been primarily occupied with the
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laentification of cognitive stages and sub-stages, rather
than the affective aspect, which Is Interpreted as
structural tension and transition. Kohlberg, on the
other hand, has studied primarily
.oral development, also
m terms of Its cognitive rather than affective-emotional
components
,
Both Piaget and Kohlberg have identified broad
periods or levels of development, with a varying number
,
of stages and sub-stages. Their interpretations are
usually drawn from clinical type interviews with children
of varying ages. (Some of Piaget 's later studies have
Involved both verbal and nonverbal responses; and Kohlberg
has been engaged in longitudinal as well as cross-sectional
studies.) The attempt is made to discover whether qualita-
tive differences in the mode of thought (or type of judg-
mental criteria) can be found. What follows is a sketch of
the main characteristics of the stages proposed, first by
Piaget for general cognitive development, and then by
Kohlberg for moral development . ^20 r^^^ purpose of this
summary is to show the sense and pattern of these de-
velopmental theories, and to fill out the meaning and
application of the basic developmental framework outlined
above
•
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Piaget, Levels of Cognitive Development
Ontogenetic development is divided into three
broad peiods or levels hv , 4 4.^x i by Piaget, with a number of sub-
periods or stages. The Levels are:
^
concrete Operatronr (2!?l'y:ars )
^^^^^^^^^ of
3. The Level of Formal Thought (ll-is years).
In the first of these periods the child acts directly on
the world around him. But in the second and third levels,
he operates also on a different plane of reality, the
representational or symbolic. At the beginning of each
level, as the child achieves in crude form a new set of
cognitive skills, his actions are "egocentric". This
egocentrism is relative to the full elaboration of these
cognitive skills, but it also marks off from the previous
level a qualitatively new way of structuring intelligent
action. This egocentrism indicates a disequilibrium
between two functions of intelligence; those of assimilating
121reality to existing schemas, and accommodating these
schemas to reality when assimilation is impossible. As
the egocentrism of each level is overcome, a relatively
stable equilibrium is achieved. But only in the third
level is a fully stable equilibrium achieved, an
equilibrium in which objectivity and full reversibility
of thought are elaborated.
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^' ^^^^-^^^ sensory-Motor In^.^^.^.^^^ .
this level, the hasic
.anner of relating to the
world is by way of direct perceptual and
.otor activity
The infant.s first actions are reflexive. The egocentris.
here is complete, for the self and the world are totally
undifferentiated, m the course of this period, objects
are gradually seen as interrelating in the direct way as
entities. As a correlate of the independence attributed
to objects in their interaction, the world of objects
takes on an independence from the self. The growing
gap between the self and the world is part of a
decentering process. Eventually different features of
different objects are distinguished, and the self likewise
becomes multifaceted or autonomous on this plane of direct
action. This process of detachment of self and world
prefigures a sense of spatial, temporal and causal
dimensions, and the child becomes capable of imitation and
play. The coherence of action, or equilibrium, achieved
at the sensory-motor level around age 2 is one of direct
action on the world. But it is enriched by a growing
ability to symbolize.
2« Hie Level of Preparation for and Organization
of Concrete Operat ions (2-11 ye.^^raK At this level, there
is cognitive operation on concrete reality by means of
symbolization and symbol manipulation. Language develops
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and beco.es a prl.e tool for dealing with concrete
problems. This level is divided into two stages:
"
-r:?r?:^-:L--^---^-a^ ...everslble
"
a^rScf^e^---- -e^-age o. reversible
At first, m the "Preoperation" period of preparation,
the language and thought of the child are egocentric. He
is tied to his own viewpoint. And while he has vague
intuitions about the intentions and perspectives of others,
he is unable to take the role of the other or understand
it m a coherent way. His attention is centered, and his
reasoning is frequently distorted by thinking only about
the surface features of phenotiena. Thinking here can be
seen as prelogical, and one of its main characteristics
is its •irreversibility". This is demonstrated by the
inability, for example, to understand that the quantity
of water in a tall, thin glass is conserved when its
surface qualitative appearance is transformed by pouring
the water into a shorter and wider glass. Here is the
way John Flavell introduces the notion of reversibility
of thought (which is achieved only in the second stage
of this concrete representational level): "a cognitive
organization is reversible, if it is able to travel
along a cognitive route (pursue a set reasonings, follow
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a series of transfonnatlons In . aispla.. etc., ana then
reverse a.rectlon in thought, to ,ina a.ain an unc.an^ea
point Of departure (the
.e^innln, precise, the original
state of display, etc.)"122
In the "Concrete operational" stage, the child
achieves a coherent and integrated cognitive syste. on
the concrete representation plane. He overcomes the ego-
centrist of the initial pre-operational stage. Through
the decentering of his reasoning process, he is now able
to balance or compensate in understanding a process by
reversing a line of reasoning. He is now able to see,
for example, that added width in a water glass compensates
for a loss in height. Also, in overcoming the egocentrism
of the first stage, the child develops a richer capacity
for taking roles in concrete situations. And finally,
he begins to extend his thought from the actuality of
the concrete situation toward an understanding of its
potentialities.
But there are limitations still in this level of
thought, relative to the problem-solving achievements of
formal thought. The cognitive activity of the child is
still oriented towards immediate and concrete reality! he
still begins his reasoning process with the actual
situation, seeing its potentialities as a function of the
various given descriptions. Descriptions of objects and
Ill
system Of descriptions under which he comprehends these
events are never assessed as a whole in terms of theories
Formal or theoretical thinking becomes possible at the
next level, where the child achieves a greater degree of
detachment from the descriptions which were previously
accepted as direct representations of reality.
^' I^vel of Formal Thonght
, m the final level
of cognitive development, reality is still dealt with in
terms of internal manipulation of symbols. But the child,
or adolescent, is no longer limited to operating with
symbols which represent a concrete reality content. In
addition to these first-order operations he can now perform
second-order operations. The first-order descriptions or
symbolizations are now treated not as direct representations
of reality, but as conditionals. And the operations he
performed with these symbols are now seen as part of a
total set of all logically possible operations. Thought
here is completely reversible. Succinctly stated, concrete
reality can now be seen as a special case of the possible.
This is a qualitatively new type of detachment or
conditional dissociation from concrete reality. The
initial forays into hypothetical or theoretical thought
are marked again by a certain egocentrism. But it is
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E-sslble. graaually, to achieve objectivity. This can
occur When the cognitive structures of formal operational
thought are In egulUbrlu,. Plavell gives the following
paradlg. case of how the adolescent thln.s. or can thin.,
at his cognitive "best"!
for consideration the totalitv of distinct combinatinn.
ll ^^^^f
P^^Po-itions. These combinations are r'gardeS
som^i^firmedV'°'"\^' ""^'^^ "^^^ ^ confirmed ^^d
that ' ^Ucits L't^'^'^T ^"^^^tigation. is it true^n r a elici X? if so, does 3 also? Is it true thA^A produces X only when B is absent? Such are the
thf^^^'S?^
questions which make up the domain of
Ms Sk as ti^^'^^^^^^'^T"' adolescent views
rifn o V determining the actual shaoe of
test!l23^
successively putting them to empirical
Kohlberg: Levels of Moral Development
Most of Piagefs studies that have contributed to
this theory of mental development have dealt with such
categories as space, time, number and causality. Little
of his energy has been spent studying the development of
categories of practical reason, although one of his early
^oJ^s, The Moral Judgment of the Child , broke some new
ground in this area. One of the most thorough and persistent
elaborators of the developmental approach to moral judgment
is the United States is Lawrence Kohlberg. Kohlberg*
s
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theory postulates osmewhat more tightly defined stages
than Piagefs original wor>. in the area of ^oral Judgment.
And while Piaget placed considerable emphasis on peer
group interaction in explaining upward stage movement,
Kohlberg broadens this to focus on general role-taking
opportunities.
^4 ^
"Ulster of the dimensions of moral ludqment
th^n CO n^.f'^^r ^""'^^ ^^^^^^^^ conteS rathera cog itive form. An example is the dimension ofresponsiveness to peer, as opposed to adult? expecta-
n'^r'^'^J^^ hypothesizes this dimen^ion^^spart of his autonomous stage, his rationale forderiving this from a consideration of cognitive formis vague and unconvincing. There is nothing more
cognitively mature to preferring a peer than an adult
.... While Piaget attempted to define two stages ofmoral Judgment (the heteronomous and the autonomous)
^rr^^''''
empirical study and logical analysis indicaternat his moral stages have not met the criteria of
stages he proposes ... as his cognitive stages do.l24
Kohlberg* s methods of study are similar to those
employed by Piaget. In an interview, he presents a child
with a moral dilemma; i.e., he describes a situation in
which someone is called on to make a morally relevant
decision. After finding out what the person in the story
did, the child is asked, "Should he have done it?" and
••Why?" One of Kohlberg 's favorites is the following
conflict involving the values of property and human life.
In Europe, a woman was near death from cancer. One
drug might save her, a form of radium that a druggist
in the same town had recently discovered. The druggist
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was charging $2,000, ten times what th« hto make. The sick woman's husb^nr r f ^"'"'^ ^i-^everyone he knew to borrow th^^" * ^i^^' "'^"^ toonly get together about h^l f % H^^' '^o^ldthe druggis? that M^wife was dWna '"Z^^^' ^ ^^^^sell it cheaper or let hTm ^^'^^'^ ^i'" to
said,
..No...
^he^husband^got'^L per:;e f'nl '^^^^^^the man's store to steal 5 ^^"^ ^^o^® into
the husband have done ?iat7 ^fllf "i^^' ^^^ould
Kohlberg presents his results generally in the form
Of a summary of the stages discerned. He does not tie his
stages to age-norms, which in any case are merely guides
for developmental analysis. But he holds that his stages
define. (A) culturally universal components of morality;
(B) coherent modes or structures of moral judgn^ent; and
(C) a logically invariant sequence (i.e., the order of
progression could not be different). The evidence he
presents to support this claim is methodologically
somewhat more sophisticated than Piagefs, and includes
a study of moral Judgment development among Taiwanese
peasants. 126 The summaries often vary in minor detail
from one article to the next, but the following summary
attempts to present the general outlines of Kohlberg 's
stage framework. ^27 ^^ee also Appendix A, "Kohlberg*
s
Definition of Moral Stages'.^ Its purpose is to familiarize
the reader with some of Kohlberg* s basic distinctions and
terminology.
Kohlberg* s studies have led him to distinguish
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three basic levels of moral development, first, a
preconvfintlonal level* s^>r-/^r^^-Leve , econd, a conventional level, and
^^^r6, a postconvenMonal, principled or autonomous level
Within each of these general levels of moral thinKing, two
structural stages are distinguished, m the preconventional
level, moral value is interpreted in terms of the physical
or hedonistic consequences of action. The major difference
between stage 1 and stage 2 children is that stage 2
.
subjects have achieved a basic notion of fairness as
reciprocity. The stage 1 child is attentive primarily
to differentials of power, status or possessions, rather
than to exchange in terms of the different needs people
have. In response to the dilemma of whether to steal the
drug to save a life, the stage 1 subject might typically
rest his judgment on factors such as the cost of the drug
or the damage done in the process of stealing it, or the
likelihood of going to jail. In contrast, a stage 2 child
might point out that Heinz wants his wife to live, or
that he may need her to help him someday, or that the
druggist needs to make a profit. Unilateral deference to
superior power gives way here to a naively egoistic and
egalitarian judgment of the external consequences of
actions.
The conventional lelvel of moral thought overcomes
the egoism of stage 2 in resting moral judgment on the
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ae,«e to „Mch an action con.o..s to t.e expectations o.
others ana supports the basic dimensions of one-s social
oraer. Sta.e 3 involves an orientation towara pleasin, ana
helping others, aoing what is approved by the™, ana is
often referred to as a "^ooa hoy-nice girl" orientation.
The "others- who aefine right ana wrong perfo.ance of roles
are usually those whose expectations are ™ost prominant
m the chiia.s social environ-nent. Stage 4 is referrea to
as "the law and oraer orientation" or an "authority ana
social-order maintaining orientation", m this stage the
social order is seen as a value In it==i<= „dx i Itself, somewhat distinct
from the persons whose expectations make it immediate to
Mm. one does his '.duty- and upholds a general respect
for authority, vn^ereas a stage 3 subject might Judge the
drug stealing case in terms of saving face or gaining the
approval of his family, the stage 4 child will invoke
notions of honor, duty and the importance of maintaining
the social order, including its laws.
There are two critical limitations to these four
types of moral thought, and these limitations emerge most
clearly with stage 4 judgments. Stage 4 thought does not
clearly recognize obligations to persons outside the
particular social order of the subject; and it provides
no clear guides to the creation of new norms or laws, no
perspective adequate to guide participation in a changing
117
social order. The postconventional level of thought is
constituted by stages which represent structures of
thought adequate to overcoming these limitations. Moral
values and principles are accepted apart fro. an individual's
identification with his social order, and they are viewed
as valid regardless of whether they are held by significant
persons or groups in his society. The first such structure
of thought, stage 5, is a Contractual legalistic
orientation", m this stage, obligations are framed in
terms of freely made agreements and contracts. Emphasis is
placed upon procedural rules for reaching agreement and
results in a "legal point of view", m the case of stealing
a drug to save a life, considerations such as the
appropriateness of pertinent laws and procedures would
take deliberation beyond the level of simple maintenance
of the social order. The final stage in the sequence is
termed "the universal ethical principle orientation".
Whereas stage 5 thinking is bound to consideration
primarily of concrete rules and norms of a society, stage
6 Involves the structuring of thought around universal
ethical principles - at the most general level, the
principle of justice. The formal properties of law
(universality and impartiality) are extended to the whole
domain of a person's moral relations. Decisions of
conscience are made on the basis of self-chosen principles
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Which are a.st.act ana ethical in nature,
.^^.ents a.out
the stealing of a dru, to save a life would
.e fra.e. m
ter.s Of the principle of respect for hu.an life and
personal standards of conscience such as honesty.
Now before launching into an assessment of the
fruitfulness of the cognitive-develope.ntal approach for
the study of political education, one last bit of ground
woric must be laid. The cpaestion is, how is the relation
between the stages of moral judgment and stages of
cognitive-development conceived? Kohlberg's answer is that
there is a parallelism or isomorphism between general
cognitive development and moral development, cognitive
maturity is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for
moral judgment maturity.
1
^-elation of moral Judgment to intellective
df??i?FT^ suggested by the fact that our staae
fr! no ^^r""^
^^'^^ Piagetian concrete operationsa e necessary for conventional (Stage 3 and 4)morality and that formal operations are necessaryfor principled (Stage 5 and 6 ) morality .... Whileformal operations may be necessary for principled
morality, one may be a theoretical physicist 'and yet notmake moral judgments at the principled level. 128
We turn now to the task of assessing the merits and
limitations of developmental psychology, and its potential
contribution to the study of political education.
CHAPTER VII
DEVEDDPMENTAL PSYCHOI^GY, A„ ASSESSMENT (I)
Introduction
The assessment offered here, and in the next chapter'
can advance only a small portion of the way toward a
definitive Judgment on the fruitfulness of the cognitive-
developmental approach for the study of political education.
.
I have approached the tas)c of assessment in a critical, hut
sympathetic and, hopefully, constructive manner.
The distinctions which are brought out so clearly
by developmental psychology provide a useful framework for
research. Political judgment overlaps with moral judgment
in many ways. And we should expect to find distinctions
Similar to that between a conventional morality and a
principled moral code when we look at the types of reasons
or mode of thinking which supports or underlies the politi-
cal Judgments of the population. This is, in fact, similar
to the core distinction we have drawn between the achieve-
ments of political socialization and the achievements of
political education.
The fruits of this approach will effectively
challenge, I believe, those who view man and the science
of man from the conformity perspective, investigating
what is essentially a conformity-training process under
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the ruhrlc o.
"socialisation... The develop^entalist • s
unaerstandin, of the explanatory task, and its relation
to normative inquiry differs considerably. The concepts
Which ^tde research are philosophical or normative rather
than behavioral,
.^d empirical research results are said
"to help Clarify and define an ultimately adequate,
universal and mature conception of morality. "1 31 gut
there is no thought of abandoning analytic and empirical
,
rigor. The approach, in fact, should prove more satisfying
in the understanding and explanation of many facets of
social and political life. But in order to bear this
fruit, the developmentalisfs notion of the character
of a full-blown explanation needs to be pulled out of the
narrower confines of a psychologist's treatment. For
a view of the common and universal dimensions of mental
development is not complete without explicit ties to the
character of an individual's involvement in social and
political life.
There is an important connection between the points
made in the two preceeding paragraphs, which can be
advanced in a preliminary way here. That is, while manv
of the distinctions made bv developmentalists can aid in
formulating a justifiable ideal of human development . ^ ^
^
we are le^t with an inadequate conception of how this
ideal might be realized in particular societies with their
121
example, Kohl.er. clai.s that t.e aevelop^ent o. a.ea.
concepts follows the sa.e invariant sequence in an
Atayal viUa.e on Por.osa as in ^.erica,
.ut that during
the Atayalan adolescence there is a "rearession.' to
concepts held by younger children. This is accounted for
as '^cultural learning'., for "the culture can ^reverse*
the sequence by specific training. "1 33 Now the question
•night arise as to how to prevent this reversal and
..ove
Atayal youngsters bac^ toward a conception of drea.s as
internal and i.^aterial n^ental phenomena, and away fro.
the "regressive'' equation of the soul, the dream, and
ghosts. Would it be a task for formal educational
institutions, or some other institutional device attenuat-
ing the hold adults have over adolescents - their
leverage for training? But as soon as we consider the
question in this light it must be recognized that any
such measure would involve tampering with the myths which
provide the social fabric with structure and continuity.
We would be looking, in other words, for a point cf
leverage which would Involve more or less fundamental
transformation of the Atayal culture and social structure.
These broader social implications of the approach seem some-
what opaque to most developmental psychologists. It would
be the task of a theory of political education to tie the
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Ideals of hu^an development picked out by the concept
of education to a theory of social structure. Only from
that point can we develop an adequate idea of how to
promote political education.
The comments which follow are pursued under three
headings, 1) the character of mature thought (this
chapter), 2) the explanation of mental development; and
3) from thought to action (chapter 8). It will be
apparent not only that many of the points made could be
pursued profitably in greater detail, but also that many
of the points made separately have a close bearing on one
another.
The Character of Mature Thought
This section is divided into three parts. First,
we present a critical assessment of Kohlberg's theory of
moral development. Since practical questions (in the
sense of "practical" introduced above, pp. 98-99) are so
intimately involved in the reasonings behind political
Judgment, it is important to understand more precisely
how Kohlberg's theory taps into this dimension of thought.
Next, with a broader view of the dimensions of socio-
political judgment in hand, we consider Piaget*s (and
Kohlberg's) treatment of the unity in mental development.
In what sense must we make reference to a unifying feature
of mature thought? And what can we say about mature socio-
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political thought in ter^s of its ••reversibiUty" or
••objectivity, nn^uy. „e concluae this section with a
brief treatment of what „e ta.e to be a central feature
of mature thought
- its reflectiveness.
W« have looked at the broad theoretical framework
of the cognitive developmental approach, and at the
specific stage sequence postulated by Kohlberg for
moral development. The postulates of the theory Kohlberg
proposes to account_for the stages of moral development
can be summarized as follows:
V
'^^^^^ stages of moral develoompnfwhich represent (3) c^^Kiu:ve-^t-rn..f-,,^:r.°gT!"^
'
in conception of selFI^TT-i^^nffflKS^^
represent successive modes of "tLing l^^. l^Jj''^
J^hps" in social situations, so that (D) the sffialenvironmental determinants of development are ?heopportunities for rni
.
..w.^ Moreover! (S) the
so tharr.r.^
.^;rn..nr.^ his perceived ' environment
,
at (r) moral stages and their development
represent the interaction of the child's structuring
ment^''?''^/"^^'^^f features of the environ-
Tn i?"" ^^i?^ successive forms of equilibriumI interaction. This equilibrium is conceived as (H)
3^ i^^^^^' ^ith (I) change being caused bvdisequilibrium, where (J) some optional level of
'
'^t^''\^^J^^^^^P^^cy is necessary for change betweenthe child and the environment, 134
We now want to consider what is involved in treating
stages of moral development as "level [s] of justice", and
mature moral thought as a "justice structure". "^^^ There
are two types of criticism to be offered of the way
Kohlberg has formulated or interpreted this theory. The
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outline o. stages
.e postulates see.s acceptable e„ou,. i„
^emo,
.oote. m e.pi.ical eviaence,
..t the clal.s about
.o.aXlt. put .orwa..
. „ot cXearly
.oote. in eviaenee ana
Ultimately phllo3opM=al-nor.atlve claims about morality
-
»ust be
-^estlonea. The first type of criticise, which
I will only outline briefly, deals with the adequacy of
the characterisation of (^nature) morality ger^, as
bouna univocally to the concept of Justice. The question
is whether
.orlality is not conceivea of .00 restrictively.
The secona type of criticism - which is in a sense the
converse of the first
- asks whether Kohlberg's inter-
pretation of morality is adequate to the logical features
of many virtues which we would want to incluae in a full-
blown conception of the development of practical reason.
(This line of thought is pursued in the next section,
••Cognition, Affect, ana the Unity of Mental Development. ••)
The two approaches to criticism are united in the idea that
human development Is best treated not lust as ^r,n^^,.^.,.1
development (with a single concent, justice, at the
pinnacle), but as the development of reason (ratlonalitv l
or modes of reasoni ng with and through concepts
.
The first set of criticisms to be dealt with come
from the point of view of the moral philosopher. The
aeliberatlons behind the critique flow from posing the
question, "Is Kohlberg prescribing a moralityP-'l^e ^
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persistent criticism of Kohlberg is that he has not
spelled out clearly enough the postulated logical
relations between the concepts at different stages. For
example why is it that a "punishment orientation" is
logically prior to a "reward" or "instrumental" orientation.
Kohlberg has gone some way in a recent article toward
spelling out these logical relationships more clearly. 137
But especially at the higher levels, it becomes clear
that Kohlberg 's theory not only makes claims about logical
priority, but also "has built into it claims about the
relative worth of the stages as ways of moral thinking. "138
How, then, does Kohlberg interpret these claims of worth-
whileness?
Justice, including the notions of equality and
reciprocity, is given priority by Kohlberg as the central
feature of mature moral thought. And the "justice
structure" which emerges at stage 6, it is argued, can be
Judged more adequate or better according to the criteria
-advanced by the formalists in moral philosophy - of
Increased prescriptivity and universality (or universali-
zability). And these standards are internal, so the
argument goes, to the notion of what morality is.
The general criterion we have used in saying
that a higher stage's mode of Judgment is more
adequate than a lower stage is that of morality
Itself, not of conceptions of rationality or
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sophistication imported fro. other domalns.l39
These formalist claims have never been without
serious challenge.l40 But the task of taking up this
Challenge directly is beyond the scope of this paper or
the competence of the writer. Instead, x will note some
of the difficulties others have pointed to.
1. one question which arises is whether justice can
stand alone as a principle in dealing with moral problems.
It can be argued, for example, that the criteria of
equality and reciprocity (equality in exchange) are too
formal. For they do not discriminate between the various
respects in which people could be treated equally. One
could attempt to wreak equal harm on others without
violating the formal notion of equality. William Frankena.
for example, finds it necessary to appeal to two principles
of morality: justice and benevolence. "The area of Justice
is part of morality, but not the whole of it. Beneficence,
then, may belong to the other part of morality, and this
is just what seems to be the case to me."^^^
2. Another line of argument questions whether
Kohlberg's theory deals adequately with the moral virtues
picked out by concepts of character traits. Richard
Peters notes the "inadequacy in Kohlberg's treatment of
the content of morality as manifest in virtues such as
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courage, compassion, sincerity and the 1Ike. "
He disnilsses character-trsi »•<. v«done on honesty showed that lt^as s?t,';^"f^ '^''^ """^"^and an unreliable predictor of what ^M?^ °" =P^"^1" =over a range of circumstancer lut h= i """^"^Whether this might be specifi^ to a trairf ""^"^^^^honesty. Ke never examines the marked dif-^^between them and what he calls mnlip^est??!""^
Peters suggests that the learning of habits, even when they
are not fully understood, may be an important part of
what is required in developing a rational, principled
moral code. This argument is parallel to the position
taken in Part I of this work, that political socialization,
though not issuing in a reflective understandina or
perspective on political life, may be seen as a prerequisite
to political education.
3. A further, related, question can be raised about
the notion of objectivity in morals, Kohlberg connects
the logical criteria of reversibility to the reciprocity
of Justice and to the uni versalizability of moral
Judgments. Alasdair Maclntyre (as one among those who
have questioned the possibility of generating a list of
[formal] defining characteristics of morality) notes that
universality of application is involved in conceiving of
anx type of rule, Ke argues then that "there is nothing
specific to moral valuation in universalizability and in
so far as moral valuations are not expressions of rules
12S
they are not unlversalizable. ••
moral va^u!J^on^are°Lt"^' envisaged where
extreme would those fn^^T^^'^^i^^'^^*- ^he one
in certain situations of moral oerplexitvis the case with wv^at- ^^^^^ 4.-U •. ' H-^-cj-^-ity . , , , This
supererogation^
. Tn T.Z °f^"^ '""^l^^ °f
matelv say LL'n ^o and =
«nn°;* '^7" ?lln'; Sn::."?:^,L?^rcannot, be universalized. 143 ' j-ogicaiiy
I want to refrain fro^ entering into this arena of
debate about the .leaning of morality and the type of
criteria proper to distinguishing moral from other types
of discourse. I will grant that a fully developed moral
person may act on principle, and that his type of Judgment
differs in an important qualitiative sense from convention-
al Judgments which hinge on "doing the done thing.- There
Is in other words, a developmental dimension to the
distinction between traditional and principled moral codes
which comes out in considering how it is that people can
come to act on self
-accepted (autonomous) principles. ^44
What I want to follow up on is the more general
consideration of what types of concepts enter into
practical discourse - on what there are reasons for doing
or for bringing into being. I want to ask whether there are
129
not at least see practical concepts - important in the
political discourse and the political Judgments which
provide the flesh and hones of political life - which do
not Share the central characteristic that Kohlher. ascribes
to mature
.oral thought (and Piaget to formal thought)
-
I.e. reversibility (or universalizability)
. m dealing
With this question, we will also be indirectly calling
into question Kohlberg^s Judgment that the criterion of
mature social-moral thought is tied to a single concept
like Justice and not to a more general dimension of
rationality.
We might consider such concepts as courage and
integrity, or autonomy and creativity, or being critical
and displaying foresight. For example, a man might find
good reason to act courageously in a situation in which
he could not demand it of others, or see it as their
duty also
- an act of supererogation as Maclntyre noted
above. Richard Peters has suggested viewing these higher-
order traits of character as examples of human excellence
which we find admirable, but which do not necessarily
call forth approval in a moral sense. 145 por they refer
to the manner in which something is done rather than
precisely what it is that is done (i.e. they indicate a
development of human capacities ) . We may disapprove of
the specific activities in question, such as robbing
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trams or having a Jo)ce at someone else's expense. And
yet we may retain some '^sneaking admiration" for the
excellence displayed in the enterprise - «„o>.ciiuerpr such as courage
and foresicrht in th*» fir-at- .g i: m e first case or creativity and critical
acumen in the second.
Similar notions come to mind when we consider the
range of interpersonal relationships which we enter into
and develop during the normal course of life, in these
relationships certain "reactive- attitudes and feelings,
to which we attach great importance, emerge - such as
gratitude, resentment, forgiveness and love. It is these
notions 1 will consider in the next section.
But first I want to note that these two types of
notions
- character traits and reactive attitudes - share
one feature in common. It is that they are connected
intimately with what it means to be a "person". As Peters
develops this idea:
Being a person is connected conceptually withhaving what I call an assertive point of view, with
evaluation, decision and choice, and with being, to
a certain extent, an individual who determines 'his
own destiny by his choices. It is connected, in
other words, with reason in its various aspects. '/>?e
are all persons in that normally we have a potentiality
for developing such capacities to a considerable
degree. 146
The criterion of development which we want to
propose as appropriate to the sphere of social and
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political judgment is that of reflective rationality. To
aeliberate reflectively on political <^estions involves
consiaering or treating others as .ore or less developed
persons who are capable of .ore fully developing the
capacities which mark the. as persons - that is the
.ore
••intellectual" excellences U.e critical thinking and
foresight, the richness of "affective" life brought out
in forgiveness and love, as well as those virtues which
lie on the border, such as integrity and courage. Political
aiecourse and Judgment involves (to anticipate the argument
in the next section) concepts such as these (i.e. autonomy,
resentment, courage, etc.) which are not necessarily
••reversible" in the Plaget or Kbhlberg sense. These
notions are connected, on the one hand, to the development
of reason, and on the other hand, to the idea of being a
person.
Cognition, Affect, and the Unity
of Mental Development
I want to consider now the distinctions which were
Introduced earlier between cognitive and affective aspects
of mental life, and between social and physical spheres of
Judgment. My comments are based upon a reading of the
final section of an article Piaget first published in
1940, "The Mental Development of the Child. "^'•^ In this
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article we find one of his rare attempts to aeal with
both cognitive and affective aspects of the thought of
adolescents,
Plagefs essential thesis Is that cognition and
affect are two aspects of the same phenomenon. Concepts
for dealing with the physical world or the Interpersonal-
social world are similar in having this "double aspect".
David Elkind summarizes the position as follows.
By and large Piaget would seem to hn a
The cognitive systems termed ''personality and '.s^lf"
o?herV^f^f ^"^'^ respect. If they differ f'om
th^ ^^>. 7''^^^^^ systems - such as those dealina w^the physical world - then it is in terms of theircontent, not their mode of operation. 149
^^"^
What is interesting (or troubling) about this
article (and other treatments by Piaget and Kohlberg) is
that Piaget speaks of a parallelism and interaction
between cognitive and affective/sori development.
Exactly parallel to the elaboration of the formal
operations and the completion of the construction ofthought, adolescent affectivity asserts itself
through the development of the personality and itsinjection into adult society .... Now this personal
system cannot be constructed prior to adolescence,
because it presupposes the formal thought and
reflexive constructions we have Just discussed. 150
To summarize the difficulty which might be thought
to arise here, we can aski is Piaget postulating an over-
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sphere o. Jua^.nts a.out t.. p.,.,.,, ,,,,,, ^ ^^^^^ ^^^^point Of interpretation only to deny it. as Piaget
definitely woulti •v-.x io. But the manner of exDoq^^^r^r, i ^ ,c-«.position could lead
to misinterpretation of Piaaefs *^l get s theory of mental life,
along the lines of what Richard Peters fin^.r T:e ds common in
child development textbooks.
use of intellect w^re free froA nf f
morality and the
awareness, each of which has its affec?i5e aspect. 151
But Piacret has no such intentions, for he holds fast to
the position that "personal schemas, like all others,
are both intellectual and affective." He continues.
We do not love without seeking to understand, and we
tL. y.^''^'' ^^'^'^ "'^^^^^^^ ^ ^"^^1*^ of judgment.Thus when we speak of 'affective schemas', itmus;be understood that what is meant is merely theaffective aspect of schemas which are also intellectual.
The theory can best be conveyed by pointing to the
dialectical interaction, in mental development, between
application in the social and physical spheres. The thrust
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Pia^et.s treatment o. t.e senso.v-.otor sta,. 3,..s to
revolve arouna th, aeveXop^ent of certain cental sKiUs
(with cognitive and affective aspects) l„ ,,,Ung „lth
th. Physical woria. he Is sufficiently aialectlcal to
allow that certain social experiences ana concepts are
crucial to the development ana elaboration of certain
level of thought m the physical sphere. Por exa.pl-
in speaking of the adolescent's
"new capacity to orient
himself toward what is a^-str^^r-i- =r>^ .IS b tract and not immediately
present
.
. .
which
... is indispensable instrument
in his adaptation to the adult social framework
......
he says "there is no doubt that this is the most direct
and, moreover, the simplest manifestation of formal
thinking. "153
The point of interpretation is, I hope, settled.
But two more points must be made. First, there is an
important and intimate connection between the affective
aspects of mental life and the development of inter-
personal-social concepts. This connection comes through
clearly when we look at those "reactive- attitudes and
feelings which emerge in participative interpersonal
relationships. Second, we are still faced with the problem
of finding ways of describing the overall character of
the levels in the development of mental life. In the
article mentioned earlier ("The Mental Development of the
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Chiia..), P,.,et
..e,uentl,
.e.ers to the
..reversiMUty.
ana
..reflectiveness., of for.aX t.ou.nt,
..t these ter.s
ao not appear at all m the discussion of social/affective
development, x want now to loo. at how Pia.et conceives
of the unity in mental development, and defend this
conception in modified form. The necessity of modification
Will come out when we loo. at certain important features
of reactive interpersonal attitudes.
in the article we are considering, Piaget offers
the following insight into the threads of continuity and
discontinuity in the mental lifej
unit..
conclusion, let us point out the basicity of the process which, from the construction
inLnf^'^^' universe by infantile sensor^^oto?
wnr?d i'^^:?^^'.^^^^^ reconstruction of the
^Z]t ^ ^ypothtico-deductive thinking o^ the
der^ve^f^ ^"^wledge of the concre^i ^orld
cM^dhoo^ w ^^^^^^ operations of middlehildh d. Je have seen how these successive
?n?t??i"'^''"^ f^r^^ ^''^^^^^ ^ decenterina of thei i ial egocentric point of vie^n order to place it
ion^ ^ver-broader coordination of relations andc ncepts, so that each new terminal grouping furtherintegrates the subject's activity by adapting it to
e?aS::r^;r^'"''^.^""''^^- ^^^^^^^^ ^^^^ intenectuall boration, we have seen affectivity graduallvdisengaging itself from the self in order to submit,thanks to the reciprocity and coordination of values,to the laws of cooperation. Of course, affectivitvis always the incentive for the actions that ensue ateach new stage of this proaressive ascent, since
affectivity assigns value to activities and distributes
eneray to them. But affectivitv is nothing withoutintelligence. Intelligence furnishes affectivity withits means and clarifies its ends .... in reality,
the most profound tendency of all human activity is
progression towards equilibrium. Reason, which
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Reason, rational action, or rationality m cental
life
-
these, then, are the phenomena which have this
double aspect of cognltlvlty and affectlvlty. intel-
lectuality and emotionality. Placet has been engaged m
the description and clarification of the characteristics
of different levels or types of rationality. This is the
thread of continuity In mental development.
But because Plaget finds a fundamental coherence
or structuring of the reasoning processes of a child at
a certain level of thought, he must also account m his
descriptions for discontinuities in the development of
reason.155 This development Involves, in other words,
qualitative transformations in the mode of reasoning,
Plaget offers a rich variety of concepts for getting at
the essential characteristics of rationality at the level
of mature or formal thought. In different places he has
said that mature thought Is detached, objective,
equilibrated, reversible and reflective. Plaget himself has
noted that these are different perspectives or conceptual
tools for getting at the essential characteristics of
the reasoning processes.
What I want to propose here Is first of all, that
the "reflectiveness" of mature socio-political thought be
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taken as central to its understanding, and as the central
cognitive criterion of political education, I will
present, in the remainder of this section, the rudiments
of a philosophical argument that mature socio-political
thought cannot be "reversible" and "objective" in quite
the same sense indicated by Piaget. To do this we must
return to a consideration of the "reactive" interpersonal
attitudes we have mentioned, and the sense in which they
,
may enter into mature "reflectively rational" thought.
These attitudes and feelings (e.g., resentment and
gratitude, forgiveness and love, hate and hurt feelings)
are "reactive" in the sense that they depend on the
attitudes and feelings of other human beings toward us. 156
These feelings have at their core a view of the good-will
or malevolence which others have toward us. And they
point to "the very great importance that we attach to the
attitudes and intentions of other human beings, and the
great extent to which our personal feelings and reactions
depend upon, or involve, our beliefs about these attitudes
and intentions. "^^'^
Now, to return to our central problem, the
characterization of mature (or formal) thought, we find
that Piaget attaches importance to two achievements which
find expression in reflectiveness of thought. Formal
thought is, first of all, thinking about thought. It
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implies a sort of detachment attained when the direct
operations on concrete reality are themselves represented
and operated on in propositional form. Secondly, in
formal thought there is a reversal of relations between
the real and the possible. Piaget and Inhelder sum up
these two features as follows
i
Formal thinking is both thinking about thouaht
iS^^r''^^^:;^' ^ operationalsystem which operates on propositions whose truth, in
^"rV?^^''^?^^ 2" relational, and numericaloperations) and a reversal of relations between whatIS real and what is possible (the empirically qivencomes to be inserted as a particular sector of thetotal set of possible combinations ). 153
It is the second sense of reflectiveness that I
want to consider - the quality which assigns the real to
a "mirror-reflective" relation to an empirically discover-
able subset of the logically possible. I want to argne
that the feature of formal thought which Piaget ties to
this sense of reflectiveness - its reversibility and ,
to some extent, its objectivity - cannot be characteristic
of those social attitudes and feelings we have called
"reactive ". And it is at least doubtful whether any
mature thought about social phenomena can be reversible
and objective in quite the sense that Piaget attaches to
these terms. The argument follows from three points.
1, The reactive aspect of these interpersonal
attitudes is not simply a mirror reflection. Rather, there
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is an indefinite series of reflections. Por in for.in,
beliefs a.out others, there is .ore than Just an account
n^ade of their beliefs about .e. We consider also their
beliefs about my beliefs about them, and so on.
2. In thinking reflectively about and forming
beliefs about this series, we are not Just detached
observers (although there is a sense, captured by the
notion of role-taking, in which a certain detachment is
necessary to grasping the perspective of the other and
attempting a coordination). Rather, we are parttclo.n^.
.
and thus in an important sense these attitudes are non-
detached. It is conceivable that this participative
attitude can be suspended, but as Strawson notes, "a
sustained objectivity of interpersonal attitude, and the
human isolation which that would entail does not seem
to be something of which human beings would be capable,
even if some general truth were a theoretical ground for
it. "159
3. We are not just participants tout court in social
life, but participants in relationships whose fabric is
dependent on specific beliefs about others and their
attitudes. Because of this, new information or a change
of beliefs may alter (sever or deepen) a relationship in
such a way that it can never be the same again. But at this
point our thinking about this relationship is in a
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ve
sense Irreversible. The ramifications of a change in
belief can alter the whole interpretative framework. Cne
cannot reverse his thought and think about what it was
like "When she loved me," when new information alters his
belief about what was before the core of his interpretati
framework
- i.e. when he learns that she was deceiving
him all along. We are not framing "hypotheses" in forming
beliefs about others in these relationships, but something
more like hedging our bets in the risk of investment in
human social life. But however our bets are hedged, they
cannot be totally withdrawn in the way a disconfirmed
hypothesis can be discarded.
I conclude, then, that an important range of concepts
about interpersonal relations, tied to the notion of being
a person, point to a certain irreversibility of mature
thought about social life.^^O j ^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^
character trait concepts, tied to both the social conditions
presumed by the process of public discourse and to the
Idea of developing one's capacities as a person, are
similarly applied reflectively without the implication
of reversibility.
Charles Taylor comes to similar conclusions after a
somewhat different argument.
Reversibility implies a grasp of things as
systems which can undergo a coherent set of trans-
fromations as ideally manipulable entities; and
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them. Bu? an oblectl?e unal^J S?""^"^ '^'^iP^ «lth
Taylor emphasizes the affective or striving aspect of
interpersonal relations, spea).ing of the working through
of a tension-filled relationship m imagination, or play-
acting, in order to better grasp its significance.
in a relatfon^h? ^i^^^en sources of tensioni s ip, for instance, we can out it inperspective; and with this we alter the reLt^onshipin some degree, so that its past form can become
"Jusr^h'r^'" entirety; and by this I meL notJust that we cannot return to it in fact but th^^
r^tu^Hatr? '^l.^ ^'^^^ ^^^^P inteUectuany'of aeturn path; in other words, cur thought here is
a swZdl?'";';."'"^' lignif^^aice isSignificance. To attempt to treat it as anobject, which can be examined in abstraction from our
8Wlnr^'%'i; ^^^^^ ^--^ from th?ssharing and hence alter the relationship .... Wecannot become disintricated enough from theseSituations of involvement to dominate them asTnanipulable objects, and hence objectivity here hasto mean something else; it can only mean that we
come to put them into perspecitve. 162
Here we arrive at our conclusion about Piaget's
and Kohlberg's conceptions of mature social thought* it
cannot be reversible and objective in exactly the sense
which they seem to intimate by those terms. It is for this
reason that I have chosen the reflectiveness of mature
social thought as an essential characteristic. In our
assessment, then, there remains only the further clarifi-
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cation Of What we
.ean by the reflectiveness of
.ature
social thought.
we are interested primarily in the reflectiveness of
practical reasoning, which involves questions of what
there are reasons for doing and what there are reasons
for bringing into being. I.t .e begin by putting fo.ard
the core clai. I want to clarify as a defensible view of
What is involved in reflective practical reasoning. The
claim is that when a reflectiveness
.,,_„^,„
is attained, the crucial achiev<.^o nt 1^ t.h. .v.i..,.
formulate new altern.Mv.. for .ntion outsid. .
£^MIgwork.of^grm5 and goals ^ .nd t-^ reconcile or oW.o
^S^gna-Conflicting_a^^ of action m a principled
and autono'pous manner
. It is not a choice of means to a
given end, as in conventional (or instrumentally rational)
thought, where, according to Kohlberg, the ends are given
in the social mores and sustained by Justification in terms
of upholding the social order. Rather, in reflective thought
one is able to deliberate on the ends of action, to hold
them up and view them from many angles or perspectives. .\nd,
most importantly, there is an awareness that since we are
crucially implicated participants in social life, actions
can have qualitatively different results. We become aware
that choice among ends which have qualitiati vely different
results is, in effect, choice of a future self. We become
143
capable of understanding and choosing a.ong alternative
personal ideals and for^s of life. Benemve_£^tionallty
Involves, then, holding „d di ffer.nv ^^ds or ,,m, „^
action and asking what the reason. ... aoln. . . „
terms of What vmd of self .nd ^v-^^
for brl ncrlng Into being .
The distinction I have drawn between instrumental
and reflective rationality resembles that made by Dewey
(noted in Chapter I) between "wide and narrow use of
reason" when we deliberate, that is, rehe.^rse in
Imagination various competing possible lines of action.
^ nv.
'^^^ latter holds a fixed end in view anddeliberates only upon means of reaching it. Theformer regards the end in view in deliberation astentative and permits, may encourage the coming into
view of consequences which will transform it and
create a new purpose and plan .... Deliberationis not an attempt to do away with this opoosition ofquality by reducing it to one of amount as with
utilitarian rational calculation. It is an attempt
to uncover the conflict of aims in its full scope
and bearing .... in short, the thing actually at
stake in any serious deliberation is not a differencein quantity, but what kind of a person one is to
beco'Tie, what sort of self is in the making, what
kind of a world is making. 163
We can see now how developmental psychology is tied
to the developmental perspective. For with the achievement
of mature reflective thought - with the ability to gauge
in imagination possible self-transformations, and to
accept the irreversible altering of relationships which
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are
way arise from fh< « a^-K^t is achievement of perspective -
„e
capable of vlewln, others as agents, as persons wlthl
assertive point of view „ho are also potential!, capable
of acting to control their destiny, to enrich their
emotional lives and to develop their higher order
capacities. Another connection is that in thinking
reflectively about oneself and others as persons capable
of developing their capacities to a high degree, the
question of the possibility of wide scale human develop-
ment arises. That is. in what sort of society Is the
development of human excellences - fuUy developed,
reflective persons
- possible, and how might this society
come into being. The question is, basically, how to create
a rational society. To speak of a rational society is not
to specify what partlclar aims might be pursued by
members of the society or the specific social practices
shaping the form of life considered desirable. It is
only to say that it would be capable of providing
conditions for the full development of reflectively
rational citizens. This type of thinking might be called
Utopian In the modern sense that what ought to be - the
good society - is intimately connected with a view of
how it might be brought into being. IS"* We can sum up by
saying that reflectively rational social and political
thought involves at least four components: 1) a view of
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hun,an excellence, tied to the notion of persons ana their
full development, 2) a view of the rational society, 3) a
theory of society and social change, 4) a moral point of
view (Which attempts to refine the principles used to deal
with conflicts arising In the achievement of human
excellence
- the full development of reason, and the
rational society).
Let me conclude by pointing out that this proposed
criterion of mature socio-political thought (-reflective
rationality) is normative in two senses. It is normative,
first of all, because the stages of mental development
(the development of reason) are picked out from a particular
angle or perspective. The distinction between instrumental
and reflective rationality is but one of many criteria
which could be proposed for better coming to grips with
the qualitative structural development of practical reason.
Just as I have given reasons for rejecting "reversibility"
as a major developmental criterion in this sphere, so
also may further empirical and conceptual inquiries force
a revision of this notion of "reflectiveness". This
criterion is normative in a second, related, sense also.
For if it is to pick out a significant feature of mental
life, it stands in need of justification. That is, if it
proves an empirically fruitful and conceptually clear
notion, the question arises as to how much reflectiveness
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ou,ht to p.o.ot.a
.or „.at proportion a.a se,™ent of
the population, and how this ought to be done. This Is
the «oral component of the developmental perspective, ^s
Taylor puts it, a developmental criterion is normative
because "concepts of successful maturity are the basis of
arguments concerning how we should live. "165 ^ tentative
attempt to Justify this criterion is presented m the
concluding chapter of this study.
CHAPTER VIII
^^^ixaJ. i^oYCHOLGGY: AN ASSESSMENT (H)
Introduction
in the preceedlng chapter, two central points e.eraed
about the enterprise of constructing a developmental
political psychology geared to the study of political
education. The f i r•Q^ < ,st is a general point about the fundamen-
tal character of Piagefs developmental psychology. It
was pointed out that Piaget has been engaged in the tas.
of reconstructing the ontogenetic development of reason
or rationality. I argued further that the highest level
of rationality in socio-political thought is best
characterized in terms of its reflectiveness; that the
development of practical reason is intimately co nnected
with the notion of a person, and that a certain human
excellence is apparent in the emotional life and character
of individuals who attain a perspective on life through
reflection. The second point is that an understanding of
reflective social and political thought requires recognition
of the participative character of social relations. Actions
are tied not Just to the beliefs of the agent, but to his
beliefs about others* beliefs, and how he figures into
their beliefs, etc. It is the shared significance of
behavior which warrants describing it as action. And it
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is this participative character of social life which
requires qualifying the sense in which social thought can
be reflective
- i.e. it cannot always be reversible in the
way reasoning about physical objects can be.
In this chapter I want to proceed by showing how
this second point is related to the explanations offered
by Piaget and Kohlberg for advance in levels of rationality
with ontogenentic development, and to the claims made by
Kohlberg concerning the explanation of action. I will be
trying to lay the basis for the argument that the categories
of a theory of social structure enter at crucial points
in an explanatory theory of political education.
The Explanation of Development
Developmental psychologists have, on a number of
occasions, been criticized for "ignoring the social
dimension" in their inquiries. This attack might be seen
as rooted in a misunderstanding of the tasks developmental
psychologists have set themselves, or in a disagreement
about the characterization of the phenomena to be
investigated, or in a more basic disagreement about
the character of a "science" of psychology and its
epistemological underpinnings. But this criticism has
also been advanced by some philosphers sympathetic to the
developmental perspective who are concerned with the inter-
pretation of Piaget* 3 work. For example, Stephen Toulmin
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comments on •^conservation" studies, in which it is found
that the
"preoperational" child cannot understand that an
identical quantity of water is contained in a tall, thin
glass and a short, fat one
:
„ .
The experimenters seeminaly ignored thesocially determined
- not to say conventional -character of the tasks they invited the cMld ^operform, notably, the ambiguities in their lino^i stirexpressions, (a young child can hardly be expS toguess intuitively by what exact standards, and ^n
^nt^nd^h/^'f P^-ticular criteria, his interrogators
"?s twi". ° ^^T} ^'J'' "^^^ ambiguious question,I here 'more* in the one container than in the
°; Sf'^""^.,^^® amount in both?"; and we have noright to be surprised if his resulting behavior isby our standards, inconsistent . 167
In this section I want to follow up on this last
criticism, and show how the "ambiguity" of the concepts
which guide social practice, or the "inconsistency" of
their criteria of application, may be related to the
explanation of mental development. I will consider the
development of reflective socio-political thought and how
far the explanatory schemes of Piaget and Kohlberg take
us toward an understanding of its development.
Before we proceed, I want to state a central theme
of my argument. In speaking of human development as the
development of persons (or potential persons), and in
segmenting that development into a scheme of levels of
rationality, I assume that the explanation offered must
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taxe into account the specific features of the level of
reasoning to he explained. Because of this, no general
explanation can he offered to account for all the trans-
formations in .ode Of reasoning which can he observed
auring the course of ontogenetic development. More
specifically, it is important to distinguish between the
factors which can be cited ho ^v^i 4o t explain the achievement of
instrumental rationality (operational thought, conventional
-norality) and those cited
,
in accounting for the development
of reflective rationality (formal thought, principled
morality). Instrumental rationality can be viewed as the
use of reason m the minimal sense of what is required if
there is to be any social-institutional life at all. It is
the achievement picked out by socialisation to the basic
principles of social life, through Induction into
conventional forms of thought and social practices. Here
we are speaking of the ability to grasp ends or purposes,
fit an action to that end as a means of its attainment, and
to regulate this conduct by reasons available in public
discourse. 168 Because socialization is an achievement, and
failure is possible, an explanation of successful sociali-
zation must make reference to the specific social practices
which led to this achievement, A general description of
the tyee of factor involved In explaining socialization -
such as role-taking opportunities - is possible. 169 gut
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because the opportunity to ta.e certain roles In certain
Circumstances could hinder or fail to promote socialization.
It is necessary to specify the character of successful
practices in explaining the achievement of socialization.
When we are attempting to account for the development
of the ability to reason reflectively, it is n=^..•— ± ix» xu IS aiso necessary
to cite the role of specific social institutions or
traditions. Why is this so? First of all, the capacities
or abilities which are expressed in an^: type of reasoning
cannot be exercised apart from some practices such as
those in which we find them exemplified. We must reason
about something, and practical reason cannot be exercised
outside the context of some question about actual praccices^^O
In the case of instrumental reasoning, the practices
involved relate to the capacities required for some
minimum level of functionina in any society. The explanatory
role of social experience cannot then involve picking out
features of social practice which distinguish one society
from another.
In turning to the explanation of the development of
reflective rationality, however, we do not find this type
of reasoning in all societies. Where it is found, it may
be recognized in practices which may vary from one society
to another, according to the specific beliefs and ideals
of the people. Critical thinking, autonomy, and creativity
may be recognized in very different practices, but they
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are not at all nec.ssarllv connected with the minimal
requirements of social life. So it is these specific
practices
- institutions, traditions, structural features
Of society
-
which must be cited as necessary preconditions
for the development of reflective rationality, i believe
that some such distinction as this is implicit in the
explanatory schemes offered by Piaget and Kohlberg.
However, they have failed to develop this point, and this
I believe is one of the major weaknesses in their theories.
To correct this deficiency would move them in the direction
of a more adequate social psychology.
^' Pi^qet and the Explanation of Mental Development
.
In the comments introducing the last chapter, we said that
the distinctions employed by developmental psychologists
like Piaget and Kohlberg - the phenomena they identify -
provide an important and useful framework for research.
But it was implied that in order to provide an explanatory
theory with real fruitfulness for social scientists
several important tasks remain. I want to focus here on
two interrelated tasks which have remained peripheral to
the endeavors of developmental psychologists. The first
difficulty is that the explanatory theory is constructed
at a very high level of abstraction, with attention
focused on identifying the types of factors important in
development. Flavell*s comments bear on this point:
153
The system is obviously descriptive in h>,«It has over the years nrovirio^ , sense thatinformation on the chana?na nh/ ""f^^^^ °^ detailed
nltion in the course
^^^onLoene^Jc'd'''^"^obviously it also purport to exnl^ r!^"^'^^"^-describes. Piaget^ecognizes w^^wL ^^^"^"^age is a vehicle for causes ra^w ""^^^ ^^^t
self, nonetheless the "real" cauLf'"'' ^
^^""^
tically varied at the exoerimen^^? ? ^""f ""^^ systema-
studies (although atLmSs are made r^^.'" Piagefstheoretically) and hence few predict^velt'^''^ l^^^are made. 171 a ctive statements
It is necessary, then, to get at the specific practices
Which promote mental development.
The second task is to interpret these "real" causes
in ways that can be made relevant to the questions which
have priority for social scientists, especially those
bearing on social structure and social change. FlaveU
further Indicates how a psychologist might conceive of
this task.
In effect, every time Piaget discovers a new cognitiveform and describes its development the stage is setimmediately for further experimentation: to find out
of what social and individual variables the new form
might be a function, i.e., socioeconomic backaround,general intelligence, familial environment, personal
adjustment, and so on.l"2
Let us now turn to Piaget 's explanatory framework.
Earlier we said that cognitive-developmental psychologists
offer an "interactionist" explanation of development. This
is a term through which the developmentalist hopes to con-
vey his attempt to avoid the a priorism of the maturation-
ists and the crude empiricism of the environmentalists! the
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first type of explanation tends to posit cental structure
Without genesis and the second tends to view development
as genesis without structure (to use Piagefs aphorisms).
Development, the genesis of mental structures (modes of
thought), is to be accounted for as due to the interaction
of an actively structuring organism and his environment.
Piaget goes further than this, to the extent of
identifying four general factors which must be included in
any adequate account of ontogenetic development. 173 Each
of these factors is conceived of as a complex of conditions
which is necessary, but not by itself sufficient, for
development. The four factors are: 1) "organic growth and
especially the maturation of the nervous system and the
endocrine systems"? 2) "exercise and
. . . acquired
experience in the actions performed upon objects (as
opposed to social experience)"; 3) "social interaction
and transmission"; and 4) "a process of equilibrium
. . .
in the sense ... of self
-regulation". 174
It is the third type of factor that is of importance
175here. I want to note in particular that the social
experience involved in ontogenetic development is of two
types, "social interaction" and "transmission". The first
type, "social interaction", corresponds on the one hand
to the experience of confronting other selves in a social
order. This results in attaining the capacity to take the
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role Of the other, or cooperate. So, on the other hana,
"social interaction., corresponds to the preconditions for
c^evelopin, fro. sensory-.otor intelligence to operational
thought (instrumental reason).
The second type of social experience, referred to as
"transmission', by Piaget. has a .ore ambiguous status.
One form of transmission,
"school-teaching., is cited as
a factor in the explanation of ontogenetic development. 176
But on the next page. Piaget states that "^y explanation
of the child's development must take into consideration
two dimensions: an ontogenetic dimension and a social
dimension (in the sense of the transmission of the successive
work of generations)..
.177 it is this sense of "transmission..
which is of greatest importance to social scientists, and
which is almost totally unexplored by developmental
psychologists. For the ".successive work of generations.,
includes not only
.'school-teaching", but also the in-
stitutional and structural features of a society which
emerge historically out of previous social forms. An
explanation of the ontogenetic development of socio-
political thought which excludes these factors cannot, in
Its turn in the circle of human sciences, provide a
satisfactory conception of the human constructions which
these successive social forms represent. Only by exploring
this sense of "social experience" will we find the
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institutional and social-structural preconditions for
development from conventional-operational thought to
principled-formal thought, from instrumental to reflective
rationality. The social scientist may be interested in the
relationship between the different modes of thought and
the construction, maintenance and transformation of
specific social forms. But this task can proceed only as
a complement to an adequate understanding of how these
social forms relate to (facilitate or hinder) the develop-
ment of forms of thought,
^* ^>^lberg*s Explan.ntorv FramewnrV. We noted
earlier that Kohlberg proposes to account for the role
of experience in moral development in terms of certain
universal structural features of the environment, and the
relation between specific experiences and the child's
mental structure. In the interpretation of social experience,
Kohlberg places great emphasis on role theory. The universal
structural features of the social environment he identifies,
"the fundamental inputs stimulating moral development,"
are referred to as "role-taking opportunities. "^'^^ This
Is basically a specification of Piaget's "social interaction"
factor. The minimal capacities for social-moral life are
established in all societies because "all societies are
alike In the sheer fact of having systems of defined
complementary role expectations. "^'^^ Thus role-taking
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opportunities are reouired if there is to "ho .uiier x be any social
life, and social institutions constitute the framework
for providing these opportunities on a continuing basis.
Role-taking opportunities are a minimal condition for
moving to the conventional moral Ivel.lSO Kohlberg also
generalizes this notion of role-taking opportunities, and
makes the further claim that "All societies have the same
basic institutions of family, economy, social stratification,
law and government." These institutions have, he says,
"certain transcultural functional meanings" in spite
of "diversity in the detailed definition of these
institutions, "ISI
An important part of Kohlberg 's theory is the claim
that "the 'normal* course of social experience leads to
progression through the sequence" of stages, while
•specific forms of experience, like jail, may have a
•regressive' effect. "^'52 Kohlberg himself cites statistics
which should lead to questioning this claim. In a study
of middle class urban boys in three nation (U. S. A.,,
Taiwan and Mexico), Kohlberg concluded that "moral Stage
4 is the dominant stage of most adults. "^^^ Another study
by Kohlberg and his colleagues found that only 57% of their
subjects over 45 years old had attained formal operational
thought. ^^"^ Certainly, the the "normal" course of social
experience cannot be said to be sufficient for the
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transition to reflective thought.
But we do not need to rely solely on statistics to
throw doubt on the adequacy of Kohlberg^s conception of
the role of social experience in development. There are,
I think, good theoretical reasons. We will look now at
how Kohlberg views the "sequence of groups or institutions"
in which a child participates in the course of progress
through the stages of thought. In order to get a fuller
flavor of Kohlberg* s treatment, I quote at length.
The first group, the family, has received the mostattention in socialization theories. From our pointof view, however, (1) family participation is not
^n^'^V?^''^>.'''"i^^''^\^^
necessary for moral development,a d (2) the dimensions on which it stimulates moraldevelopment are primarily aeneral dimensions by whichother primary groups stimulate moral develooment,i.e., the dimensions of creation of role-taking
oppportunities .... The second group in which the
child participates is the peer group .... ;;hile
peer-group participation appears to be stimulating
of moral development, its influence seems better
conceptualized in terms of providing general role-
taking opportunities rather than as having very
specific and unique forms of influence.
A third type of participation presumed important
for moral development is that of participation in the
secondary institutions of law, crovernment and, perhaps
of work. One index of differential opportunities for"
participation in the social structures of government
and of work or economy is that of socioeconomic
status. It is abundantly clear that the lower class
cannot and does not feel as much sense of power in,
and responsibility for, the institutions of government
and economy as does the middle class. This, in turn,
tends to generate less of a disposition to view these
institutions from a generalized, flexible and organized
perspective based on various roles as vantage points.
The law and the government are perceived quite
differently by the child if he feels a sense of
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potential particiDation in the social ^^r?-.^he does not. 135 " order than if
My critique is as follows. In each case of social
participation, Kohlberg abstracts from the specific
influence of a social structural or institutional facet of
social life in order to return to his notion of "general
role-taking opportunities". But since "social" is defined
by Kohlberg as "the distinctively human structuring of action
and thought by role-taking, "186 this amounts to nothing
more than citing "social experience" as a type of factor
in development. In terms of Piagefs division, it is
••social interaction" without transmission of the succes<;ive
work of generations
.
One exception will be noted in the quote
above. Kohlberg speaks of "socioeconomic status" as an
index not only of role-taking opportunities, but also
of a "sense of potential participation in the social
order." But how is this idea to be given full concrete
meaning in an explanation if all institutions (except,
e.g.. Jail, which has a regressive influence) are
stripped of their specific features which might be cited
as promoting or fixating development?-'-^'^
Part of the problem I believe, can be found in the
quantitative interpretation given to the notion of
"role-taking opportunities". Special features of institutions
which might make for moral progress are reduced to
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quantity of communication and sheer amount of role-taking
opportunities
,
Participation is partially a matter of she-r inter-action and communication in the grouD, since
communication presupposes role-taking. in addition
thf^^''"^r individual in the communicationand he decision-making structure of the grouDenhances role-taking opportunities. The more theindividual is responsible for the decision of thegroup, the more must he take the roles of others inIt ...
.
VVhile leadership roles might be expectedto require more role-taking than follower roles, it isalso likely that "democratic leadership" requires
more role-taking than "autocratic leadership" on thepart of both leader and follower
. . .
.188
Institutions, groups and relationships are conceived as
distinguishable, then, in terms of the quantity of role-
taking going on, and presumably that is connected with
the opportunities for role-taking available. The special
character, or qualitative difference between various
relationships, groups or institutions is reduced to
differences in quantity of role-taking opportunities.
But how could it conceivably be fruitful to distinguish
the essential character of institutions such as marriage,
slavery and bureaucracy in terms of the amount of role-
taking opportunities?"^ Kohlberg might reply that the
distinction is only for explanatory purposes, for
understanding the role of the institution in stimulatina
development, and not for classificatory purposes. This
reply may seem plausible, but I want to argue that
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certain e...nM.l and dlst1 ncn.l .h^
^-tar^_^
Institutions can be i-nporfan^ m ^h- gXElanatlon^
aeyeloE^ent
- features which bear on the opportunities of
social participants not only to take roles, but also to
construct new rolp<? 190 ^, -u ^ies, to probe in a manner conducive
to reflection on what one really wants, 191
Ernest Gellner argues that the concepts and
institutions in a society are interrelated. ^92
^n«^^^^?I'''^^^^
^""^ beliefs are themselves, in a sense,i stitutions among others, for they provide a kindof fairly permanent frame, as do other institutionsindependent of any one individual, within whichindividual conduct takes place. In another sensethey are correlates of all the institutions of asociety; and to understand the working of the conceptsof a society is to understand its institutions . 193
And he adds in a footnote
:
It is, however, very important not to misunder-
stand this point. For it is not true to say that to
understand the concepts of a societv (in the way its
members do) is to understand the society. Concepts are
as liable to mask reality as to reveal it, and
masking some of it may be a part of their function. 194
In offering an example to illustrate his argument, Gellner
asks us to imagine a society in which the word "boble" is
applied to characterize people.
Research reveals that bobleness or bobllitv is
attributed to people under either of the following
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courage, and generos^", L cluef "Prlahtness.person holding a certalA Iffint *is also i£3oia^%^^^J^i?f^^0'^-,^-J-t-i" Position.
Lve
Bobility-(a) appears to be a descriptive term (descripti^
of a character trait), while bobility-(b) is an ascription,
not dependent on the characteristics of the person in
question. But the people in this society do not distinguish
two concepts, bobility-(a) and bobility-(b)
. 3o it appears
we have a case of a concept with multiple and incoherent
criteria for its application.
Gellner wants to point out that incoherent concepts
- or concepts with Inconsistent criteria - can be soci-.lly
functional, that there can be "social control through the
employ.Tient of absurd, ambiguous, inconsistent or unintel-
ligible" concepts and doctrines.
Bobility is a conceptual device by which the
priviledged class of the society in question acquires
some of the prestige of certain virtues respected in
that society, without the inconvenience of needing
to practice them, thanks to the fact that the same
word is applied either to practitioners of those
virtues or to occupiers of favored positions. It is,
at the same time, a manner of reinforcing the appeal
of those virtues, by associating them, through the use
of the same appellation, with prestige and power. But
all this needs to be said, and to say it is to bring
out the internal logical incoherence of the concept
- an Incoherence which, indeed, is socially functional, "^^^
And likewise "social change may occur through the replace-
ment of an inconsistent doctrine or ethic by a better
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one. ^198 social change thus .ay conceivably
.esult when a
person notices the incoherences of doctrines or concepts,
and attempts to reform the institutions which Justify thl;
or "it may be that it invariably is a discontented segment
of society, a new rising class for instance, which
exploits those incoherences, "199
It is thus one side of the social-psychological
dialectic to view the role of reflection in discerning
these inconsistencies and moving to maintain or transform
the institutions they justify. The other side, of importance
here, is involved in the search for social conditions,
relationships, and institutions which provide the conditions
for reflection
- the openness to (expectation of, demand
for, etc.) want probing and role-construction. For the
identification of these social conditions is necessary
for an explanation of the development, beyond minimal
socially required level of operational thought, of
reflective rationality.
I think some insight can be gained into the
sociological deficiency of Kohlberg's theory if we note
that he has been attentive primarily to the debate with
those who view socialization from the conformity
perspective. On this view, as we saw earlier, the
direction of mental change was distinguished in terms of
conflicting categories of conformity and deviance.
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support and alienation, etc. f^hlberg wants to show a
universal dimension of moral development, which goes
beyond an equation of morality with
.ores. Thus he writes.
IsTo
"w^'g^oupT^-L^rshrofd:?"^ sociological notions
is ofte^ «rt"^?he':M^s":tr::L''ri?'^"^"^basic raoral values from his family 'some ?rom°th»
c^nllfc^^^Jth""
'"^^^
.'^"^ v;i::rtenrto''o f i t wi one another. Instead of DarticlDsHon
^renSf?rm^rSitv='^^''"' conflicting d':vei:oL'^t:?t enas in morality, it appsars that parti-in^ti on •» n
llnl^""^^ 2^°?°"
converges in stirnulatinft^e^deveLp-
by onfparticuT^r'r"^'^''' "^'^^ tranL?t?e'do ne la group as opposed to another
^ipdi'^r^r" ^r^^^^ ^^^^P^ ^^^^ con^licti^a' •
•
immed ate demands upon the child, they do not seemto present the child with basically conf?ic?ina ordifferent stimulation for general .or.l development . 200
If my critique to this point has been coherent, it should
be clear that I would claim against Kohlberg that the
particular demands made on a child or an adult may be
conducive to developmental failures - fixation or
regression
- rather than provide stimulation for moral
development. Basic moral values and moral development
might not be promoted by one particular group to the
exclusion of others. But it is the effect of engagement
in particular institutions, or even the impact of
widespread social practices, that is important in
impeding or promoting development.
But it should be clear by now that Kohlberg 's
account of the explanation of development, particularly
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of the transition to reflective thought, is deficient on
at least two counts. First, there is a failure to include
the historical dimension of social life, the imbeddedness
of relationships, groups, institutions and traditions in
the ''successive work of generations. "201 3^^^^^^ ^^^^^
a failure to grant qualitatively distinct structural
features of society a different role in promoting
different levels of development.
I ought to note here, in anticipation of objections
from developmental psychologists, that Kohlberg does not
limit his understanding of the role of experience in
moral development to "universal features of experienced
objects (physical or social)." In addition to this and
to logical analysis of concepts, he proposes "analysis
of structural relations betv/een experience-inputs and the
relevant behavioral organization". He calls this a theory
of "structural conflict and structural match." This type
of theory is required for precisely the reasons that we
have advanced in criticism of his sociological explanatory
ideas. An analysis of the "role-taking opportunities"
universally available in societies, he says, is a
specification of "the general belief that the more the
social stimulation, the faster the rate of moral development."
Piowever, "these theories do not account for specific
transitions from stage to stage or to eventual fixation
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at a particular stage. "202
The problem of moral change would aooear i-oof presenting stimuli which are boS su?f^°. .^""^incongruous as to stimulate confn^? f^^fi^iently
existing stage schemata ani su?fic?entL ^"^''^'^
as to be assimilable w^^^ . ^^^^^^^i^^tly congruousith some accommodative effort, 203
The reason why this addition to the theory fails to
satisfy my critique is that it separates the sociological
and psychological notions advanced to account for
development! "role-taking opportunities" on the one hand,
and "cognitive stimulation" on the other. It involves a
reduction of the qualitatively distinct institutional
features of society (which emerge in an historical
perspective on social structure) to quantitatively
interpreted role-taking notions, and the reinsertion of
these qualitative-structural features at the individual
psychological level. It is not just that the "successive
work of generations" is ignored, but this separation also
leads to untenable assertions about the social conditions
of development: for example, that the progression from
stage to stage is not promoted by the teaching of adults,
but is aided rather by optional "cognitive stimulation".
Richard Peters effectively criticizes the adequacy of
these assertions:
It looks ... as if Kohlberg's thesis about the
impossibility of adults bringing about conceptual
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concept Of "teacM^a-'ls'^^^^/LployeaffSr^tls''^""'
^<xn oe acceiierated by a variety of processes dnov,
ca!rthtr..''^""-rt'' so'onrShlb:rg\:yll this "cognitive stimulation", but most oeooLwould call it "teaching". It is a conceptualif a restricted concept of "teaching" is beingemployed which rules out the processes bv means ofwhich adults help to get the child into a'^p^sition wherehe can grasp a principle. 204 ^x n
With the separation of social and individual
-psychological
explanatory notions, such confusions seem to me inevitable.
From Thought to Action
We must also ask now what positive fruit comes from
this assessment? VThat paths of inquiry remain, on the
terrain mapped out by the developmental perspective? As
we indicated earlier, there are two approaches to develop-
mental study, each with a somewhat different set of
questions. We can view social practices as conditions which
relate to the development of rational capacities; or we
can view the levels of thought and judgment attained and
sustained in different social practices as conditions for
the maintenance or transformation of social life. For
our purposes this means that we can study the development
of modes of socio-political thought and view social
practices as conditions of this development; or we can
study socio-political institutions and practices, consider-
ing the explanatory role of the levels of thought or
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types of belief (as opposed to specific beliefs and belief
systems) available to members of the society. While these
inquiries have come to be separated in the modern study
of man, they are in fact crucially interrelated. Each
approach involves assumptions about the direction and
possible results of the other. Since I have chosen to
pursue the first, "psychological" side of developmental
studios, I shall note here some of the grounds on which
I base my belief in the fruitfulness of a developmental
approach to the "sociological" side.
In line with his emphasis on role-theory, Kohlberg
interprets the relation between level of thought and
moral action in terms of the "definition of the situation"
by the subject. The way in which an individual defines a
situation will have a bearing on what course of action
he chooses.
VThile moral judgment maturity is only one of
many predictors of action in moral conflict
situations, it can be a quite powerful and meaningful
predictor of action where it gives rise to distinctive
ways of defining concrete situational rights and
duties in socially ambiguous situations. The causal role
of moral judgment appears to be due to its contribution
to a "cognitive" definition of the situation rather
than because strong attitudinal or affective
expressions of moral values activate behavior. 205
A number of empirical studies have been done and
the results point to the explanatory power of developmental
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postulates. Kohll.., notes studies in wMch a consi.e.aMy
larger percentage of subjects at the principled level
refrained from cheating when left unsupervised, m a
college group, while 42% of the "conventional- subjects
cheated, only 11% of the "principled" subjects did so.
And With a Sixth grade sample, while 83^0 and 67% of the
"premoral" and "conventional" subjects (respectively)
cheated, 80% of the "principled" subjects did not. 206
In another study of students who listened to
speeches outside of Sproul Hall before its occupation
during the free speech movement at Berkeley, it was
found that about 80% of the Stage 6 subjects and 50% of the
Stage 5 subjects actually sat in, but only 10% of the
Stage 3 and 4 did so. 207
This type of study can also point the way toward
advance in the explanations offered for the actions of
individuals whose position exposes them to conflicting
or inconsistent social pressures, "Status inconsistency"
and "cross-pressure" hypotheses have been advanced to
account for the behavior of individuals in these situations.^
According to Lenski, for example, people regularly exposed
to social situations made ambiguous by their inconsistent
status are likely to "react against the existing social
order and the political system which undergirds it." The
theory is based on the supposition that "an individual
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With consistent statuses or ranKs has a natural tendency to
think of hi.nself in terms of that status or ranK which is
highest, and to expect others to do the same," while
others "have a vested interest in doing just the opposite,
that is, in treating him in terms of his lowest status or
rank." "Since each regards his own point of view as
right and proper, and since nei ther is likely to vi ew_t^^
e£2b.l£::n^n__n^ej-,a^^
^^^^ ^^^^^
are likely to be frustrated, and probably angered by
the experience. "209 Presumably, it is the frustration and
anger which are seen as a cause of the tendency to blindly
"react against" the socio-political order. But if we take
seriously Kohlberg's finding that "affective-situational
forces are less determining of moral decisions at the
principled than at the conventional level, "210 political
discontent might be seen as neither a blind response to
frustration, nor a mere "reaction against" what exists. To
the extent that an individual is capable of rational
reflection on his social situation, he is more likely
to be able to reconcile conflicting social expectations
and demands, to apply self -accepted and consistent
principles in an ambiguous situation. Politically, this
could mean, for example, that voting would reflect
consistent recognition of one's interests, rather than
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a discharge of emotion as a result of stress. And with a
recognition of the interests of others implied in the
development of moral principles, political action could
be seen as directed toward transforming those structural
features of society which generate insonsistent pressures
and impede the development of reflective thought. For at
this level one is capable of envisioning a more rational
society and recognizing that the "emotional" responses
of others can be tied to the failure of a changing society
to present this change as an object of rational assessment
and control. The crucial assumption in Lenski • s theory -
that individuals with inconsistent status will not be
capable of "detached, analytical" reflection on their
situation - must clearly be taken as a variable feature
of social life.
And finally, developmental postulates could quite
pla,usibly be applied to larger problems of socio-historical
development, although almost no such study which specifically
ties in with developmental psychology has been done to
date. For example, if Kohlberg is correct in asserting
that principled thought and judgment are basically "law-
making" perspectives, we can ask what portion (per cent?
segment?) of a population must be capable of reflectively
rational thought before constitutional government is
possible, as opposed to universal application of
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for.alistically codified customs, or the looser syste.
of arbitrators in tribal disputes. 211
At this point, I hope it can be said that we have
sustained the argument tentatively presented at the
beginning of this excercise in critical but sympathetic
assessment. We said that the distinctions brought out,
the achievements implicit in developmental stage criteria,
provide a useful framework for research on political
education. Political education picks out activities
fostering an achievement of excellence in political
thought and action which is deemed desirable. And the
framework of empirical research provided by developmental
psychology can aid in filling out the formulation of a
justifiable ideal of human development. Such an ideal, we
have suggested, is the development of those capacities
for reflectively rational thought which are essential for
full development as an autonomous person.
But the approach to the explanation of ontogenetic
development^^^ ^hich has been offered to date has not
recognized the importance of historically rooted
structural characteristics of societies. We have thus
been left also with an inadequate conception of how
political education might be promoted, within or through
the transformation of particular societies.
In the next chapter, I want to review some work
173
which has been done in applying developmental psychology,
and also to show that the goal of political education can
be justified even if one does not accept autonomy as a
personal ideal.
C H A P T E R IX
TOWARDS A THEORY OF POLITICAL EDUCATION
Political Education and the Development
of Political Thinking
It is my belief that political education ought to
be promoted to a far greater extent than is now the case.
Our schools and other media of instruction now devote
more attention to political socialization than most
nations. But political education is still either misunder-
stood or neglected. We must begin to establish more
directly the case for political education and push
forward the argument that it ought to be promoted. But
before we can make this argument here, we must separate
out a distinct but related question: "Should a capacity
for reflective socio-political thought be promoted?" What
is the relationship between these two questions?
1. Richard Peters' analysis of the concept of
"education" shows it to indicate the development of
desirable qualities in someone, and the extension of the
depth and breadth of his knowledge in the passing on of a
form of life. In summarizing the conditions for the
correct application of the term "education", this analysis
distinguishes a value criterion and a cognitive criterion.
That is, the activities promoted through education must be
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considered valuable, and they must lead to a growth of
knowledge and understanding. Both of these types of
criterion are internally or conceptually connected with
the notion of education. 213 But specification of the
cognitive criterion adn^its of normative dispute. Just
what do we mean by the achievements of knowledge or reason
implied in the notion of an educated person? And why do
we pick out these achievements in one way rather than
another?
The specification of the cognitive criterion which
we have proposed for "political education" is the develop-
ment of reflective political thought. As we noted at the
conclusion of Chapter 6, this notion of reflectiveness is
normative in two senses. It is, first of all, normative
in the developmental sense of laying down the outcome of
a sequence of stages in political thought. But from a
different perspective, it is also normative in the sense
of bringing out and focusing on one aspect of an inter-
related set of achievements in political thought. Other
criteria would shape our vision of mature political
thought somewhat differently. Focusing on this second
normative aspect of the criterion of reflectiveness will
allow us to note that there are other interpretations of
the cognitive criterion of education. We can then see
the point of justifying our focus on the reflectiveness
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of political thought as the criterion of political education.
And this Justification should shed light on the question
"why should political education be pro?noted?"2l4
Before we approach this question directly, I want to
look briefly at Michael Oakeshotfs understanding of
political education. Here we will see a somewhat different
interpretation of the cognitive criterion of education;
and this will help us to get a better perspective on the
task of evaluating reflective political thought. Vve will
look first at Cakeshotfs interpretation of political
education, and then at the main contrast model to which
he opposes this interpretation, 215
2, In order to engage in political activity,
Oakeshott points out, it is necessary to understand a
society's traditional manner of atte ding to its common
affairs. The initiation into a traditional manner of
behavior is nearly all-important for Oakeshott; but it is
most definitely not seen by him as a straightfor'v>7ard and
explicit process of training, Above all, political
education is a matter of imparting the potentials for
good judgment within a tradition; and in this one cannot
be trained. It can come only from teaching, observation,
and practice in exploring the potentials of a given
tradition. Education, for Oakeshott, is
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the process of learning, in circumstances of c='ir..^-and restraint, how to recocrnize and make sonetMna i?^ourselves. Unavoidably, it is a two-fold process inwhich we enjoy an initiation into wha? for San^ of abetter word I will call "civilization-, and in doinaso ^iscover our own talents and aptitude, in relation
use'?he.?2re'^^^^^^^' ^^^^^ to cultivate Tnd^'^^"
The sort of knowledge and sort of education appropriate
to politics is "knowledge, as profound as we can make it,
of our tradition of political behavior . "217
.-The fruits of
a political education will appear in the manner in which
we think and speak about politics and perhaps in the
manner in which we conduct our political activity. "218
Reaping of these fruits of political education will
involve, then, a more profound understanding of political
activity and a more thorough understanding of our own
political tradition. The cognitive achievement of political
education is specified only this far - that it involves a
more profound and thorough understanding of a tradition
of political activity. Profundity and thoroughness of
understanding does not carry us too far in getting a grasp
on the cognitive dimension of political education. But we
can perhaps get a better view of Cakeshott*s argument by
looking at the position he is most concerned to defeat.
Oakeshott argues most strongly against an "ideological
style of politics". Ideology, on his interpretation, is
merely an abridgment of tradition. The error in ideological
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politics is that ideology is "regarded as the sole guide
relied upon"2l9 political activity. It is a defective
understanding of political activity because of the "sort
of knowledge and sort of education" it proposes as
sufficient for political activity. "For it suggests that
a knowledge of the chosen political ideology can take
t]Te_£l3ce_of understanding a tradition of political
behavior. "220 in terms of the framework of concepts I
have developed here, we can see that Oakeshott is at
least arguing against an understanding of political
education which fails to recognize the essential
connection with the prerequisite political socialization
that reflective thinking about politics requires that
one should have already grasped the accepted practices of
ongoing political society.
What sort of knowledge is appropriate to this
ideological style of politics, according to Oakeshott?
"VVhat is required in the first place, is knowledge of the
chosen political ideology - a knowledge of the ends to be
pursued, a knowledge of v;hat we want to do." And what
sort of education is appropriate?
Moreover, the appropriate sort of education will be
an education in which the chosen political ideology
is taught and learned, in which the techniques
necessary for success are acquired, and ( if we are
so unfortunate as to find ourselves emoty-handed in
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~^-^^^^^^-2l-^IlAaool^ an education in the skinof abstract thought and premeditation necessarv tocompose one for ourselves. The education we shaU
ideology?22r^ '""^^'^'^ ^-^^"^^^ ^ political
3. Cur critique of Oakeshotfs interpretation of
political education begins with his understanding of
ideoloaical politics. We are particularly concerned now
with the cognitive criterion of education associated with
an ideological style of politics. Part of the thrust of
Oakeshotfs critique is against those who advocate
political activity based on a reflective grasp on principes
-
and this latter is the position taken in this paper. The
point I want to develop is that our understanding of
reflective political thought is not equivalent to his
characterization of "ideology": our understanding of
principles is not subject to the criticisms implied in
Oakeshott*s discussion.
A central point of the notion of critical reflection
is to move away from an understanding of our wants and
purposes as immutable givens in our lives, taken on once
and for all in our initiation into social life. But
adopting an ideology is represented by Oakeshott as merely
learning and being taught what we want to do. Only if
we happen not to have an ideology conveniently at hand
does a "skill of abstract thought and premeditation" enter
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-ew a
the picture, 223 Rathp-r t->.= « v 4f he han being central to an under-
standing Of ideological thouaht, sKill in abstract
aeliberation is required only through the accident of
special Circumstances. Reflective thinking, as we under-
stand it, does require sRill in abstract thought. But
this sKill is seen as an aspect of a capacity to put
thinas in persepctive
- the perspecitve necessary to the
formulation and reformulation of coherent and satisfyina
goals. This type of formulation of the cognitive achievement
of education is omitted from Oakeshotfs analysis of an
"ideological style of politics'\ Since on his vi,
capacity for abstract thought is not_.2ssential to
ideoxogical politics, his critique might be taken
warning that political socialization ought not to be
narrow, confining and rigidly held to an explicit manifesto
or summary of a society's political practices. Without a
further specification of what is implied by the discovery,
cultivation and use of our talents and aptitudes (see his
definition of education, pp. 176-177), it is hard to see
that a more profound and thorough knowledge of traditional
practices would actually be an educational achievement.
Oakeshott sees principles as abridgments of
tradition which are erroneously treated as independent of
the practices of the society. But we have not treated
principles in this way (although Kohlberg's interpretation
as a
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Of principles
.ay be subject to this critique). Principles
are ^nerely second order rules which are appealed to in
justifying the rules embodied in social practices . 224
^^.^
do indeed grow out of a society's way of life, and are not
independent in the sense of being given fro. heaven, or
merely thought up in no context whatever. But they do
give to those persons capable of principled thought a
certain potential independence from particular rules or
practices.
Ultimately, the difficulty might be traced to
Cakeshotfs ambiguous notion of tradition. On this, we
can note J. G. Pocock's perceptive comment that "if the
abridgement of tradition is ideology, the criticism ot
tradition may be history. "225 it is the principled
criticism of tradition which the capacity for reflective
political thought holds open as a possibility. In a world
so clearly beset with social changes, men can only make
history by developing this capacity.
Oakeshott offers a critique of ideology as an
"abstract" abridgement of the "flow of sympathy" bound
up in a traditional manner of doing things. We are reminded
here of our own critique of a conception of "formal thought"
in the social sphere which does not recognize the partici-
pative character of many social concepts, bound up as
they are in our important social relationships. We can
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also note our own critique of Kohlberg^s conception of
mature
.oral thought as a '.Justice structure,'' abstracted
from a principle such as "benevolence.' which picKs out
a "flow of sympathy" to other persons.
Whether or not we share Oakeshotfs evaluations of
these "abridgements of tradition" is in one sense
irrelevant, then. For it is a somewhat different notion
of a capacity for reflective political thought -
necessary to effective and critical participation in
modern political life, I will be arguing presently -
that has been our main concern. But it is instructive
to use Oakeshotfs views on ideology as a jumping off
point in our evaluation of reflective political thought.
Oakeshott grants the possible virtues of ideology in
specific contexts.
In certain circumstances an abridgement of thiskind may be valuable; it gives sharpness of outline
and precision to a political tradition v/hich the
occasion may make seem appropriate. When a manner of
attending to arrangements is to be transplanted
from the society in which it has grown up into
another society (always a questionable enterprise),
the simplification of an ideology may appear as an
asset. 226
4. In what circumstances would v^e count the capacity
for reflective thinking about society and politics an
asset? I would like to argue that some degree of achieve-
ment in reflective reasoning is essential to all
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participants in the political life of modern industrial
societies. And the highest possible degree of development
in reflective political thought is essential for a
democratic society in which all citizens can participate
in shaping the course of social change toward the creation
of desirable and satisfying forms of life.
To preface this argument, we can note first that
men can and do take up images of ideal forms of life for
themselves. 227 These ideals may be taken whole and crudely
from various given patterns of life - in the way one might
acquire the habit of repeating a maxim on personal
behavior to children. Or they may be developed reflectively
in the course of one's experiences. They may be pursued
vigorously or left on the sidelines of life. A person
may have only one or many such ideals. And for one person,
various ideals may be persistent or fleeting, consistent
or conflicitng. I have in mind ideals v;hich pick out
forms of character in a social context such as a life
given over to relentless devotion to duty, or personal
honor, or steadfast courage, or integrity, or personal
autonomy. All of these notions of an ideal form of life
I have mentioned pick out personal achievements. The
higher achievements of reason enter into some of these
ideals - autonomy, for example. The notion of autonomy
pulls the capacity for reflective reason into a vision of
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a satisfying ideal of individual life, other ideals may
be connected in different ways with various achievements
of reason.
The justification for the promotion of reflective
political thought could be pursued in the context of a
justification for the pursuit of an ideal such as personal
autonomy. My analysis has, in fact, drawn on the notion
of autonomy at various points. At the outset of this essay,
we introduced C. Wright Mills' idea that the development
of substantive reason is essential to personal freedom
in the modern world. And the notion of freedom advanced
by mils and other in the critical tradition draws on the
ideal of autonomy. Choice of these ideals is ultimately
a matter of personal committment.
But V7e need not be committed only to one ideal of
life. Consistently or coherently or not, we can draw on
a number of these visions in shaping our lives. And it is
possible to place positive value on a society v;hich
permits and encourages adherence to many different ideals
of life. And this latter position is consistent with
personally promoting a single ideal. I want to direct
my comments here to the role of reflective reason in a
complex and changing society in which a number of such
ideals have persistent adherents. And I would suggest
that most modern industrial societies meet this description.
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We can ask what the social consequences might be if
important social practices were engaged in ..erely out of
habit, in a wholly unreflective and uncritical manner. 2^0
Social practices and institutions allow members of a
society to have their needs met, and facilitate the
accomplishment of their purposes. These practices might
in fact be important in establishing a framework in which
the needs and wants of individuals may be met, and satisfy-
ing forms of life shaped. But these practices may be
engaged in without the understanding necessary to get a
sense of their social importance. They may be thought
unimportant merely because they are not thought about.
The manner of practice is habitual and unreflective.
Practices may become insulated from whatever capacities
for reflection that may develop, and the effect on the
development of these capacities in the sphere of social
thought may be stultifying. In certain circumstances,
however, the rigidity of the unreflective manner of
acting may be revealed, with potentially harmful
consequences for the individuals and the society.
In the first place, conflict between generations
may develop when the older generation can no longer convey
the sense of importance of these practices. The younger
generation may tend to discard them easily or resist their
adoption. And the rigidity of the practice of the older
186
•las
generation, and its inability to justify what it
never reflected on, may be taken as evidence that the
practice is not merely irrelevant, but stupid and without
value.
Technological and other types of changes may also
threaten a society's capacity to provide satisfying forms
of life for its members. These changes may alter or eliminate
the rationale of certain social practices or institutions.
With the loss of inclination or ability to understand and
reflect on the socially important purposes of certain
behavior patterns, practices may fail to adapt to new
circumstances. ^\nd without this guidance and control,
there may be recurrent crises.
My purpose is not to describe modern industrial
societies, nor to predict eventual catastrophe. The
purpose of these comments is to point out certain social
tendencies which can be illuminated by the distinction
between the conformist potential of conventional-instrument-
al social thought and the potential for understanding
through the development of the capacity for reflective
thought. Once illuminated, I think these possibilities
for conflict and crisis constitute a persuasive argument
for promoting reflective political thought.
Conflict -and crisis may indeed jar some out of
habitual modes of behavior. But crises are hardly the
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way in which capacities for reflective thought ^ay be
developed to the fullest possible extent. Only in stable
contexts can a refined and regularized inclination to
reflection be developed . 231 s^^i^i ^^^^^^ ^p^^
possibilities; but precisely because they are extraordinary
circun:istances, their potentials may be lost. The loss may
be accounted again in terms of the capacity of men to
connect the problems and troubles of their ordinary lives
with larger social developments. The possibilities for
formulating ways of achieving a satisfying pattern of
life through reflection connect in this way with the
possibilities for understanding and shaping social life -
through initiation of a younger generation and through
acting on issues of social change.
If. the n, we can take the "reflectiveness" of social
thought as a valuable achievement of in the development
of men' s reasonincr capacities, we are justified in taking
it as a specification of the cognitive criterion of
political education
. And we can conclude that political
education ought to be prom.oted; for it is a conceptual
truth that political education is the development of
desirable qualities in someone. The question about whether
political education ought to be promoted has sense only
in particular contexts where the promotion of political
education could conflict with the realization of other
189
values.
Before I make a few concluding speculations on how
political education might be promoted, i want to comment
on the framework for research set out by this notion of
political education.
Toward a Theory of Political Education
1. There are two quite general ways of approaching
the research problems of a theory of political education.
(I include the prerequisite political socialization in
my reference to research toward a theory of political
education. ) The first is straightforward empirical
research. This research would be geared to the formulation
and testing of hypotheses about the social practices,
institutions and policies which promote political
socialization and political education. Developmental
psychology may, as I have suggested, be a useful framework
for posing these empirical questions. But other theoretical
formulations should be drawn on to complement, enrich or
modify the Piaget-Kohlberg developmental framework.
Conceptual analysis can also be an important
complement to developmental research on political education.
The key concepts of political life can be analyzed
developmentally in order to clarify the achievements of
political socialization and political education. What types
of concepts are available at different levels of sociali-
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nation an. education, ana what are the logical prerequisites
for use Of political ter.s at different conceptual levels.
Our analysis leads us to expect that certain types of
uses of the ter..n "interest", for example, would be
available to a politically educated person, but not to
someone who was only socialized to a passive citizen role.
These studies will move toward an explanation of
the successes and failures of political socialization
and political education in different social contexts.
We must diagnose the type of political thinking which
prevails at different age levels and among different
segments of the population. People live their political
lives within a particular conjunction of institutions
and traditions. As we begin to refine our characterizations
and classifications of different types of political
thought we will find that they indicate varying levels
of thought and also varying challenges and opportunities
to engage in politics. A diagnosis of types of political
thinking is then both a characterization of a level of
political thought and a description of the institutions
which have shaped it. The way in which a child deals
with the political opinions of his parents, for example
reveals the type of thinking of which he is capable, as
well as the type of family which has fostered his capacities.
But we must at some point get outside of the given
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dimensions of a person's thought in order to develop an
explanatory theory of political education. There must be
an^nterplav between fhe diaannr.i^ of ooii tir..1
and a theory of structure in social and oolitir^l lif^.
The flow from past to future in social life is not just a
fluid transmission of traditions. There are changes in the
structure of social life. Some are gradual, some abrupt.
But in the midst of these changes people's lives may
become filled with discontents, anxieities, or "troubles"
whose source they cannot locate in their own narrow
milieu. The diagnosis of political thought of these
individuals may point to a deficiency in political sociali-
zation or a failure of political education. The former
type of deficiency might be seen where the political
traditions of an ethnic group impinge in new ways on
national political practices. And a failure of the latter
sort might be the diagnosis v/hen a local community's
political practices seem unable to comprehend new issues
thrust on it by suburbanization. But v;hatever the
diagnosis of individual political thought, we can have a
full explanatory theory only by appealing to the
categories of a social theory which can help us see the
connections among different institutions and practices,
and the sources of change.
The theory of social structure v/ould be a critical
191
theory, in the sense that we want to view social conditions
in terms of the promotion of citizen development throuqh
political socialization and political education. A critical
theory of social structure opens up questions about
whether the interests of citizens become policy issues -
in Mills* terms, whether "personal troubles of milieu-
become translated into "public issues of social structure".
'
In this way it connects with a theory of political education
which opens up questions about the capacity of a citizen
to formulate and conceptualize policy alternatives in
terms of what is in his interest. Even if crucial issues
are raised, citizens may be unable to grasp their scope
and their implications for his life. But even so, the
raising of important issues of social change may be seen
as an essential dimension of the political education of
a society.
2, I want to conclude this section with an analysis
of a recent research effort which may prove to mark a
significant step toward a theory of political socialization.
I am referring Robert W. Connellys book. The Child*s
Construct^ nn of Politi cs. Connellys book is based on
interviews v/ith 119 children, aged 5 to 16, from the
suburbs of Sydney, Australia. He is concerned with
portraying the political ideas of these children, and
interpreting the social bases of their political commit-
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tments. But the primary thrust of the work is developmental,
drawing on the Piagetian framework in investigating "the
development of the child's relationships with the large
scale social world and his reasoning about it." He asks:
"How do children construct interpretations of the political
world as they grow up, and how do they come to adopt
stances towards it?"233 j cannot do justice to this book
by a full review of its findings. Instead, I v/ant to give
an example from Connell's work to show how this perspective
on the development of political thought can elucidate
problems in other areas of political research. And then
I v/ill discuss the relationship of this work to the
framework for research on political education proposed
here.
Divergent interpretations of the relationship
between a voter and his party choice have been offered
by political scientists in recent years. On the one hand,
there has been an effort to identify those social and
psychological variables which most clearly predict a
voter's party choice. One of the strongest predictors
of party choice has been found to be the party choice
of one's family, and particularly his parents. ^-^^ One
Interpretation of this finding has portrayed party
allegiance as an unthinking reaction to external pressures,
a non-rational (or possibly irrational) impulse to
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conformity. Others, such as V. c Key, have surveyed the
data on party realignments for support of the argument
"that voters are not fools," and that party allegience is
a fairly rational alignment of votes with the voters'
interests ,235
A recent article by Arthur Goldberg2 36 attempted
to combine elements of both positions, with the argument
that "certain sociological determinants, specifically
group norms regarding party identification, may upon
examination, prove to be rational guides to action. "237
But Goldberg's argument, as Connell points out, does not
account for the first formation of party preferences;
and it is here that Connell 's inquiry enters the debate.
Connell points out that the first indication of
party preference is usually made before the child is
capable of making means-end calculations about social
groupings. ^-^^ It is necessary for the child to have a
view of party choice as open to reasoning before he can
see a political party as a means. The path to successful
political socialization is toward the reasoning capacities
necessary to see a connection between a party as a means
and policy as a goal,
Connell finds three types of cases where family
influence enters into the party preference of the child.
And although Connell does not put the matter this way, I
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believe these cases can be laid out in a pattern according
to the degree of success in political socialization to a
system of party competition. The first type of case is
"simple correspondence", where a "child mentions a family
preference, and gives his own as the same, but does not
give family choice as a reason for his own. •239 The
interviews show that the child is not making independent
calculations on grounds for party preference. He is
taking the name of a party from his parents along with
other attitudes and opinions, in a rather unthinking
manner. The second type of case points to family loyalty
as a basis for party choice. The children may "counsciously
pick the same party to express their solidarity with
their parents. "240 we see here the beginning of a type of
political thought where it is relevant to give some sort
of reason for party preference, even though it is
grounded socially only in the narrow sphere of family
ties. In a third group of cases, parental opinion is
given as a reason for party choice, and thus as a ground
for the child's own judgment.
In these cases, we may say, the children adopt
a party preference on the authority of their parents'
opinions. But it is authority of a particular kind,
the kind C. J. Friedrich had in mind when he defined
authoritative communications as those "which are
capable of reasoned elaborations." Indeed the way
these children talk is precisely described by the
quotation which Friedrich uses as the epigraph for
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ise
likely to think correctly'on the'^ubject! • 24l'''''
The point here is that, while the child is not yet capable
of connecting parties with policies in a reasoned manner,
he is aware that his parents are capable of giving the
types of reasons that are relevant to party choice. The
next step in the processes leading to socialization would
involve the ability to handle for himself the type of
discourse that connects reasons for policies with reasons
for party choice. The path is open for this development
in a way that it is not yet open for the children in the
first or second group cases.
How, then, are v;e to explain the formation of the
child's first party preference? Connell rejects a
general explanation that party preference has an
unconscious, emotional basis, rooted in the psychological
process of identification.
Identification cannot in more than a few cases
be regarded as the main base of party preference;
diffuse faraily loyalty as a motive is probably
widespread and accords better with the character of
the children's committments; considering what grounds
the children have for judgment, v/e can explain their
agreement with their parents as the result of quite
reasonable acts of political choice. These last two
explanations are compatible with each other . . . ,
but they need not apply together. 242
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Adapting this line of argument to our own framework, we can
see why explanation in terms of family loyalty does not
conflict with the latter explanation. IJhat we have in
Connell's three types of cases are diagnoses of the types
of political thought available to children; diagnoses which
draw on the idea that there is a possible pattern of
development in political socialization towards a capacity
to reason about party choice in terms of policy preferences,
A, full explanation of the successes, lack of success and
failures involved in each , diagnosis would require a broad-
er investigation of the social life of the child. For ex-
ample, if a child says that he prefers one party because
"it's just sort of a family thing", ^^"^ an explanation
in terms of family loyalty is incomplete without an
account of her parent's level of political thought. If
the parents are themselves incapable of reasoning about
party choice, if they too see it as a "family thing",
we may begin to suspect a failure to socialize the child
to the norms embodied in the ongoing political institutions.
But if this is not the case, and the child is rather
young and at a low level of general mental development,
then our diagnosis would more likely fit into an
explanation of lack of success in terms of the level of
thought available to the child. My point is that we must
distinguish a diagnosis of political thought from an
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explanation of party com:nittments ; and the latter
explanatory endeavor is intimately connected with an
explanation of the development of political thought, in
that in both v/e are led into an investigation of the
specific features of the social world of the child.
Connell sums up the implications of his findings
for the interpretation of party choice, as follows:
The 'reaction' interpretations of party choice
. .
.
represent the child's adoption of a party as
politically irrational, in essence not a political
act at all. But the discussion of children's party
preferences has not faced the question of rationality
squarely, for it has not included an analysis of what
the children think parties are and what grounds they
might have for choosina between them. We may well
ask whether their expressed preferences are not
reasonable acts of political choice, given the grounds
for choice available to them. 244
I would now like to make a few more general
comments on Connell 's work, and how it relates to the
framework for study of political socialization and
political education presented here. His evaluation of
research carried on under the rubric of "political sociali-
zation" is similar to the critique of the conformity inter-
pretation of socialization offered here.
Studies of children's political beliefs that have
been preoccupied with problems of "political sociali-
zation" have produced distorted accounts of the
development largely because they have failed to
recognize and account for the conscious creative
activity of the children themselves in the development
of their own beliefs .... The basic approach has
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been to think of the developTient of beliefs as amatter of induction into certain social norms^
cornmon patterns of beliefs or shared attitudes,
which are necessary for the well-beinq or stability
of the political systen that the children are
entering. This two-fold oreoccupation with inductioninto nornis and the stability of systems runs through
most of the "political socialization" studies. 245
The alternative put forward by Connell is to treat
the development of political beliefs "not as a mechanical
function or input of a system, but as a contingent,
historical process. "246 This is exactly the view presented
in this paper ~ that the development of political thought
should be treated as "a contingent, historical process",
a development of the child's reasoning capacities in
interaction with his social and political world.
A fully developed concept of "political socialization"
is not presented by Connell as a framework for his research.
But much of his effort is guided by a notion of the full
development of a child's "political outlook". The notion
of "political outlook" thus serves as an achievement term,
and the criteria of a political outlook resemble closely
the criteria of understanding and committment we have
proposed for "political socialization". A political
outlook has been achieved when a child's thinking about
the political world exhibits "a degree of inner coherence
and conviction." It involves "personal sets of
attitudes and stores of information" and "reasonably
199
coherent structures of belief. "^'^^
WT-iile Connell does at times hint at a concern for
achieveinents of political thinking beyond political
socialization, his work is less helpful here. ?or one
thing, he interviews no children over the age of sixteen;
and at thin point political socialization would not bo
secured, nor would politically educative influences be
likely to have had a great impact yet. The only development
he discusses which moves beyond what v/e would call
political socialization, is ideological thinking. But
on the subject of ideological thinking he is quite
ambivalent,
Connell first of all notes the achievements of
political thought which lay the basis for ideology - an
achievement that points beyond instrumental social ration-
ality towards formal reasoning. The two bases of ideology
are "the capacity to wield abstract social concepts, and
the recognition of whole socieites as a subject of
argument"; and th<^se capacities "appear and become common
in adolescence. "2^^ His further comments point to two
developments within this type of thought. The first is
toward a formal and self-conscious theory of society
which, he says, "is not a regular stage in the develop-
ment of political beliefs. "249 But here he does suggest
that it is an achievement rooted in the stimulation
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provided by specific social contexts, "it seems that the
emergence of personal ideology in middle adolescence is
very much a social product, both in the sense that it
requires a strong stimulus from others and in the sense
that the content of ideology is derived from the political
tradition of groups the person moves in. "251 ^^^g evaluation
of this development is, however, quite disparaging: there
is no particular reason to promote this type of thinking,
because "^^n informal outlook is quite enough to hold
one's end up in a conversation, which, bar voting, is as
far as most adults ever involve themselves in politics . "252
The second type of development is implicit in the
resounding call for the liberation of political imagination
with which he concludes his book.
... a group representative of the mass of the
people is growing towards adult involvement without
sign of the kind of practical imagination which would
let its members generate plans of action to deal with
the political problems they recognize. Perhaps the
really important means of social control through
influence on the development of political ideas is
exactly this: that the society fails to liberate
because it does not stimulate political imagination.
The children trek around inside the boundaries of
conventional politics; they will not move outside
them without special stimulus; and until they do, the
established political order is safe - for want of
challenge, 253
I v;ould suggest that this last description be seen
as a developmental step beyond thinking in terms of a
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formal, self-conscious theory of society. A theory of
society, after all, is presumed by the capacity to
generate plans to deal with social problems. How could
one develop a plan to deal with a social problem without
any notion of the Institutional or structural causes of
the problem? And the features of formality and self-
consciousness which Connell finds distasteful may be
seen as features of an egocentric form of this phase of
development. Viewed in this way, however, Connell 's
evaluation of ideology v/ould be deficient. For it may be
that political imagination develops within and grows out
of such ideological thinking. Mow, then, could we reject
ideology in favor of an outlook which is sufficient merely
"to hold one's end up in a conversation"? One might, of
course, have qualms about widespread fixation of thought
at this level. But within the framework of a theory of
political education , we would be reminded to pick out the
desirable posstbill ties as well as the potential fixations
in a form of thought.
We can summarize our comments on Connell 's
jsignificant work by saying that he has laid the empirical
basis for a fruitful theory of political socialization.
It is an empirical basis for a theory because his work,
like Piaget's, is largely descriptive. A full explanatory
theory must be rooted in a historical understanding of the
202
specific structural features of society which shape each
child's development. And his argument goes astray, I
believe, at the critical point where we would recommend the
study of political education; the point where the child
recognizes the need for a theory of social structure and
social change in order to gain perspective on the
political world.
Conclusion
We can now rehearse the course of this study,
recapitulate its major points, and draw out some of the
implications for political life of this approach to the
study of political socialization and political education.
We began with the thesis that freedom in the modern
world is constrained by the failure of our institutions to
develop men's social and political imagination. Lacking the
imagination to break out of the conventional formulations
of the issues and alternatives of political life, many
are unable to connect their personal troubles with
possibilities for political action. Such imaginative
achievements are the fruit of a capacity to hypothesize,
to see the real world of social beliefs and practices as
one of many possible worlds.
The subject laid out for study was the development
of men's capacity to reason in political life, './e were
looking for a conceptual framework which could provide
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the basis for a theory of the development of political
thinking. Kost of the relevant literature in contemporary
political science has adopted a distinctive framework built
upon the concept of "political socialization". This frame-
work, however, and even the conceptualization of political
socialization, has been influenced by a conformity
perspective. This confor'.r.ity perspective on socialization
involves a way of looking at and talking about human develop-
ment that omits any important reference to the exercise
of judgment or to the growth of the capacity to reason.
Individual social development is the product of molding
forces and pressures.
Our critique of this conformity interpretation was
built upon the idea that the basic point of the tenn
socialization is to pick out those social processes which
lead to the capacity to use reason in social interaction,
to understand and care about others in a social order. A
tacit normative committment to some particular social
order is inevitable unless recognition is given to the
internal connection between socialization and the
developraent of human capacities. It is the social reasoning
capacities of the child which are particularly important
with the concept of socialization. Use of the concept
implies a normative cawnittment to rationality; and it is
this committment which is obscured by social scientists
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who view socialization as the name of a process of learning
any beliefs whatever. Socialization is not the name of a
process. Rather, it picks out activities and processes
which contribute to the achievement of the capacity to
reason and act rationally in social life. Political
socialization involves bringing people to the point of
being able to participate intelligently in a society's
political practices. Failure to build upon this point
about the connection between socialization and the use of
reason has led to two related developments in the political
science literature: a potentially harraful focus on
conformist behavior, and a failure to investigate the
character or conditions of the higher development of
political thinking.
We then suggested that the further possible develop-
ment of political reasoning can be understood as political
education. Political education covers those processes by
v/hich citizens develop a capacity for reflective political
thought. There is bound to be controversy about the concept
of education, because of its connection with the develop-
ment of reason. This capacity enters in different ways
into explication of different ideals of personal life,
such as "autonomy" or "duty". And as people choose and
seek to promote different ideals through political
education, the particular understanding of the achievements
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of reason bound up in their ideals will shape the use of
the notion of political education.
But whatever the personal ideals pursued, politically
educated citizens will be capable of recognizing others as
persons, as potentially capable of citizenship of the
highest level. Framing a critical view of the public
interest and acting on the basis of self
-accepted
principles will involve promoting the equal opportunity
of all to develop their capacities as citizens. The task
at hand then beco'.nes the exploration of those institutional
and structural transformations which will provide the
conditions for political education and a fully developed
citizenry. The researches of Piaget, Kohlberg and Connell
provide a basis for understanding and explanation of the
successes of political socialization and political
education. But V7e must continue to explore further the
various ways of refining our specifications of these
achievements and of building an explanatory framework
relevant to the ongoing socio-historical process.
V7e have argued that political education ought to
be promoted in complex and changing modern industrial
societies. Implicit in my discussion of Connellys work
was the idea that political education cannot easily take
hold until the full scope of social life faces the youth
with social and political responsibilities. The needs and
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possibilities for a politically responsive world can only
be recognized when people are made responsible for acting
in the midst of conflicting demands. It would seem to me
that the main course of political education must be in the
world beyond formal schooling. "In an industrial society,
the school for citizenship can only be in the midst of our
industrial edeavors, located wherever we perform our work
and practice our profession. "^^"^ What we require is insti-
tutions and forms of organization that are open and flex-
ible in the face of reasoned challenges to the habitual
way of doing things. Such institutions can promote,
sustain and provide arenas for the development of the
reflective capacities of the citizenry. And we also need
to press in the larger political world for policies and
policy issues which will highlight this politically
educative potential in our institutional life. To do this
would be to take seriously the challenge of political edu-
cation.
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APPENDIX I
Definition of Moral Stages^SS
I. Preconventional Level,
At this level the child is responsive to culturalrules and labels of good and bad, right or wrong, butinterprets these labels in terms of either the physical orthe hedonistic consequences of action (punishment; reward^exchange or favors), or in terms of the physical ^ower ofthose v7ho enunciate the rules and labels. The level isdivided into the following two stages
i
Stage Ij The punishment and obedience orientation.
The physical consequences of action determine its'^i^^ess
or badness regardless of the human meaning or value ofthese consequences. Avoidance of punishment and unquestion-ing deference to power are valued in their own right, notin terms of respect for an underlying moral order supportedby punishment and authority (the latter being stage 4),
Stage 2i The instrument-1 relativist orientation
.
Right action consists of that which inctrumentaily
satisfies one's own needs and occasionally the needs of
others. Human relations are viewed in terms like those of
the market place. Elements of fairness, of reci.procity,
and of equal sharing are present, but they are always
interpreted in a physical pragmatic way. Reciprocity is a
matter of "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours," not
of loyalty, gratitude, or justice.
II, Conventional Level,
At this level, maintaining the expectations of the
individual's family, group, or nation is perceived as
valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and
and obvious consequences. The attitude is not only one of
conformity to personal expectations and social order, but
of loyalty to it, of actively maintaining . supporting, and
justifying the order, and of identifying with the persons
or group involved in it. At this level, there are the
following two stages:
Stage 3 1 The interpersonal concordance or "crood boy
- nice girl** orientation . Good behavior is that which
pleases or helps others and is approved by them There is
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much conformity to stereotypical imacres of what is major-ity or "natural" behavior. Behavior is frequently judaedby intention - "he means well" becomes important for thefirst time. One earns approval by being "nica".
Stage 4: The "law and order" orientation
. There is
orientation toward authority, fixed rules, and the mainte-
nance of the social order. Right behavior consists ofdoing one's duty, showing respect for authority, and main-
taining the given social order for its own sake,
III. Postconventional, Autonomous, or Principled Level,
At this level there is a clear effort to define moral
values and principles v/hich have validity and application
apart from the authority of the groups or persons holding
these principles, and apart from the individual's own identi-
fication with these groups. This level again has two stages:
Stage 5 1 The social-contract legalistic orientation,
generally v/lth utilitarian overtcne So Right action tends
to be defined in terms of general individual rights, and
standards v/hich have been critically examined and agreed
upon by the whole society. There is a clear awareness of
the relativism of personal values and opinions and a corres-
ponding emphasis upon procedural rules for reaching
consensus. Aside from what is constitutionally and
democratically agreed upon, the right is a matter of
personal "valuer" and "opinions". The result is an emphasis
upon the "legal point of view", but with an emphasis
upon the possibility of changing law in terms of rational
considerations of social utility (rather than freezing it
in terms of stage 4 "law and order"). Outside the legal
realm, free agreement and contract is the binding element
of obligation^ This is the ''official" morality of the
American Government and Constitution,
Stage 6 : The universal ethical principle orientation .
Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord
with self-chosen ethical princioles appealing to loaical
comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These
principles are abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule,
the categorical imperative); they are not concrete moral
rules like the Ten Commandments. At heart, these are
universal principles of justice, of the reciprocity and
equality of human rights, and of respect for the dignity
of human beings as individual persons.
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APPENDIX II
Relations between Piaget Logical Stages
and Kohlberg Moral 3tages256
(all relations are that attainment of the logical stagesis necessary, but not sufficient, for attainment of the
moral stage)
Logical Stage Moral Stage
gymbolic. intuitive thought
Concrete operations. Sub-
stage 1
Categorical classification
Concrete operations 3ub~
stage 2
Reversible concrete thought
Formal operations . Sub-
stage 1
Relations involving the
Inverse of the reciprocal
Formal operations, Sub-
staae 2
Formal operations. Sub-
stage 3
Stage 0 » The good is what I
want and like.
Stage 1 > Punishment-obedience
orientation.
Stage 2 ; Instrumental hedo-
nism and concrete
reciprocity.
Stage 3 : Orientation to
interpersonal relat-
ions of mutuality
Stage 4 1 Maintenance of social
order, fixed rules,
and authority.
Stage 5A > Social contract,
utilitarian law-
making perspective.
Stage 5B t Higher law and
conscience orienta-
tion.
Stage 6
;
Universal ethical
principle orientation.
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) ^who also offers a justification for this type of" summary!
"The question arises as to whether the collection of
diverse cognitive traits listed in the proceeding sections
can be pulled together under some sort of unifying
succinct description. As would be anticipated, Piaget
himself considers them as multiple expressions of a
single, cognitive orientation rather than as a string of
unconnected attributes. Actually, one could do a fair job
of conveying this unity by the simple expedient of choosing
almost any one of the characteristics described and
showing how it implies each of the others .... Thus
the choice of a 'unifier* is to a large extent arbitrary."
(pp. 161-62) The purpose of the exposition which follows
is to add some flesh to the skeletal outline of claims
made by cognitive-developmental psychologists.
121, Schemas are approximately equivalent to concepts on
the level of representational intelligence,
122, The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget
. p. 159.
123, Ibid
. . p. 206.
124, Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence," p. 375.
125, Ibid . , p. 379.
126, Ibid.
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127. For exannple, Stage 2 is referred to one time as
"naive egoist" and another time as "instrumental relativist"
and a recent article divided stage 5 into 5A and 5B. This
summary draws on a number of Kohlberg's writinas» includina
the following! "Stage and Sequence"; "Education for Justice
i
A t^odern Statement of the Platonic View," in Nancy F,, and
Theodore R. Sizer (eds.). Moral Education (Cambridge:*
Harvard University Press, 1970); "From Is to Ought," in T,
Mischel {ed,)» Cpcrni tivg Development ?.nd Eoi stf^'^-.n1 or^xr
(New York: Academic'press
,
1971); "The Child as Moral
Philosopher," in Pnychology Today (September, 1968).
A wide range of the different aspects of moral Judgment
arc used by I\ohlberg in coding the different levels and
stages, (See "Prom Is to Ought," p. 166.) I have given
here only a general summary without distinguishing these
different aspects,
128, "Stage and Sequence," p, 391, See also Appendix II,
"Realtions Retv/een Piaget Logical Stages and Kohlberg
Moral Stages,"
Chapter VII
129, Sssays in the volume Cogni t ive Deve 1opme
n
t._ and
Eplstemology, edited by T. Mischel, have . been most useful
in this task. This volume compiles papers presented by
philosophers and psvcholosits on common themes relating
to developmental psychology.
130, This distinction, as elaborated in Chapter V, hinges
on the achievement of a critical perspective on the norms
of political life with political education,
131, Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought," pp. 152-53.
132, I am not arguing that the characterizations of
mature thought generated from interviews are self -justifying.
Rather as Kohlberg claims, the descriptions, distinctions,
characterizations and clarifications of both enterprises
will each aid the other at certain points. See Chapter
9 of this work,
133, "Stage and Sequence," p, 358.
134, Paraphrased from Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought,"
pp. 183-84,
135, Ibid , , p, 195,
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135, This is the title of one of the sections of Richard
Peters* assessment of Kohlberg's theorv, "Moral Develop-
ment: A Plea for Pluralism," in T. Mischel (ed.), Cognitive
Development and Spistemoloay
. p. 273,
137, "From Is to Ought," pp. 195-213,
138, William P, Alston, "Comments on Kohlberg's 'From
Is to Ought'," in T. rdschel (ed,). Cognitive Development
and Epistemology
. p, 273,
139, Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought," p, 215,
140, For recent critique, see Alasdair l^laclntyre, "What
Morality is Not," in Against th^ :f>elf -Images of the Age
(New Yorkj Schocken Books, 1971), pp, 9 6-108, ~For a
discussion of whether and how the question might be
decided between this "monarchical" view and other views,
see W. B, Gallie, "Liberal I-iorality and Socialist Morality,"
in Philosophy. Politics and Society 2nd Series (New York:
Barnes and Noble, 1962), pp, 116-133,
Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N, J, j Prentice-Hall,
1963), p. 36,
142. "Education and Human Development," in R, F, Dearden,
P, H, Hirst, and R, 3, Peters (eds,), Education and the
Development of Reason , p, 509, Peters expands on this
critique in his "Moral Develop'tient : A Plea for Pluralism,"
143. "What Morality Is Not,** pp. 99-100.
144. See R, S, Peters, "Reason and Habit: The Paradox of
Moral Education," in W. R. Niblett (ed,), Koral Education
in a Changing Society (London: Faber, 1963).
145. "Education and Human Development," p. 511.
146. Ibid , , p. 512,
147. The connection is elaborated by Peters in Ethics and
Education . He concludes: "To have the concept of a person
is to see an individual as an object of respect in a form
of life which is conducted on the basis of those principles
which are presupposition of the use of practical reason."
(p. 137)
148. Reprinted in Six Psycho logical Studies by Jean Piaget
(New York: Random House, 1967) edited by David Elkind. This
224
discussion is equally applicable to the interpretation ofKohlberg's work,
149, "Editor's Introduction" in Ibid., p. xiv.
150, Jean Piaqet, "The Mental Development of the Child,"
pp. 64-65,
151, "'A Recognizable PhilOvSophy of Education*: A
Constructive Critique," in Perspectives on Plowden (New
York: Humanities, 1969), p. 5.
152, Jean Piaqet, P].av, Dre?^'ns and Imitation in Childhood,
p. 207. Quoted in John Flavell, The Developmental Psychology
of Jean Piacret. p, Bl.
153, Quoted in Flavell, The Developmental Psychology
of Jean Piaget
, p, 223,
154, "The Mental Development of the Child," pp. 69-70,
Emphasis mine,
155, The notion of rationality advanced here depends on
a sense of the relative coherence of reasons in a belief
system as compared with previous or subsequent levels,
and not with an absolute standard tied to the truth-
value of beliefs. Dewey, in Human Nature and Conduct ,
say« that "reasonableness is in fact a quality of an
effective relationship among desires rather than a thing
opposed to desire," (p. 194.) Alasdair I'-acIntyre and Brian
Barry defend similar notions of rationality, put to the
service of different arguments. For Maclntyre, see
"Rationality and the Explanation of Action," and "Is a
Science of Comparative Politics Possible?" in Against the
Self-Imaaes of the Age . For Barry, see Political Argument
(London: "l^outledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), "Rationality
as Consistency," p. 3.
156, The characterization of these attitudes is drawn
from P. P. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment," in P. F,
Strav;son (ed.). Studies in the Philosoohv of Thought and
Action (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 71-
96.
157, Ibid . , p. 75.
158, B. Inhelder and J, Piaqet, The_Growth of logical
Tl->iniH nq from Childhood to Adolescence (New York i Basic
Books , 1958). Cited in Flavell, The Developmental Psychology
of Jean Piaget , p, 223,
225
159, Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment," p. 84,
160, I leave open here the question of how adequate
"reversibility" is as a characterization of all maturethought about the physical world. Certainly it apolies
more neatly in this sphere. But in what sense couldGallileo, his inquisitors aside, simply reverse histhought and truly arrive at a geocentric frame of reference?
161, "What is Involved in a Genetic Psychology?" in T.
Mischel (ed.). Cognitive Development and Koistemnl na^/.
*
p. 412.
162, Ibid , . p. 413,
163, Human Nature and Conduct , pp. 215-17,
164, See George Kateb, Utopia and Its Enemies (New York:
The Free Press, 1963), ~
165, "What is Involved in a Genetic Psychology?" p. 415.
Chapter VI I
I
166, For example Leonard Berkowitz*s criticism along
these lines of Piaget's theory of moral development in
surely connected with his definition of moral values as
"evaluations of action believed by Members of a given
society to be * right'," The Development of Motives and
Values in the Child (New Yorki Basic Books, 1964), p. 44,
167, "The Concept of 'Stages* in Psychological Development,"
in T, i-lischel (ed,). Cognitive Davelonr^ont and Epj.stemolocrv
p, 31, See also D, W, Hamlyn, "Logical and Psychological
Aspects of Learning," in R, S, Peters (ed, ), Thr> Concent
of Education , pp. 24-43,
168, See R, S, Peters, "Education and Human Development,"
pp, 514-15, This is part of v;hat is presumed by being
able to view oneself and others as persons, as sources of
assertion as to what there are reasons for doing. The
availability of reasons in public discourse presumes also
that agents are capable of using language symbolically
rather than merely instrumentally. On this distinction,
see Toulmin, "Concepts and the Explanation of Behavior,"
in T, Kdschel (ed,). Human Action: Conceptual and
Empirical Issues (New Yorki Academic Press, 1969), p, 81,
226
169. Peters has argued that most forms of meni-;,i <ncan be related to failures of rationaUty at this has?."'socially required level. See
-Mental Hell?h» as anEducational Aim." in T. H. B. Hollins (ed.), Mms ?nEducation, pp. 71-90, ^* — —
Piaget emphasizes a particular feature of sociallife
- peer group interaction - while Kohlbera of?ersa generalized notion of "role-taking opportunities^ asuniversal aspects of social life to be included in inaccount of mental development, and moral development inparticular. But it has been sugaested by W. P. Alstonthat such factors as these may need to be suppl^m-nt-dby the requirement that an internalization of rulesaccompanied by a special emotional intensity (such asdescribed by Freud as the establishing of the sup^reao)is necessary for moral dsvelooment. I do not intend toargue here whether the particular features identified bvPiaget and Kohlberg are wholly adequate. See Alston,Comments on Kohlberg's 'From Is to Ought*," pp. 278-79.
170 For a related argument, see P. H. Hirst, "Liberal
Education and the Nature of Knowledge," in R. F. Dearden,
P. H. Hirst, and R. 3. Peters (eds.). Education and the
Development of Reason .
The Developmental Psychology of jean Piaget, p. 36.
172. Ibid., p. 420.
173. See "Conclusion: Factors in Mental Development," in
The PsvcholoQv of the Child , by Jean Piaget and Baerbel
Inhelder
.
174. Ibid., pp. 154-56.
175. The fourth factor, "equilibration", is also of interest
and merits treatment I cannot give it here. T, Mischel sug-
gests it is a distinct type of theoretical notion, without
empirical content, which can be translated in logical terms
as something like a "desire to know". Alasdair Maclntyre
has discussed an asy.nmetry between the explanation offered
for rational and for irrational beliefs which might bear
on the status of "equilibrium" as an explanatory notion.
He says that an explanation of rational beliefs ends with
clarification of the norms of reasoning which governed
formation of the belief; and the history of those norms
can reveal only preconditions for their adoption, not
necessary and sufficient conditions. In any case, it may
be important to differentiate the status of "equilibration"
227
in relation to the other factors cited in an explanationSee T'laclntyre, "Rationalitv and the Explanation of JVction "
and T. Mischel, "Piageti Cognitive Conflict and l^otivation
of Thought," in T. Mischel (ed.), Cognitive Developrnent-.
and Eplstomoloav .
176, The Psvcholocrv of the Child , p. 156,
177. Ibid.
, p, 157,
178. "Stage and Sequence," p. 199,
179, Ibid., p. 398. Included, here, would be established
child-rearing practices,
180. There are, of course, other conditions, such as
maturation, physical experience, etc., and perhaps
linguistic capacity. And role-taking opportunities would
figure, likewise, in the development of thought about the
physical world,
181, "Stage and Sequence," p. 397. The attribution of
functional meaning to institutions hinges, it seems to me,
on the part they play in deveT oping and maintaining
minimal capacities for social life in a population. The
interpretation of functionalists like Marion Levy seems
to support this position. See Alex Inkeles, "Society,
Social Structure, and Child Socialization," in Clausen
(ed,), Socialization and Society , The task of reducing
all institutions to this "common functional meaning" has
not, however, been successfully carried through. And the
example Kohlberg chooses is ill-suited to his purpose
i
"As an example, while the detailed prescriptions of law
vary from nation to nation, the form of 'law* and the
functional value of its importance and regular maintenance
are much the same. in all nations with formal law." Ibid ,
Besides the obvious point that the class of "nations with
formal law" is not inclusive of all societies, it should
be noted that it is the principled level of morality, not
the minimal conventional level, which Kohlberg terms a
"law-making" perspective,
182, "Stage and Sequence," p, 388,
183. Ibid , , p, 384,
184, D. I<uhn, J. Langer, and L. Kohlberg, "The Development
of Formal-Operational Thought j Its Relation to Moral
228
Judgment," unpublished paper, 1971. citPrJ in t v
and C. GllUge.n, "The Adolef^ent a Phllosop^e^ Th^'
iilytT:i:lotl]' " ^°3tconventlonal iorldf-'SleSLs
185. "Stage and Sequence," pp. 399-400,
196. Ibid., p. 398.
187. Part of the problem with Kohlberg's (and otherdevelopmental psychologists') explanatory proqram is hisalmost exclusive focus on successful mental development.This may be partly due to the mode of cross-sectional
research on agG-qroups desiqned to elucidate achievements
rather than diagnose failures. It has been commented thatquite opposite to the Piaget-Kohlbarcr aooroach, Freud's
'
theory of mental life is primarily helpful in elucidatingthe character of failure in social and moral development.
Perhaps a s-^mthesis of these two theories would mitigate*
the weaknesses and bolster the strengths of each approach.
See David H, Jones, "Freud's Theory of Moral Conscience,"
Ellio^JSllY (1966), pp. 34-57; and R. S. Peters, "Freud's
Development in Relation to that of Piaget."
188. "Stage and Sequence," p. 399.
189. h slave, while limited as to the types of communica-
tion permissible with significant others in his environment,
has sufficient opportunity to grasp the idea of others. It
is in fact the mark of extreme oppression and degradation
that slaves may come to view themselves as their masters'
do-as objects, worthless in themselves, to be manipulated
by others,
190. See Turner, "Role-Taking i Process Versus Conformity,"
in A, Rose (ed.). Human Behavior and Social Processes
(Boston: Houghton Miff lin Co., 1962), pp. 20-40.
191. On "real wants" and want-probing institutions, see
John R, Champlin, "On the Study of Power," Politics and
Society (November, 1970), pp. 91-111. .
192. It seems also that the conceptual coherence attained
in the development of reason and the rationality of
social-institutional life would be interrelated.
193. "Concepts and Society," in Sociolocfical Theory and
Philosophical Analysis , D, Emmet and A. Maclntyre (eds.),
(New York I The Macmillan Co., 1970), p. 115.
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194, Ibid^, footnote 1,
i-i?c\l^r ^* '^^ historical parallel elucidated bv
of 'b^™' "^"'""^ ^"^^^"^ in Place"^
196. Ibid.
. p. 141.
197. Ibid_.
, p. 140.
198. Ibid. Presumably "better" means here - at least inpart - more coherent or consistent,
199. Ibid
. . p. 146.
200. "Stage and Sequence," p. 402.
201. Any appearance of a distinctively conservative
argument here ought to be dispelled by Pocock's reminder
»
".
. .
in confrontations between conservatives and radicalsthe awareness of history is by no means all on one side.If the abridgement of tradition is ideoloay, the criticism
of tradition may be present more complex than mere
transmission." "Time, Institutions, knd Action: An Essay
on Traditions and their Understanding," in P. King and
B. C. Parekh (eds.). Politics and S^^oerience (London:
Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 223. On this account,
Piaget's use of the term transmission to suggest an
historical dimension ought to be questioned.
202. "Stage and Sequence," p. 402.
203. Ibid.
204, "Moral Development: A Plea for Pluralism," p. 244.
205, "Stage and Sequence," pp. 396-97.
206, Ibid. , p. 395. Another interesting experimental
situation is the Milgram obedience test, in which "the
subject is faced with disobeying the rules formulated by
an authority fiaure who is seen as violating the rights
of another individual." "In this situation the experimenter
orders the subject to give an increasingly severe
electrical shock to a stooge 'learner' who has agreed to
participate in a nonsense-syllable learning experiment.
In this study, only the Stage 6 subjects would be expected
to question the authority's moral right to ask them to
230
inflict pain on another. Stage 5, "social contract"
subjects, would tend to feel the victim* s voluntaryparticipation with foreknowledge released them from
responsibility to him while their agreement to particioatecommitted them to comply. As expected, 75 per cent of
a small group (6) of Stage 6 subjects quit as comparedto only 13 per cent of the remaining 24 subjects at thelower moral stages." Ibid
.
207, N. Haan, M. B, Smith, and J, Block, "The floral
Reasoning of Young Adults » Political-Social Behavior,
Family Background and Personality Correlates," Journ algf_Personalitv and Social Psycholoav (November. 196817
pp. 183-201. *
208, e.g. Gerhard I^nski, Power and Privilege (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1966); Irving Goffman, "Status Consistency and
Preference for Change in Power Distribution, " American
Sociological Review 22 (1957), pp. 275-81; S. M, Li^t,
PQ^iticQl J^an (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1963),
209, Power and Privilege , p. 87, Emphasis mine. This is
similar to the example of "good" sociological theory
presented by Ralf Dahrendorf « n his essay "Sociology and
f^uman Nature," discussed above in Chapter 2, pp. 54-56,
210, "Stage and 3eq\ience," p. 396,
211, An example of the latter case, the igurramen among
Moraccan Berbers, is discussed by Gellner in "Concepts and
Society,
"
212, v;e have not considered the more specifically socio-
logical side of developmental theory - phylogenetic
development. For a suggestion in this regard, see I, Copi,
"The Growth of Concepts," in P, Henle (ed,). Language ,
ITiought and Culture (Ann Arbor, Mich, j The University of
Michigan Press, 1958), pp, 25-48,
Chapter IX
213. See Peters, "Education and the Educated l^n," in
P. H. Hirst, R. F. Dearden, and R. S. Peters (eds.).
Education and the Development of Reason .
214, Strictly speaking, it is a conceptual truth that
education is desirable. But this is not to say that in all
231
circumstances the promotion of educational actlvih^oo .desirable. The value criterion of education estlbU^L^"Rrima facie case that education should be oromo^ed .n
^
ofTJll ^^%<^--i-^ility of promoting'thrd:v;iop.nent
SLf P ^''^ political thought is called for becluse
T
want to argue that political education is desirable forniost people in modern indnr.trial socijrM^. ^
caealinq hare with Oakeshotfs essav, "PoliticalEducation," in rj^onalism in._Pnlj^P., For the Umitedpurposes of this section it~;:7iri~t~e necessary toconsider Oakeshotfs other writings,
216. "The Study of Politics in a University." inRationaliser in PoH^.'r^e>^ p, 304,
217. Oakeshott, "Political Education," p. 128.
218. Ibid
. . p. 133.
219. Ibid
. . p. 122.
220. Ibid
. . p. 122, Emphasis added,
221. Ibid
. . p. 117.
222, Ibid
. Emphasis added.
223. The peculiar way in v^hich Oakeshott inserts the term
"premeditation" into his discussion of ideology might
lead one to believe he has in mind an analogy with the
legal definition of murder: ideology is the wrongful
killing of tradition with knowledge" aforethought
. "The
contnetion we are investigating is that attending to the
arrangements of a society can begin with a premeditated
ideology ("Political Education", p. 118.)
224. See Richard Peters, "Michael Oakeshotfs Philosophy
of Education," in P. King and B, C, Parekh (eds,).
Politics and Experience , pp. 60-61,
225. "Time, Institutions and Action: An Essay on Traditions
and their Understanding," p, 223,
226. Oakeshott, "Political Education," p. 122.
227. This discussion draws on P, F, Strawson's treatment
of individual ideals in "Social Morality and Individual
Ideal."
232
228. Strawson does not restrict himself in this way.
229. Cf. Strawson, "Social Morality and Individual Ideal."
l^l: 'T'^^ i^"^"" argument is developed from a readina
fn J R^'p. • ^"i^^^r"' "^^li^^tion, ideals and ^Ui?v,"i . . Pinnock and J. W. Chapman (eds.). Political andLegal QhllHation (New York, Atherton, 1970) ; pp. 89-1 iff-
231. By "stable contexts" I do not mean to imply anabsence of political conflict. ^,^at I intend to conv^vis that one's pattern of life cannot be constantly und^rthreat i:rom outside and uncontrolled forces; and that
at a minimum one's life and physical well-being cannot bein constant danger.
232. Melbourne: Melbourne University press, 1971, The
title was "chosen for the analogy with Piaget's celebrated
works on the child's construction of the physical world "
(p. 3)
233. Connell, The Child's Construction of Politlr?^. po.
1 and 3. " ~
234. See A. Campbell et al
.
The American Voter (New Yorkt
V/iley, 1964); and M, K. Jennings and R. Miemi, "The
Transmission of Political Values from Parent to Child,"
Aturican Political Science Review 63 (March, 1969), pp. 5-25,
237. Ibid., p. 5.
238. See The Child's Construction of Politics , pp. 65-84.
239. Ibid.
, p. 67.
240. Ibid., p, 81.
241. Ibid
, , p. 72, Citation from C. J, Friedrich, Man and
Kls Cover nraent (Mew York, 1963), p. 218,
242. Ibid., p. 83.
243. Ibid.
. p. 72.
244. Ibid
. , p. 81.
245. Ibid. , pp. 233 and 234.
233
246. Ibid.
,
f p. 235.
247. Ibid.
* P* 90,
248. Ibid.
-
p. 89.
249. Ibid. p. 91.
250. Ibid.
• p. 93.
251. Ibid, p. 91.
252. Ibid, p. 91.
253, p. 240.
254, Kariel, The Promise of Politics
, p. 63,
Appendices
255, Kohlberg, "Fronn Is to Ought," pp. 164-65.
256, L. Kohlberg and C. Gilligan, "The Adolescent as a
Philosopher," p. 1072.
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